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January 29, 2019 
 
  
The Honorable Betsy DeVos 
Secretary of Education 
Care/Of Brittany Bull 
United States Department of Education 
400 Maryland Avenue, SW 
Room 6E310 
Washington, District of Columbia 20202 
  
Re: Docket ID ED-2018-OCR-0064 
  
Dear Secretary DeVos:  
  
On behalf of the State University of New York, I write to offer comments in opposition 
to the above-referenced Proposed Regulations under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972. Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,1 I ask that each comment herein be 
carefully considered and responded to before Final Regulations are issued.  
 
As a general matter, the State University of New York believes that the vast majority of 
the Proposed Regulations exceed the Department’s authority and include requirements that are 
contrary to the evidence, are inconsistent with other federal and New York State law, and 
represent a marked change in approach from the position of the Department during prior 
Democratic and Republican administrations. The State University of New York therefore is 
strongly opposed to these Proposed Regulations and asks the Department to withdraw them from 
consideration. 
 
The State University of New York (SUNY) is the largest comprehensive system of higher 
education in the United States, with 64 college and university campuses located within 30 miles 
of every home, school, and business in the state. As of Fall 2018, nearly 425,000 students were 
enrolled in a degree program at a SUNY campus. In total, SUNY served 1.4 million students in 
credit-bearing courses and programs, continuing education, and community outreach programs in 
the 2017-18 academic year. SUNY oversees nearly a quarter of academic research in New York. 
Its students and faculty make significant contributions to research and discovery, contributing to 
a $1.6 billion research portfolio. There are 3 million SUNY alumni worldwide, and one in three 
New Yorkers with a college degree is a SUNY alum. 
 
SUNY has invested significantly in the prevention of, and response to, sexual and 
interpersonal violence on campus and in the community. University leadership and staff have 
                                                          
1 5 U.S.C.A. § 706. 
1
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traveled to the White House, testified before the United States Senate, and advised executive and 
legislative leadership and staff at both the federal and state levels, as they consider legislation 
governing institutional response to harassment and violence both domestically and while on 
study abroad. In 2014, New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo met with the SUNY Board of 
Trustees to discuss the issue of sexual assault on campus. The resulting Working Group2 and 
uniform policies3 were widely lauded as the most comprehensive, forward-thinking, and 
balanced in the nation, and formed the basis for legislation introduced by the Governor. That 
legislation, Education Law Article 129-B (referred to as “Enough is Enough”), was passed by 
wide bipartisan majorities. It passed unanimously in the State Senate, with a Republican 
majority, and with all but four votes in favor in the State Assembly. SUNY proudly worked with 
New York State’s Education Department and other stakeholders to develop regulations 
implementing pieces of the legislation,4 as well as a guidance document to assist campuses in 
implementing the law,5 and partnered with the New York State Department of Health and State 
Coalitions to develop a model Memorandum of Understanding for campuses and external 
programs.6 SUNY obtained a federal grant to translate important policies under the law into 120 
written languages and American Sign Language, and made those translations freely available for 
download.7 
 
On the national level, we regularly work with Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand and New 
York delegation Members of the House of Representatives from both parties to assist them in 
considering and drafting legislation in this area. SUNY was the first University to endorse the 
Campus Accountability and Safety Act, bi-partisan legislation introduced in each House of 
Congress. 
 
After passage of the Violence Against Women Act amendments to the Clery Act, SUNY 
developed a free 93-page resource8 to assist colleges and universities in compliance. Issued 
within weeks of the Regulations, it was downloaded tens of thousands of times before the 
Department issued an updated Clery Act Handbook. The new law called for, among other things, 
access to existing “visa and immigration resources.” In response, SUNY brought in partners and 
developed a Visa and Immigration Resource to assist campuses in providing plain-language 
information. That resource has likewise been translated into 120 written languages and made 
                                                          
2 https://system.suny.edu/sexual-violence-prevention-workgroup/.  
3 https://system.suny.edu/media/suny/content-assets/documents/sexualviolenceprevention/SUNY-Policies-Sexual-
Violence-Prevention-Response-Updated-Jun2015.pdf. 
4 Part 48 Annual Aggregate Data Reporting by New York State Institutions of Higher Education Related to Reports 
of Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Stalking and Sexual Assault, NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT 
(Aug. 31, 2017), available at https://www.regents.nysed.gov/common/regents/files/917brca4.pdf. 
5 Complying with Education Law Article 129-B, NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (June 2, 2016), 
available at http://www.nysed.gov/common/nysed/files/article-129-b-guidance.pdf.  
6 https://system.suny.edu/sexual-violence-prevention-workgroup/mou-model/.  
7 SUNY SAVR 129-B Translations, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, Funded in part with a grant through the New 
York State Department of Health. https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc-
Ere2v0QmQxEy_GFhvSIcdqBQwbdme_xvKUIptvkTtF8Y0g/viewform?c=0&w=1.  
8 Policy and Programming Changes Pursuant to the Campus SaVE Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act, 
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK (JULY 2014 AND JAN. 2015), HTTPS://SYSTEM.SUNY.EDU/MEDIA/SUNY/CONTENT-
ASSETS/DOCUMENTS/GENERALCOUNSEL/SUNY-VAWA-GUIDANCE-2014.PDF.  
2
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available for download and customization at no cost.9 SUNY partnered with the City University 
of New York (CUNY) to develop SPARC,10 an online introduction to prevention training that is 
likewise made available for download and customization by colleges and universities at no 
cost.11 SUNY partnered with the One Love Foundation12 to develop the largest installation of a 
dating violence prevention program in the nation, directly reaching over 20,000 students in a one 
month awareness program and reaching thousands more via social media.13 SUNY collaborates 
with the New York State Office of Victim Services and many partners on SUNY’s Got Your 
Back, a program to educate college students in violence reduction while assembling comfort bags 
for those who present to hospitals, rape crisis programs, domestic violence shelters, and law 
enforcement. To date, tens of thousands of bags have been assembled while educating thousands 
of students and community members.14 
 
While we appreciate the time and effort the Department has expended in researching and 
proposing a series of regulations on this critically important issue, aside from certain minor 
technical areas, the State University of New York must respectfully oppose the implementation 
of these Proposed Regulations in their current form. 
 
In Part I of SUNY’s comments, we address the Secretary’s authority to regulate Title IX, 
which falls under 20 U.S.C. 1681, et seq., in the introductory regulatory language of proposed 34 
CFR Part 106 et seq. In offering comments regarding this authority under 20 U.S.C. 1681, et 
seq., we highlight areas of alignment, while raising major concerns about the significant 
economic, legal and regulatory problems evinced within the Proposed Regulations, to provide 
the Department with sound guidance about the appropriate path forward. Then, in Part II, we 
proceed to comment on each section of the Proposed Regulations in the order they are proposed. 
We identify specific areas within the Proposed Regulations that must be reconsidered or 
removed to comply with the text and purpose of Title IX. Preceding our formal comments, we 
begin with an Executive Summary. 
  
                                                          
9 Immigration and Visa Information In Response To Sexual & Interpersonal Violence, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW 
YORK, Funded in part with a grant through the New York State Department of Health. 
https://www.suny.edu/violence-response/Visa-and-Immigration-Resource/.  
10 Sexual and interpersonal violence Prevention And Response Course. 
11 SPARC: Sexual and Interpersonal Violence Prevention & Response Course Online Training, STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK AND CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, Funded in part with a grant through the New York State 
Department of Health. https://system.suny.edu/sexual-violence-prevention-workgroup/online-training/.  
12 https://www.joinonelove.org/.  
13 https://www.suny.edu/y4y/.  
14 https://www.suny.edu/gotyourback/.  
3
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Executive Summary 
 
The Department of Education’s (the Department) Proposed Regulations pursuant to Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 include minor technical areas with which the 
University agrees. However, the vast majority of the Proposed Regulations exceed the 
Department’s authority and include requirements that are contrary to the evidence, inconsistent 
with other federal and New York State law, and represent a marked change in approach from the 
position of the Department during prior administrations (both Democratic and Republican). The 
State University of New York (SUNY), therefore, after much consideration, must oppose these 
Proposed Regulations and ask the Department to withdraw them from consideration.  
 
SUNY does not believe the Department has made a sufficient showing that it has the 
authority to propose important aspects of these regulations under Title IX itself. The Department 
has not offered any evidence that there has been any disparate impact on Respondents in the 
conduct process, the party of interest for the Department in proposing these new rules, and has 
not shown that there is discrimination to be redressed on the basis of sex. The Department clearly 
has the right to regulate under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 in a way that 
addresses unequal treatment on the basis of sex. But there must be some evidence that the 
regulation is promulgated to address inequality or discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Undoubtedly, through its request for comments, the Department has received references to 
dozens of studies of populations in college, secondary education, and society-wide showing a 
clear and statistically significant difference in the percentage of males versus females who are 
subject to sexual harassment, sexual violence and unequal treatment on the basis of sex.  
 
Approximately 1 in 5 females report in climate surveys that they have experienced non-
consensual sex in their college years, while 1 in 13 males report the same, with transgender 
students generally reporting even higher rates. Simply analyzing identified male and female 
experiences with harassment shows that it has a differential impact on the basis of gender. 
Therefore, the Department would be on fairly solid ground requiring educational institutions to 
offer resources aimed at ameliorating the impact of such discrimination for which prevalence 
differs so much by gender, and requiring institutions to take it seriously and pursue 
investigations and adjudications to sanction those who violate the law and policy. That would be 
tied to serious, published and peer-reviewed studies that consistently show a differential impact 
in victimization and impact between genders.  
 
Conversely, the Department presents no such published study showing that a complete 
lack of due process, traditional due process owed under case law, or the new maximized due 
process envisioned in these Proposed Regulations differently impacts people on the basis of sex. 
After careful research, we can find no such study. The Department has not shown or referenced 
any evidence that due process differences affect people differently on the basis of sex. Plainly, 
the Department now offers a mistaken understanding of its own regulatory system surrounding 
Title IX. Its Proposed Regulations distort the beneficial impact that Title IX has had on 
protecting Reporting Individuals and ensuring a fair process for all parties in campus disciplinary 
proceedings. The detailed due process provisions of the Proposed Regulations may or may not be 
a good idea. But the Department does not have jurisdiction to mandate “good ideas” or “best 
4
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practices.” It is not a consulting firm. The Department only maintains jurisdiction under this 
Civil Rights law to regulate in a way that reduces discrimination on the basis of sex. 
 
Even conceding for the sake of argument that a Respondent, if treated differently than 
similarly situated individuals of another sex, could be a victim of discrimination on the basis of 
sex, the Department still must show that the current system is actually allowing discrimination 
on the basis of sex. The Department has not shown that Respondents are predominantly male. It 
may assume so based on the few conversations it held with activists in preparation for drafting 
these Proposed Regulations, but there is no actual evidence this is so. Further, even if most 
Respondents were male, there is no evidence that they are held responsible more or less often 
than females, that their sanctions are greater or lesser than females, or that these additional due 
process requirements would change that. The Department must regulate within its jurisdiction. 
There is no evidence here that the current system of investigating and adjudicating sexual 
harassment and violence leads to disparate treatment on the basis of sex. There is no evidence 
that these Proposed Regulations would lessen such disparate impact. The Department simply 
does not have jurisdiction to regulate in this way and cannot do so without some evidence that 
this is not a solution in search of a problem but an evidence-based method of addressing a 
problem of unequal treatment on the basis of sex.  
 
SUNY also must oppose these Proposed Regulations because they fail the standards of 
the President’s Executive Order 13771. The cost savings the Department proposes are inaccurate 
and exaggerated, and the Department should have to identify two deregulatory actions for every 
new regulation in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. There is no actual cost savings here; 
instead, it is a cost shift that is a result of fewer cases being investigated under Title IX but still 
being investigated and adjudicated under the Clery Act and state law. The due process 
obligations will increase actual costs within Title IX investigations and will lead to significant 
additional litigation. Further, the proposals will drive up costs for both the institutions and their 
students.  
 
SUNY also does not believe the Department has followed the Administrative Procedure 
Act, and thus its actions will not withstand judicial scrutiny. Only a few days ago, a lawsuit 
against the Secretary of Commerce overruled his bid for a 2020 census question because the 
courts ruled that the Secretary had clear pretexts for his actions and ignored public opinion, facts 
and evidence. As the January 2019 decision in State of New York v. Department of Commerce 
shows, courts will look beyond the “presumption of regularity” afforded Executive Branch 
officials where they cannot escape the conclusion that the agency’s stated rationale was not the 
true reason for its actions, and may look both within the administrative record and outside of it to 
identify if the stated reason for acting was just a pretext masking an unstated goal. Over 50,000 
comments have been submitted so far to the Department, and the overwhelming majority are in 
opposition to this regulatory action the Department seeks to take. From its own statements since 
coming into office, Department leadership decided what they wanted the regulations to cover, 
and then built a document to suit.  
 
In addition, while the regulations state that the Department considered First Amendment 
Constitutional freedoms, the Department impinges on an institution’s academic freedom, which 
is protected under the First Amendment. SUNY is unable to find any case that says the First 
5
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Amendment or other Constitutional rights automatically give way just because the action by the 
federal government is declared to be under the Spending Clause. The due process elements of the 
Proposed Regulations abrogate the rights of colleges to determine their process at a local level, in 
a shared governance approach with the communities they serve, by setting detailed and 
comprehensive processes before the institution can determine whether someone credibly accused 
of harassing or assaulting another member of the institution’s community can be sanctioned or 
limited in their ability to continue harassing or assaulting the Reporting Individual or other 
community members. It is clear that these Proposed Regulations rescind the common principles 
of local control, and micro-regulate a process that many institutions have put significant research 
and resources into creating.  
 
SUNY also believes that the Department’s Proposed Regulations significantly abridge 
Federalism principles enshrined within the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. New York 
will acutely feel this impact as it has the nation’s most comprehensive state law to combat sexual 
assault, dating violence, domestic violence and stalking within college communities. New York 
also has detailed laws to combat sexual harassment in the workplace, and the Department’s 
Proposed Regulations interfere with many laws a state is charged with implementing under the 
State’s police powers. As the Department alluded to in its Directed Questions, there is a 
significant impact on New York’s labor sector regarding these requirements in the Proposed 
Regulations. The Proposed Regulations themselves conflict with New York City labor laws, 
New York State labor laws, and cause significant issues with collective bargaining agreements. 
 
SUNY also has specific issues with multiple sections of the Proposed Regulations. By 
pulling in the Clery Act definition of “sexual assault,” the Regulations would create process 
conflicts depending on the type of report. Essentially, the Department is creating a different 
process for sexual harassment including sexual assault that is not consistent with existing statute 
and regulations covering that same assault. Institutions will have to choose between violating the 
Clery Act, and risking fines and funding, or violating the new Title IX regulations and risking 
funding and having their determinations overturned (but only in favor of Respondents). It is also 
clear that the notice provisions are far more onerous than what is provided to someone under the 
Clery Act or even someone questioned by police. Campus conduct processes have never been 
treated as a stand in for criminal adjudications, and that has not changed.  
 
SUNY also has specific issues with the way the Department structured proposed section 
106.44, regarding an institution’s response to sexual harassment under Title IX. Previously, the 
geography to which campus conduct processes applied did not just include incidents within the 
United States. By narrowing the geography of where institutions’ codes of conduct apply, it 
essentially excludes recourse for students on study abroad programs sanctioned by institutions 
and creates significant issues with campus management and supervision of Greek letter 
organizations. The Department’s treatment of geography within these Proposed Regulations is 
also in direct conflict with the Congressional intent of the 2013 Violence Against Women Act 
amendments to the Clery Act.  
 
SUNY also takes issue with the Department’s partial “safe harbor” because it is written in 
such a way that would significantly elevate the Respondent’s rights over the Reporting 
Individual when due process balancing dictates that each are to be treated equally in a conduct 
6
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process. SUNY also raises concerns with the unintended consequences of the mandated 
investigation of an Accused when there are two or more complainants due to the damage it will 
do to the rights of Reporting Individuals and Respondents. The Department includes higher 
disclosure requirements that would force an institution to reveal the names of all those who had 
made a complaint to date even if those who disclosed the incidents do not wish to participate in 
the process. SUNY also objects to the “emergency removal” provision the Department has 
provided for in these proposed regulations. Again, there is a lack of clarity on procedure that can 
be interpreted to modify current college and university procedure.  
 
SUNY also finds that many areas in proposed section 106.45, which addresses the 
process for formal grievance procedures for sexual harassment, lack clarity and engage in cost 
shifting on institutions and students. The Department did not define “bias” in one area, which 
could lead to significant legal challenges on frivolous bases and extend the time before formal 
hearings are completed. SUNY also found that there is no definition of “delay solely caused by 
administrative needs,” which could lead to needless challenges. SUNY can think of multiple 
situations in which something may have to be postponed for minimal time, and if these Proposed 
Regulations go into effect, this could cause confusion and challenges. The Department also puts 
bounds around which standard of evidence may be used (preponderance of the evidence versus 
clear and convincing evidence), where other authority, such as the Clery Act, are neutral on such 
choice. The Department also regulates K-12 institutions and institutions of higher education 
differently to a point that ignores the balance of due process required for each type of institution 
and ignores the level of quasi-property rights afforded to each student at each different level.  
 
SUNY has found that the way the Proposed Regulations treat cross-examination and 
“advisor of choice” are structurally defective and completely obliterate any cost savings the 
Department believes it will find by implementing these provisions. Contrary to what the 
Department stated only a few years ago, it now seeks to add significantly to the Clery Act 
“advisor of choice” language by essentially requiring equal representation in all forms in all 
campus conduct proceedings, which would include attorneys, and mandate cross-examination. 
The cross-examination mandate would harm both Reporting Individuals and Respondents 
because if they do not participate, all their previous testimony and submissions will be excluded. 
While the impact on Reporting Individuals is obvious, the Department likely did not realize the 
harm to Respondents who may face analogous criminal charges and are advised not to participate 
in cross-examination.  
 
SUNY also finds that allowing access to evidence on which the institution does not 
intend to rely will cause significant privacy and confidentiality issues if not defined further. The 
Department’s timeline for an official investigative report is also practically unworkable because 
institutions and students expect that the conduct process will be resolved in a timely and 
expedient manner. This requirement would cause an onerous burden on institutions, Reporting 
Individuals and Respondents alike, and would cause undue delay in resolving conduct issues 
while adding little to Title IX’s core legislative mission of reducing sex-based barriers to 
educational access. SUNY also urges the Department to revisit its language regarding appeals, as 
it causes undue confusion and changes the nature of what may be appealed for against common 
practice across the country.  
 
7
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SUNY and its campuses care deeply about preventing and responding to harassment and 
assault in a way that makes education as accessible as possible, treats crimes and violations 
seriously, and offers all due process required under the Constitution, statute, and case law prior 
to assigning a sanction to a person found responsible for a violation. In New York, nearly half of 
Article 129-B, the longest and most comprehensive state law on point to date, is devoted to due 
process and fair process. That is a critical part of the approach. Institutions must always try to 
“get it right” when it comes to sanctioning a student. But the law was balanced. It also includes 
provisions on consent, amnesty for Reporting Individuals and Bystanders disclosing violence at a 
time they were using drugs or alcohol, clear language around confidentiality, mandatory biennial 
climate surveys to understand the state of the issue, and clear language about available resources 
for all parties. Such a balanced approach has been lauded in New York and looked to elsewhere.  
 
A balanced approach helps a policy change stand the test of time. No one is calling for 
drastic changes to the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA), to the VAWA Amendments 
to the Clery Act, or to the Negotiated Regulations issued by the Department under that law. Here 
in New York, no one is calling for repeal of Education Law Article 129-B. These laws were 
drafted with significant input from stakeholders, and with careful consideration to balance and 
protect the rights of all interested parties while still addressing important governmental interests. 
 
We urge the Department to re-open consideration of these rules and issue new Proposed 
Regulations that balance the rights of the accused with the rights of students to access K-12 and 
higher education when faced with harassment and violence. This is a moment where the entire 
country is considering issues of harassment in employment and education, athletics, the private 
sector, and government. The Department has an opportunity to lead a national conversation 
about a balanced approach to harassment and violence in education, to align with laws on the 
books, both federally and in laboratory states, and to establish an approach that future 
administrations leave undisturbed because, even if not perfect, it is fair, balanced, and flexible to 
all different institutions to respond in appropriate ways.  
8
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I. 20 U.S.C. 1681, et seq.: The Proposed Regulations Raise the Cost of Title IX 
Compliance for Reasons Unrelated to Redressing Discrimination “On the Basis 
of Sex” and In Violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative 
Procedure Act 
 
For the reasons detailed below, we do not find in current law the Department’s 
jurisdiction to regulate in this precise way. The Department’s proposed due process procedures 
violate longstanding precedent requiring balance in due process, and will have unintended 
consequences to the detriment of both students who report harassment and those who are 
accused. The specific provisions will make the investigation and adjudication of harassment and 
violence on our campuses more complex, more difficult, more expensive and far less effective. 
 
A. SUNY Supports Proposals to Align Title IX Procedures with Existing 
Federal and State Law and Judicial Authority 
 
Before addressing the myriad reasons we believe parts of these regulations exceed the 
Department’s authority, are out of concert with other statutory and regulatory authority as well as 
case law, and will make the investigation and adjudication of sexual harassment and sexual 
violence less efficient, more error-prone, and less equitable for our students, we wish to point out 
a few areas where we strongly agree with the Department. 
 
We applaud the Department’s requirement that cases be investigated and adjudicated by 
those sufficiently trained in important concepts central to these investigations, including an 
emphasis on the neutral role of institutions, and who are not taught with materials that use sex 
stereotypes.15 The 2013 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Amendments to the Clery Act 
and New York State Education Law Article 129-B similarly require comprehensive training, and 
SUNY has committed itself to developing and promulgating training materials to help its 
campuses, and fellow educational institutions, continuously improve their response to, and 
prevention of, sexual harassment and sexual assault. SUNY System Administration and Student 
Conduct Institute16 leadership and staff have hosted hundreds of live and digital trainings over 
the last decade. Our campuses have hosted thousands of such trainings as well. We recognize 
that, as with any offering of due process and fair process before a government action, the level of 
training and preparation is not uniform at all institutions across the country. We hear and support 
the continued call of the Department to raise the capacity of professionals at the higher education 
and K-12 levels, and SUNY will continue to develop training materials and resources that can be 
accessed at no cost or very low cost to help fellow institutions meet this need. 
 
                                                          
15 U.S. Department of Education, Title IX Proposed Regulations, Vol. 83, Fed. Reg., pp. 61473, 61479, 61483, 61497 
(Nov. 29, 2018) (hereinafter referred to as “Title IX Proposed Regulations”). 
16 The SUNY Student Conduct Institute (SUNYSCI) is a joint Project of the SUNY Student Conduct Association 
(SUNYSCA), SUNY Title IX Coordinators Association (STIXCA), and Office of General Counsel. It provides in-
depth live and digital training to student conduct officials, hearing officers, Title IX officials and other college 
personnel in due process, trauma-informed investigations and adjudications, questioning and weighing of evidence, 
and other crucial best practices in the investigation and conduct process that comply with relevant case law, Title IX 
guidance, the Clery Act, and New York State Education Law 129-B. Material for training is created with a careful 
emphasis on case law, statutory requirements, best practices, and eschewing sex stereotypes. As of the date of this 
letter, the Institute had trained well over 600 people in its first half-year of operation. https://system.suny.edu/sci/.  
11
et al.: Panel: Title IX Revisited
Published by The Keep, 2019
   
 
Page 12 of 82 
 
In considering training, while we applaud the Department’s requirements for training 
those that work on the formal grievance process, we would note that the Proposed Regulations 
are devoid of any training requirements or professional expectations for staff that work on the 
newly elevated informal process. While SUNY does not use an informal process to address cases 
of sexual assault (we may use informal processes in certain harassment cases, depending upon 
the nature of the conduct and other factors), we acknowledge that some institutions may choose 
to do so based upon the imprimatur of the Department. Thus, we urge the Department to set 
minimum standards for training in that area as well, so that students are served by individuals 
with the highest level of training, regardless of whether they go through a formal or informal 
process. 
 
We support the Department’s efforts to standardize the importance of the role of the Title 
IX Coordinator at a high level and to require institutions to provide all students and community 
members with relevant contact information for the Coordinator. SUNY, through its SAVR 
(Sexual Assault and Violence Response) Resource, available at http://response.suny.edu, 
provides community members with 24/7, anonymous access to relevant on and off campus 
resources including counseling, health, and wellness; Title IX; University Police/Public Safety; 
anonymous reporting mechanisms; and disability services on campus. We also provide access to 
all known law enforcement, medical, rape crisis, legal resources, and resources specific to 
immigrant Reporting Individuals17 through that same resource. We would happily share this 
resource with the Department and other institutions of education to assist them in providing 
similar information to their students and community members. 
 
We also thank the Department for acknowledging that its regulations may not violate 
rights protected by the Constitution.18 As the Department noted in its Preamble, the previous 
Title IX guidance was criticized because it “removed reasonable options for how schools should 
structure their grievance processes to accommodate each school’s unique pedagogical mission, 
resources, and educational community.”19 We appreciate the Department’s acknowledgment of 
the knowledge and experience of educational institutions and agree that institutions are more 
often in a better place to directly speak with students and community members about how best to 
meet the challenge of preventing and responding to harassment and violence on campus and in 
the community.  
 
While we do not necessarily agree with this determination on policy grounds and believe 
it will cause significant confusion with Title VII, state laws on employee harassment, and case 
law traditionally interpreting Title IX, we acknowledge that the Department likely has 
“prosecutorial discretion” to limit the occasions upon which it will investigate and find an 
institution to have violated Title IX. In these Proposed Regulations, the Department has 
significantly limited what disclosures are covered under Title IX and, while we again do not 
agree on policy grounds, we acknowledge that the Department may expend limited resources in a 
                                                          
17 While the Department uses multiple terms to refer to the person impacted by harassment or violence, we are using 
the neutral term Reporting Individual that is outlined and defined in New York State Education Law Article 129-B. 
N.Y. EDUC. L. 6439(9). 
18 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61495. 
19 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61464. 
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broad or narrow manner. We appreciate the Department’s acknowledgment that a 60-day 
timeline (even if not enforced strictly) poses significant challenges for campuses, especially in 
complex cases, and all parties are better served by a flexible standard that requires institutions to 
take these cases seriously and address them in a reasonably prompt manner that may be extended 
for good cause (which we note should include administrative need),20 but that does not 
shortchange the parties and the need to gather facts and apply law and policy. 
 
B. This Regulation Fails the Standards of Executive Order 13771 
 
The Proposed Regulations should not be exempt from Executive Order 13771,21 as the 
cost savings are inaccurate and exaggerated. Therefore, the Department should identify two 
deregulatory actions for each additional regulation added herein.22 While SUNY supports the 
proposals outlined above to the extent they align with existing state and federal law and 
constitutional norms of due process, we have significant legal and policy concerns with the 
remainder of the Proposed Regulations. First, we disagree that the proposals will lower the 
administrative costs of investigating and adjudicating claims of sexual harassment and sexual 
violence. Closer examination of the cost-shifting that will occur under the Proposed Regulations 
reveals that the Department’s cost estimates are fanciful, and not based on the actual 
administrative costs to recipients and the social costs to Reporting Individuals.  
 
Preliminarily, we note that by aligning the standards of actionable harassment for agency 
action with the standards used by courts for money judgments, there is no longer any advantage 
for Reporting Individuals to seek agency-level redress from the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 
over the court system, especially since they will not (as has traditionally been the case) be able to 
obtain money damages beyond actual expenses through OCR.23 The burden of showing a Title 
IX violation in their specific case through the administrative or judicial process will align. While 
this will potentially save resources for OCR with fewer Reporting Individuals able to 
successfully seek an investigation of Title IX violation claims, and perhaps in a small way save 
resources that institutions would spend going through an OCR program review, this savings will 
be eclipsed by the funds institutions will expend to defend the same accusations of Title IX 
violations in Article III or state courts. 
 
Additionally, while OCR’s jurisdiction to find an institution in violation of Title IX for 
failing a Reporting Individual would all but disappear for most college campuses, Respondents 
would maintain robust rights for administrative review, and even the right to have their 
determination overturned, through the OCR administrative process with the new rights the 
Proposed Regulations award only to Respondents. We believe nearly all Respondents found in 
violation will automatically appeal to OCR to have their findings overturned since such an 
appeal is free and can only help their position. This will significantly increase the effort and 
expenditures of recipients when compared with the far less expensive task of responding to an 
                                                          
20 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61497. 
21 Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 FR 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/03/2017-02451/reducing-regulation-and-controlling-regulatory-
costs. 
22 A review of the plain language of the requirements reveals nearly 50 new regulatory obligations. 
23 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61495. 
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OCR data request and addressing any issues through the administrative process. It will likewise 
clog court dockets with litigation filed by both Reporting Individuals and Respondents and will 
not advance the obligations of institutions to decrease the impact of harassment and violence on 
access to education. 
 
The Proposed Regulations reshape the Title IX landscape without any true estimate of the 
cost. The Department admits that it cannot make such a determination with “absolute precision,” 
but estimates that the changes in the Proposed Regulations “would result in a net cost savings of 
between $286.4 million to $367.7 million over ten years.”24 Yet this cost estimate does not 
consider in any way the impact of continued exposure to sexual harassment and sexual violence 
which would not be investigable and actionable under this regime. 
 
Incredibly, despite the thousands of words devoted to regulating and enforcing brand 
new, invasive, and incredibly detailed standards under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, “[t]he Department does not believe it is reasonable to assume that these Proposed 
Regulations will have a quantifiable effect on the underlying rate of sexual harassment occurring 
in the education programs or activities of recipients.”25 In other words, these rules will not 
effectuate Title IX’s main mission of eliminating the barriers to education that are erected on the 
basis of sex. The Department does not even account for the continued impact of harassment and 
assault on the basis of sex, or the likelihood that, with fewer allegations investigated, those who 
commit harassment and assault will be free to continue to do so towards this specific Reporting 
Individual and others. The Department writes that “we do not attempt to capture costs that arise 
out of the underlying incidents themselves, but rather those associated with the actions 
prescribed by the Proposed Regulations and the likely response of regulated entities to those 
proposed requirements.”26 
 
Yet even ignoring the impact on Reporting Individuals across the country who will not 
have their complaints heard and the financial impact on institutions if those exposed to 
harassment and assault drop out of college (and if other students are exposed to harassment and 
assault by someone who may have been removed from the campus under another process), the 
Department ignores or minimizes the steep costs for public and private colleges to maintain an 
expanded system of due process as mandated by the Department, and the near certainty that such 
elevated requirements—beyond the requirements of any court or statute in the country—will lead 
to significant amounts of litigation for institutions. 
 
Such litigation will have direct costs to institutions that will likely have to be passed on to 
the end users, students. The insurance company United Educators analyzed 1,000 claims in cases 
of Title IX litigation and found the cost of litigation to be high. In just 100 of those cases, 
judgments and attorney’s fees cost $21.8 million. United Educators reported that the cost on 
average is $350,000 per case.27 Using those numbers, a mere 1,050 additional cases would 
completely wipe out any savings from even the highest savings number estimated by the 
                                                          
24 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61484. 
25 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61485 (emphasis added). 
26 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61485. 
27 Emily Tate, The High (Dollar) Cost of Sexual Assault, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 6, 2017), available at 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/04/06/sexual-assault-claims-can-be-costly. 
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Department. Considering the detailed requirements and the gray areas they are certain to create, 
1,050 additional cases filed over the course of the same 10-year period should be considered a 
low estimate. 
 
Further, the savings for institutions are not real because, at least in higher education 
institutions, the approach to sexual harassment and assault is likely to remain fairly static, even 
for cases that do not meet the narrower definitions of a Title IX violation under these rules. The 
VAWA amendments to the Clery Act remain in place, and the same sexual assault report that 
may be a form of harassment under these Proposed Regulations would engage those VAWA 
requirements. Institutions may have state laws, as here in New York, that maintain obligations. 
The Department admits that many institutions are unlikely to change their approach to reports of 
sexual harassment and assault, even if they are outside of the narrow scope of the definitions 
here.28 For those institutions (and there are many of them), the costs of investigations and 
adjudications will not be reduced; the costs will merely be shifted. Whether the institution 
now investigates and adjudicates under the Clery Act requirements, state law, or its own student 
conduct code,29 those same costs will remain. Simply passing them from a Title IX accounting 
ledger to a conduct code accounting ledger does not make those expenses disappear.  
 
The Department’s estimates are not accurate because, while for most institutions, the cost 
of investigating and adjudicating will not disappear but only shift to other obligations, the costs 
of the due process requirements, and their subsequent litigation, will ultimately raise the cost of 
compliance for institutions of higher education. We have identified more than four dozen new 
regulatory obligations in these Proposed Regulations. To that end, to comply with Executive 
Order 13771,30 this rule should not be allowed to proceed without the Department identifying at 
least two deregulatory actions for each of the myriad regulatory additions imposed upon 
institutions.31 
 
We note that these costs will fall hardest on less-resourced institutions, including 
community colleges. At many community colleges, there is insufficient staff to fill the myriad 
separate positions required by the plain language of these Proposed Regulations and the process 
requirements and administrative and judicial litigation costs will cripple many institutions. We 
acknowledge that many of our private college counterparts, especially small institutions, 
specialized institutions, technical institutions, and religious institutions, are likewise thinly 
                                                          
28 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61485-61486 (“We believe it is highly likely that a subset of recipients have 
continued Title IX enforcement in accordance with the prior, now rescinded guidance, due to the uncertainty of the 
regulatory Environment...In general, the Department assumes that recipients fall into one of three groups: (1) 
Recipients who have complied with the statutory and regulatory requirements and either did not comply with the 
2011 DCL or the 2014 Q&A or who reduced Title IX activities to the level required by statute and regulation after 
the rescission of the 2011 DCL or the 2014 Q&A and will continue to do so; (2) recipients who continued Title IX 
activities at the level required by the 2011 DCL or the 2014 Q&A but will amend their Title IX activities to the level 
required under current statute and the proposed regulations issued in this proceeding; and (3) recipients who 
continued Title IX activities at the level required under the 2011 DCL or the 2014 Q&A and will continue to do so 
after final regulations are issued.”). 
29 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61486. 
30 Exec. Order No. 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 FR 22 (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf. 
31 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61484. 
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staffed, which will make compliance especially difficult and the administrative and judicial 
litigation costs may be ruinous for institutions that already operate on a tight budget. 
 
C. Due Process in Campus Conduct Proceedings 
 
Indeed, the full impact of the Proposed Regulations cannot be understood without 
addressing its impact on the cost of adjudicating campus conduct proceedings. Certainly, outside 
of the Student Handbook or Code of Conduct’s promises,32 due process is required at public 
institutions whenever a decision excludes the student from the education process for more than a 
trivial period or threatens a person’s reputation.33 Almost all suspensions beyond 10 days or so 
are likely to be non-trivial to require some basic due process procedures.34 As the length of the 
suspension increases, those procedures and safeguards may take on an increasingly formal 
nature. Under current case law and practice, the due process requirements relax when discipline 
is limited to required counseling or classroom reprimand, unless, in some cases, those sanctions 
include a potential transcript notation or other designation that may impact a student’s future.35 
Yet the Department now proscribes a one-size-fits-all system that is beyond its authority and 
outside the requirements of binding authority. 
 
How is Due Process applied in different contexts? 
 
Procedural due process is intentionally broad and flexible. As explained in more detail 
below, in purely academic cases, there are few procedural requirements imposed on the college, 
whereas, in student conduct cases at public institutions, notice, hearing, and written decision are 
generally required. Substantive due process, on the other hand, always applies. Any decision 
subject to due process analysis can be overturned by a court on the grounds of arbitrary decision-
making. Finally, in the case of sexual assault, domestic or dating violence, or stalking, the form 
and standards of the proceedings change to account for the sensitive nature of issues. 
 
Notice 
 
A student must be given notice of the specific charges, the grounds for those charges, and 
the names of witnesses against them.36 The college must generally adhere to the notice deadlines 
                                                          
32 Most or nearly all institutions offer far more process in their code or policies than is legally required and 
institutions are generally held to the process they offer under contract law or a related theory. 
33 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).  
34 Id. 
35 Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 548 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972); Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077, 1079 
n. 1 (8th Cir. 1969). 
36 E.g. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961); Goss, 419 U.S. at 582; Gruen v. 
Chase, 215 A.D.2d 481 (2d Dep’t 1995); Nawaz v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. Of Dental Med., 295 A.D.2d 944 (4th Dep’t 
2002). Note that while the identity of student witnesses would generally be covered by FERPA within any 
documents the witnesses provide in which they are identified, SUNY’s long-standing analysis has been that due 
process, which is Constitutional, trumps FERPA, which is statutory/regulatory. Due process requires providing the 
names of witnesses, with the exception of extreme cases where providing such identification would endanger the 
witnesses. We note that the Proposed Regulations are consistent with this analysis. 
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in general outlined in applicable policy.37 Many colleges also provide notice of the disciplinary 
process and the student’s right to a hearing. The notice is intended to provide the student with the 
information necessary to prepare a defense, including a description of the basic facts and 
evidence.38 In emergency or exigent circumstances where a student poses a specific health or 
safety danger to others or property, a student may be suspended without notice of the charges.39 
However, the student must be given proper notice promptly after the suspension, preferably 
within 24 hours.40 
 
Hearing 
 
Both in cases of academic dishonesty and other discipline, public colleges generally must 
provide students with some form of hearing before being suspended or expelled.41 The hearing 
must be scheduled promptly after the process is initiated but also provide the student with 
enough time to prepare,42 and must be before an impartial decision maker.43 Yet, courts have 
never required the hearing to mimic judicial customs and rules.44 For example, the disciplinary 
officer or panel does not need to follow the rules of evidence45 and can consider any evidence 
                                                          
37 Weidemann v. State Univ. of N.Y. Coll. at Cortland, 188 A.D.2d 974, 975 (3d Dep’t 1992) (Holding a failure to 
adhere to the 5-day notice requirement deprived the student of any opportunity to rebut or explain the evidence 
against him and violated his rights).  
38 See Goss, 419 U.S. at 580 (“No better instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth than to give a person in 
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.”); Blanton v. State Univ. of N.Y., 
489 F.2d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1973) (“notice need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal indictment”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
39 Schwarzmueller v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 105 A.D.3d 1117, 1118-19 (3d Dep’t 2013) (holding that 
suspending the student immediately after he was released by police at 1 a.m. did not violate due process in light of 
the circumstances and the fact he was given notice later that morning); cf. Held v. State Univ. of N.Y. Coll. at 
Fredonia, 165 Misc. 2d 577, 579 (Sup. Ct., Chautauqua Cty. 1995) (“The [disciplinary code] provision clearly 
recognizes that suspension without hearing (and presumably proper notice) may not be invoked except in limited 
cases that come within a finding of the college’s legitimate interest in protecting property and the safety and welfare 
of specific individuals or the general public”). 
40 See Schwarzmueller, 105 A.D.3d at 1119. 
41 Goss, 419 U.S. at 579 (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard”); see also 
Mary M. v. Clark, 100 A.D.2d 41 (3d Dep’t 1984); Budd v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Geneseo, 133 A.D.3d 1341, 1342 
(4th Dep’t 2015).  
42 Compare Held, 165 Misc.2d at 582 (expressing the need to provide a student sufficient time to prepare for a 
hearing) with Machosky v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Oswego, 145 Misc.2d 210 (Oswego Cty. 1989) (holding 
unnecessary delays in scheduling the hearing deprived the student of significant rights). 
43 See Marshall v. Maguire, 102 Misc.2d 697, 699 (Nassau Cty. 1980) (overturning college board decision where the 
Associate Dean served on both the initial decision-making committee and the review board); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 
382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967) (indicating that prior involvement in an investigation renders impartiality difficult 
to maintain and holding the student was entitled to show that members of the panel with prior contact with the case 
could be presumed to have been biased). 
44 See Dixon, v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d at 159; Fain v. Brooklyn Coll. of the City of N.Y., 112 A.D.2d 
992 (2d Dep’t 1985) (“Despite the informality of the hearing and the committee’s failure to adhere to the question 
and answer format, petitioners were afforded a full opportunity to explain their actions and confront their 
accusers.”). 
45 Monnat v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Canton, 125 A.D.3d 1176, 1177 (3d Dep’t 2015) (holding where the code 
indicated the Hearing Board was not bound by rules of evidence and free to consider any information “relevant to 
the charges that would contribute to the rendering of an impartial and fair judgment,” it was not improper to 
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“relevant to the charges that would contribute to the rendering of an impartial and fair 
judgment.”46 At the hearing, students are entitled to present their side of the story, including 
evidence and witnesses to support their claims.47 However, absent campus rules (which are 
common) or specific legal requirements to the contrary, a student generally does not have the 
right to cross-examine witnesses directly or through a panel.48 Finally, many schools offer 
students the ability to choose an advisor to help them in the disciplinary process. Colleges may 
limit the role the advisor plays and, except in cases of sexual and interpersonal violence, colleges 
may place limits on who may serve as an advisor.49 When a student is given a choice of advisor, 
the college may need to make reasonable but not unlimited accommodations to ensure that 
advisor is available for the student to ensure the student’s right is effectuated.50 
 
Decision 
 
After the hearing, the student is entitled to a written decision.51 That decision should 
describe the factual findings and the evidence relied upon in reaching the determination of 
responsibility. It must be specific enough to permit the student to effectively challenge the 
determination in administrative appeals or the courts and to demonstrate that the decision was 
based on the evidence in the record.52 Therefore, conclusory references to source documents or 
testimony are insufficient to satisfy due process. For example, it is insufficient to simply state 
that one student harassed another based on the testimony of a police officer. Instead, the 
determination should describe the facts about which the witness testified, such as the violations 
with which the student was charged, and why that witness was credible.53 
 
Substantial Evidence 
 
Substantive due process requires that all disciplinary decisions are based on the evidence 
and the rules.54 The required evidentiary standards, such as the “preponderance of the evidence” 
                                                          
consider prior disciplinary history or other uncharged conduct); Budd, 133 A.D.3d at 1344 (upholding a disciplinary 
decision based on hearsay evidence). 
46 Monnat, 125 A.D.3d at 1177.  
47 However, such right is not unlimited; for example, a student may be restricted from calling character witnesses. 
See Schwarzmueller, 105 A.D.3d at 1119. 
48 See, e.g., Dixon, 294 F.2d at 159; Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; Gruen, 215 A.D.2d at 482; but see Donohue v. Baker, 
976 F. Supp. 136, 146-47 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
49 Gruen, 215 A.D.2d at 482. 
50 Machosky, 145 Misc.2d at 214 (“Given the extreme prejudice,…and given that there were no prior requests by 
petitioner for any adjournment or other abuse of the disciplinary process by the petitioner, the failure to afford the 
petitioner an opportunity to have an advisor present at the hearing was violative of his legal rights.”). However, 
these accommodations must be reasonable. A student may not use the choice of an advisor to delay or stall the 
conduct process. 
51 Kalinsky v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 161 A.D.2d 1006, 1007 (3d Dep’t 1990); Boyd v. State Univ. of 
N.Y. at Cortland, 110 A.D.3d 1174, 1175-76 (3d Dep’t 2013). 
52 Id. 
53 These were the facts of Boyd v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Cortland, 110 A.D.3d 1174 (3d Dep’t 2013). 
54 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803. 
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standard, are determined in the Code of Conduct. Generally, the judicial officer will be given 
deference in credibility determinations.55  
 
The preponderance of the evidence standard is applied in most administrative settings, 
including all federal civil rights cases.56 By allowing recipients to choose a higher standard of 
proof, the Department treats those who disclose sexual harassment and sexual violence 
differently than others who disclose discrimination, without any reasoned explanation. 
 
In drawing the ultimate legal conclusions, courts review decisions to ensure a sufficient 
factual basis exists to support those findings. Speculation, conjecture, and suspicion are 
insufficient to reach the necessary threshold.57 The court will review the record and will 
generally defer to the college’s decision if it finds sufficient facts to allow a reasonable person to 
reach the same decision.58 This standard applies even if the reviewing federal or state judge 
would have decided the case differently. 
 
In sum, procedural due process is not a one-size-fits-all standard in the student conduct 
forum. As will be discussed in greater detail, below, the Department’s Proposed Regulations 
seek to remove the flexibility afforded to recipients in investigating and adjudicating sexual 
misconduct in a manner outside its authority and well beyond the requirements of statute and 
binding legal precedent. 
 
D.  The Department’s Regulations, as Proposed, Violate the Administrative 
Procedure Act, are Arbitrary and Capricious and Cannot Withstand Judicial 
Scrutiny 
 
Not only do the Proposed Regulations promise to raise administrative costs for recipients 
and OCR and social costs to Reporting Individuals and Respondents without a basis in well-
established judicial precedent, they likely cannot withstand judicial scrutiny if enacted in their 
current form. Chevron deference is not absolute. Courts will overturn agency interpretations of 
statutes that are arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise violate the Administrative Procedure 
Act,59 and will not countenance agency rulemaking that is pretextual or breaks with settled 
policy without a good reason. Here, the proposals cannot hold the force of law because they 
manifestly contradict the text and purpose of Title IX, reverse the Department’s long-standing 
interpretations of the statute, and may be dressed in a pretextual rationale. Simply put, the 
                                                          
55 Lambraia v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 135 A.D.3d 1144, 1146 (3d Dep’t 2015); In re Lampert v. State 
Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 116 A.D.3d 1292, 1294 (3d Dep’t 2014). 
56 See, K.K. Baker, D.L. Brake and N.C. Cantalupo, Title IX & The Preponderance of the Evidence: A White Paper 
(Aug. 7, 2016), retrieved from https://www.feministlawprofessors.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Title-IX-
Preponderance-White-Paper-signed-8.7.16.pdf; Amy Chmielewski, Comment, Defending the Preponderance of the 
Evidence Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 143. 
57 Fain, 112 A.D.2d at 994 (holding that “a mere scintilla of evidence sufficient to justify a suspicion is not 
sufficient” and the record lacked proof of sufficient quality and quantity to persuade a fair and detached fact-finder 
“reasonably, probatively, and logically”). 
58 Esmail v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr. at Brooklyn, 220 A.D.2d 328 (1st Dep’t 1995) provides an example of the 
analysis for academic dismissal. Katz v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 85 A.D.3d 1277, 1280 (3d Dep’t 2011), 
provides an example for academic dishonesty cases. Finally, Lambraia, 135 A.D.3d 1144 (3d Dep’t 2015), provides 
an example in the realm of behavioral conduct cases. 
59 5 U.S.C.A. § 706. 
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Department has not offered a scintilla of evidence to show that its proposals are necessary to 
remedy discrimination on the basis of sex. Without such evidence of discrimination on the basis 
of sex, or an explanation for why its Proposed Regulations ameliorate this putative sex 
discrimination, the rulemaking is without legal substance, and the Proposed Regulations cannot 
have the force of law. 
 
i. There Is No Evidence That These Regulations Are Aimed at Reducing 
Discrimination or Unequal Treatment On The Basis of Sex 
 
The Department clearly has the right to regulate under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 in a way that addresses unequal treatment on the basis of sex. But there 
must be some evidence that the regulation is promulgated to address inequality or discrimination 
on the basis of sex. Undoubtedly, through its request for comments, the Department has received 
references to dozens of studies of populations in college, secondary education, and society-wide 
showing a clear and statistically significant difference in the percentage of males versus females 
who are subject to sexual harassment, sexual violence and unequal treatment on the basis of sex. 
Approximately 1 in 5 females report in climate surveys that they have experienced non-
consensual sex in their college years, while 1 in 13 males report the same, with transgender 
students generally reporting even higher rates.60 Simply analyzing identified male and female 
experiences with harassment shows that it has a differential impact on the basis of gender. 
Therefore, the Department would be on fairly solid ground requiring educational institutions to 
offer resources aimed at ameliorating the impact of such discrimination for which the impact 
differs so much by gender, and requiring institutions to take it seriously and pursue 
investigations and adjudications to sanction those who violate the law and policy. That 
requirement would be tied to serious, published and peer-reviewed studies that consistently show 
a differential impact in victimization and educational and employment impact between genders. 
 
Conversely, the Department presents no such published study showing that a complete 
lack of due process, traditional due process owed under case law, or the new maximized due 
process envisioned in these Proposed Regulations differently impacts people on the basis of sex. 
The Department has not shown or referenced any evidence that due process differences affect 
people differently on the basis of sex. 
 
The Preamble—which provides the Secretary’s reasons for issuing these Proposed 
Regulations— lacks an evidentiary showing sufficient to establish the facts by which the agency 
makes such a critical determination—one that promises to fundamentally shift the effectiveness 
of Title IX as a tool for preventing and adjudicating harassment and violence and certainly shifts 
the population of interest to be protected under this Civil Rights law from those limited in 
educational access when subject to sex-based harassment or assault to those accused of 
harassment or assault under Title IX. It does not identify what data within its cited literature 
informs its decision and why that data dictates the present changes. Without more specific 
                                                          
60 See e.g. David Cantor, Bonnie Fisher, Susan Chibnall, Reanne Townsend, Report on the AAU Campus Climate 
Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct, Association of American Universities (Oct. 20, 2017), available 
at https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAU-Files/Key-Issues/Campus-Safety/AAU-Campus-Climate-Survey-
FINAL-10-20-17.pdf. 
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information, the public has no basis for understanding how that literature led the agency to 
reverse its long-standing interpretation of Title IX. 
 
The Secretary’s opinion on the matter, moreover, is not the kind of evidence-based 
decision-making that our courts expect of agencies. It may be that the Secretary disfavors the 
Department’s current guidance, but she does not have the unilateral authority to cancel it without 
following the APA. The agency must proceed along the legal channels, including setting forth a 
particularized rationale for the reversal. 
 
The closest item in the Preamble approximating evidence are references to statistics, 
drawn from a website maintained by a historian, K.C. Johnson, that over two hundred “students” 
have sued their institutions for due process violations since the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter 
(2011 DCL), and that ninety institutions have “lost” due process challenges brought by 
Respondents since 2011 DCL. Most experts would not give such credit to non-peer reviewed 
research, housed on a web link by an activist with a clear agenda (and an interest in selling 
books). A cursory review shows that the list is far from comprehensive and is shaded towards 
cases that will support the professor’s viewpoint, while leaving out or minimizing cases that may 
not. Certainly, even if taken as true, two hundred cases amidst the tens of millions of students 
who have attended college over the past decade should not be the factual basis for a landmark 
reversal of federal policy. What is clear on its face is that these statistics, standing alone, do not 
demonstrate that the Proposed Regulations specific to due process are needed to prevent 
discrimination on the basis of sex. 
 
For one thing, many of the two hundred “students” who have sued their institutions 
pursuant to the private right of action recognized under Title IX are actually Reporting 
Individuals alleging that the institution acted in “deliberate indifference” to their Title IX rights. 
Elevating the due process protections afforded to accused students will do nothing to ameliorate 
harms to the Title IX rights of such Reporting Individuals. For another, the assertion that 
institutions “lost” ninety legal challenges by Respondents is highly misleading. Professor 
Johnson trumpeted that SUNY “lost” a student conduct case in a mid-level appeals court, but did 
not make such a fuss when that same case was reversed by a nearly unanimous Court of Appeals 
(New York’s highest court) in SUNY’s favor.61 In the bulk of the cases cited in Professor 
Johnson’s spreadsheet, the Respondent “won” by overcoming an institution’s motion to dismiss 
the complaint or deny an application for temporary or permanent injunction. The most likely 
inference we can draw from this limited outcome data is that the courts determined that the 
Respondent alleged facts which, if proven true, could support a claim of discrimination by the 
institution on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX.  
 
Clearing a procedural hurdle is not the same as proving a case of discrimination. The 
spreadsheet does not support a conclusion that these violations occurred as a matter of fact, only 
that some courts hold that the complaints, as pleaded, could support a claim of Title IX 
                                                          
61 Haug v. State Univ. of New York at Potsdam, 149 A.D.3d 1200 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017), rev’d, 32 N.Y.3d 1044 
(2018). 
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discrimination as a matter of law.62 Simply asserting that the case was withdrawn and settled, 
moreover, is not evidence that the institution admitted fault. 
 
The spreadsheet is not comprehensive of the state of Title IX case law. The spreadsheet is 
not designed to track how many institutions have “won” due process challenges and, of course, 
the spreadsheet cannot report on how many lawsuits are never brought in the first place because 
the Respondent or Reporting Individual found the process generally fair (even if they do not 
agree with the outcome) or could not identify a challengeable error. The spreadsheet also, in an 
effort to include state-level counterparts to Title IX, it cites state case law arising from violations 
of state law, rather than Title IX.63 These cases may be dispositive of general principles of due 
process, but are not relevant to the rights guaranteed under Title IX. By mixing these types of 
cases, it creates a database that is far from a neutral, scholarly, thorough, complete, and accurate 
collection upon which to base a fundamental reversal of decades of agency policy and practice.64 
 
At best, this list of cases could offer a legal syllabus of how selected courts interpret the 
contours of due process in the student conduct forum. But, without exploring the merits of each 
case, the list offers no information about how any institution has actually violated Title IX and 
whether such violations have a disparate impact by gender, nor does it explain why the 
Department must abruptly change decades of consistent interpretations of the statute to address 
such alleged violations. Without such evidence, the Department does not have jurisdiction under 
Title IX to force nearly every school district, college, and university in the United States to 
require these procedural due process protections for Respondents and, even if it did, the 
proposals could effectively force these recipients to violate the statute by treating those who 
disclose sexual harassment and sexual assault unequally. 
 
After all, in its thirty-seven words, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
specifically prohibits any person, “on the basis of sex,” from being “excluded from participation 
in, be[ing] denied the benefits of, or be[ing] subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”65 Nothing in the statute or its history 
remotely suggests a Congressional intent to elevate the due process rights of those accused of 
harassment or assault over the minimums established by the U.S. Supreme Court, at great cost to 
those whose educational access was limited by harassment or assault.  
 
To the contrary, both the Department and the judiciary have consistently interpreted Title 
IX to prohibit sexual harassment and sexual violence of all forms at schools receiving federal 
assistance. Sexual harassment and sexual violence can create hostile environments that interfere 
with the ability of students to receive equitable access to education free from discrimination on 
the basis of sex. In turn, to assist school districts, colleges, and universities in meeting their 
obligations to fairly and promptly investigate and adjudicate incidents of sexual harassment and 
                                                          
62 Remember that in consideration of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, courts are obligated to 
reasonably construe all facts in favor of the non-moving party. This does not mean those “facts” are “true” or that 
they would be proven at trial. 
63 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Blaise, 157 A.D.3d 1072 (3d Dep’t 2018) (violation of New York Education Law 129-B). 
64 See generally FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584-587 (1993); Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
65 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681. 
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violence, the Department and its Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued a Dear Colleague letter on 
April 4, 2011 (2011 DCL).66 The 2011 DCL supplemented the “Revised Sexual Harassment 
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties,” 
issued January 19, 2001 (2001 Guidance),67 by the OCR under the Clinton Administration 
(which was very similar to guidance issued on March 13, 1997),68 and then reissued January 25, 
2006, by the OCR under the Bush Administration.69 OCR then issued its “Questions and 
Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence” on April 29, 2014 (2014 Q&A), which provided 
additional assistance in implementing the 2011 DCL and the 2001 Guidance.70 
 
These documents, along with Resolution Agreements that school districts, colleges, and 
universities have entered into with OCR to settle alleged Title IX violations or compliance 
reviews, demonstrate a consistent, bipartisan understanding that Title IX prohibits these 
institutions from discriminating against those who disclose sexual harassment and violence. The 
Department recognized this consistent tradition in the Preamble, detailing the history of sub-
regulatory guidance issued in this area.71 It did not mention, however, that for the most part this 
sub-regulatory guidance was consistent over the course of more than twenty years, with 
comparatively minor deviations. Indeed the Department’s consistent interpretation, across 
administrations from different political parties, has been in place for so long that it is older than 
nearly all current K-12 students and more than half of all college students. 
 
This consistency lasted until the Department announced a marked shift in interpretation 
of the role of Title IX in September 2017. The Secretary announced that OCR would commence 
a formal notice and comment period to replace the 2011 DCL, and then issued a Dear Colleague 
Letter (the 2017 DCL) rescinding the 2011 DCL and 2014 Q&A and advising recipients to 
follow the 2001 Guidance.72 
 
Plainly, the Department now offers a mistaken understanding of its own regulatory 
system surrounding Title IX. Its Proposed Regulations distort the beneficial impact that Title IX 
has had on protecting Reporting Individuals and ensuring a fair process for all parties in campus 
disciplinary proceedings. The detailed due process provisions of the Proposed Regulations may 
or may not be a good idea. But the Department does not have jurisdiction to mandate “good 
ideas” or “best practices.” It is not a consulting firm. The Department only maintains jurisdiction 
                                                          
66 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Apr. 4, 2011), available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “2011 DCL”). 
67 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT 
OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (Jan. 19, 2001), available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “2001 guidance”). 
68 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by 
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 FR 12034 (March 13, 1997). 
69 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Jan. 25, 2006), available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/sexhar-2006.html. 
70 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE (Apr. 29, 2014), available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf 
(hereinafter referred to as “2014 Q&A”). 
71 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61463. 
72 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION, Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (Sept. 1, 2017), 
available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-title-ix-201709.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “2017 
DCL”). 
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under this Civil Rights law to regulate in a way that reduces discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Even conceding for the sake of argument that a Respondent, if treated improperly, could be a 
victim of discrimination on the basis of sex, the Department still must show that the current 
system is actually allowing discrimination on the basis of sex. The Department has not shown 
that Respondents are predominantly male. It may assume so based on the few conversations it 
held with activists in preparation for drafting these Proposed Regulations, but there is no actual 
evidence this is so. 
 
Further, even if most Respondents were male, there is no evidence that they are held 
responsible more or less often than females, that their sanctions are greater or lesser than 
females, or that these additional due process requirements would change that. The Department 
must regulate within its jurisdiction. There is no evidence here that the current system of 
investigating and adjudicating sexual harassment and violence leads to disparate treatment on the 
basis of sex. There is no evidence that these Proposed Regulations would lessen such disparate 
impact. The Department simply does not have jurisdiction to regulate in this way, and cannot do 
so without some evidence that this is not a solution in search of a problem but an evidence-based 
method of addressing a problem of unequal treatment on the basis of sex. 
 
ii. Chevron Deference is Not Absolute, and Agency Rulemaking Cannot 
Be Arbitrary and Capricious 
 
We point the Department to this evidentiary gap because it reveals the fundamental legal 
issues with the instant rulemaking. As the Department is aware, the U.S. Supreme Court holds 
that when Congress authorizes an agency to issue regulations, and that agency creates a 
regulation interpreting a statute it enforces, those regulations will only be given controlling 
weight if they obey the two-part test described in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.73 The judiciary need only defer to the agency’s interpretation, first, if the 
statute is ambiguous as to the precise question at issue, and, second, if the interpretation 
reasonably resolves those ambiguities.74 
 
The Chevron court understood that agencies balance competing interests in formulating 
policy. It recognized that an agency’s interpretation may reflect a “reasonable accommodation of 
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute,” yet still may not 
warrant deference if “it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation 
is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”75 As such, the interpretation cannot manifestly 
offend the text and purpose of the statute.76  
 
Chevron built on well-established standards of review of agency action derived from the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).77 The U.S. Supreme Court has long held agency 
regulations to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, invalidating regulations where 
                                                          
73 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). 
74 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44. 
75 Id. at 845 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
76 Id. at 844. 
77 5 U.S.C.A. § 706. 
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the agency “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”78 Regulations may also be set aside where 
they are contrary to a Constitutional right, made in excess of jurisdiction or in violation of 
procedure, and not supported by substantial evidence.79  
 
Fundamentally, an agency’s regulatory action will be arbitrary and capricious—and 
therefore cannot carry the force of law—when the agency does not “examine the relevant data 
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.”80 Courts require agencies to detail the “essential facts upon 
which the administrative decision was based” and “may not supply a reasoned basis for the 
agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”81 Courts also demand that agencies explain 
their decision-making rationale in response to significant comments made during the rule-
making procedure.82 Courts also will invalidate regulations that are facially illogical, such as 
policies that conflict with other agency regulations and create a “back door” allowing the agency 
to circumvent its own rules.83 And they will deem a regulation arbitrary and capricious where the 
agency adopts a more restrictive means of achieving a policy goal without explaining why less 
restrictive means were inadequate.84 
 
In January, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found 
a textbook example of illegal rulemaking in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in State 
of New York v. Department of Commerce.85 There, the Department of Commerce inserted a 
question in the 2020 Census that would ask respondents their citizenship, even as this question 
contradicted longstanding practice and the agency’s own experts objected to it. The Court stated 
that the Commerce Secretary “failed to consider several important aspects of the problem; 
alternately ignored, cherry-picked, or badly misconstrued the evidence in the record before him; 
acted irrationally both in light of that evidence and his own stated decisional criteria; and failed 
to justify significant departures from past policies and practices — a veritable smorgasbord of 
classic, clear-cut APA violations.”86 The court declared this process a sham, wherein the agency 
                                                          
78 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); 
5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (2)(A). See, also, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 698 F.3d 1101, 1124 
(9th Cir. 2012) (agency’s failure to consider policy impacts of decision); Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. 
Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 429 F.3d 1136, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (agency’s failure to consider vital aspects 
of the problem before it). 
79 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (2)(B) - (E). 
80 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc., 463 U.S. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted); Williams Gas 
Processing-Gulf Coast Co., L.P. v. FERC, 475 F.3d 319, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (agency determination devoid of 
reasoned decision-making must be set aside). 
81 United States v. Dierckman, 201 F.3d 915, 926 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
82 Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 626 F.3d 84, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
83 Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
84 Cin. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 761 (6th Cir. 1995). 
85 New York v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-CV-2921 (JMF), 2019 WL 190285 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 
2019), available at 
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.491254/gov.uscourts.nysd.491254.166.0.pdf. 
86 Id. at 225-245. 
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pursued a single-minded goal of adding the citizenship question even as the “real” reason for the 
decision was outside the pretext of enhancing enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.87 
 
Thus, precedent is clear that administrative agencies are not above the law, and courts 
take seriously their obligations to evaluate whether the agency’s stated rationale for rulemaking 
is supported by the evidence. The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction, and it will reject administrative constructions that conflict with clear congressional 
intent.88 
 
iii. Agencies Cannot Revoke Long-Standing Guidance Without Good 
Reasons 
 
The Department need also be aware that sudden reversals in policy may be unlawful, 
even where the revoked policy was not a regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that 
“regulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever,” but cautions that “the 
forces of change do not always or necessarily point in the direction of deregulation.”89 When an 
agency upends its own interpretation of a statute, courts require a showing of “good reasons for 
the new policy,” including “a reasoned explanation” for disregarding facts and circumstances 
underlying the former policy.90 Particularly where the change in policy “could necessitate 
systemic, significant changes” to stakeholders’ practices, the agency owes more than 
“conclusory statements” to justify the interpretation.91  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Encino Motorcars has affirmed Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in FCC v. Fox Television Stations that an agency’s decision to change 
course may be arbitrary and capricious where it ignores or contradicts its earlier factual findings 
without a good reason.92 Encino Motorcars arose from an agency rulemaking with parallel flaws 
to this current process. In that case, the Department of Labor, which is charged with interpreting 
and enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), issued an “interpretive regulation” in 1970 
that a service advisor who sold maintenance and repair services at an automobile dealership was 
not a “salesman” exempt from receiving overtime compensation.93 Following several court cases 
that rejected this interpretation, the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter in 1978 that 
changed its position and aligned with those court decisions.94 This guidance made clear that 
service advisors were exempt employees who were not required to receive overtime 
compensation under the FLSA.95 Twenty-one years later, in 2008, the Department of Labor 
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would hold service advisors to be exempt.96 Then, in 
2011, the Department of Labor reversed course, and completed its 2008 notice-and-comment 
                                                          
87 Id. at 245-253. 
88 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. 
89 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, 463 U.S. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
91 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S.Ct. 2117, 2126-27 (2016). 
92 Encino Motorcars, 136 S.Ct. at 2127. 
93 Id. at 2122. 
94 Id. at 2123. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
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rulemaking by issuing a final rule that went back to the 1970 guidance.97 Service advisors were 
again entitled to overtime compensation.98  
 
Based on that sudden reversal in policy, a group of service advisors sued their employer, 
claiming violations of the FLSA.99 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court threw out the final rule, 
holding that the regulation “was issued without the reasoned explanation that was required in 
light of the Department of Labor’s change in position and the significant reliance interests 
involved.”100 The Department of Labor referenced comments made for and against the proposal, 
but then gave no actual reason why it believed one approach was more reasonable than the 
other.101 It also made no effort to sort out inconsistencies in its regulation, which would exempt 
dealership employees who sold vehicles but not exempt dealership employees who sold 
services.102 Conclusory statements were not enough to satisfy this burden.103  
 
Clearly, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 7-2 decision in Encino Motorcars, an agency 
exceeds its jurisdiction when it revokes a longstanding policy without providing a good reason, 
even if that policy constituted sub-regulatory guidance. Yet the Department of Education has 
offered nothing but conclusory statements to justify this change. Here, the Proposed Regulations 
acknowledge that the Department has been issuing guidance on the proper interpretation and 
enforcement of Title IX in the campus disciplinary process for decades. It also acknowledges the 
force of this guidance, as it putatively has “created” a process followed by recipients of federal 
funds.104 Yet it has suddenly reversed course, with no reasoned explanation for why it has upset 
decades of settled practice. 
 
To be sure, the Department never “created” the disciplinary process, nor does the 
Department have jurisdiction to mandate such a top-down system under Title IX. It is more 
accurate to say that the Department’s Office for Civil Rights enforces Title IX through campus 
investigations, and its approach has encouraged recipients to reform their practices to conform 
with investigatory standards and outcomes. Moreover, individuals have spurred reform by filing 
complaints with OCR claiming that campuses are failing to live up to their Title IX obligations. 
OCR follows a Case Processing Manual to determine if the institution is in violation. Institutions 
such as SUNY have relied for decades on this guidance material in shaping their campus 
responses to sexual harassment and sexual violence. 
 
Additionally, students, faculty, staff, and third-parties have long relied on this guidance in 
understanding their Title IX rights. Those individuals can bring private lawsuits against 
universities for not following Title IX. This private right of action has led universities to reform 
their practices to avoid liability. Nearly forty years ago, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
                                                          
97 Encino Motorcars, 136 S.Ct. at 2123. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2124. 
100 Id. at 2126. 
101 Id. at 2126-27. 
102 Id. at 2127. 
103 Id. See, also, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (agency rationale 
must be based on actual evidence beyond conclusory statements). 
104 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61465. 
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held in Alexander v. Yale University that a university could be held liable under Title IX for 
failing to take seriously allegations of “quid pro quo” sexual harassment between a female 
student and a male faculty member or administrator. 105 The students in Alexander alleged that 
the university was obliged under Title IX to address sexual harassment, because this misconduct 
compromised their ability to access the educational benefits provided by the university.106 
Although the plaintiffs in Alexander did not prevail in their claims, the case led universities to 
implement grievance procedures for preventing, investigating, and adjudicating sexual 
harassment.  
  
The U.S. Supreme Court then expanded the scope of institutional liability in two cases 
during the late 1990s. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Court identified a 
private right of action under Title IX against recipients for teacher-on-student sexual 
harassment.107 One year later, the Court held in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education that 
a school could be liable for monetary damages under Title IX if it was “deliberately indifferent” 
to student-on-student harassment about which it had “actual” knowledge.108 The harassment had 
to be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived the impacted students of 
access to the benefits of education. 
  
In light of Gebser and Davis, the Department sought public comments regarding a 
school’s obligation to take affirmative steps to prevent, investigate, and adjudicate sexual 
harassment. In 2001, it published its Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, which updated 
nearly identical guidance published in 1997. This Guidance affirmed that institutions were 
responsible for incidents of student-on-student sexual harassment. 
  
The 2001 Guidance meshed the definition of sexual harassment in Davis applicable to 
private causes of action for money damages with the “core factors” previously offered by the 
Department of Education in a 1997 guidance letter for determining the appropriate institutional 
response.109 Specifically, institutions must examine the “constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships” to determine whether the conduct is “sufficiently 
serious that it adversely affects a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from the school’s 
program.”110 The 2001 Guidance also created a wide scope of responsibility for preventing 
sexual harassment and violence. The institution has a duty to prevent and address discrimination 
throughout its operations, “whether they take place in the facilities of the school, on a school bus, 
at a class or training program sponsored by the school at another location, or elsewhere.”111 
Because Title IX protects any “person” from sex discrimination, students of all genders may 
                                                          
105 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). 
106 Alexander, 631 F.2d at 181. 
107 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
108 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
109 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPT. OF EDUCATION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS 
BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (1997), available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar01.html. 
110 2001 Guidance, at p. vi. 
111 2001 Guidance, at p. 3. 
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bring complaints of harassment. Students are protected from harassment by a school employee, 
another student, or a non-employee third party, like a visiting speaker or visiting athlete.112  
  
Contrary to the Department’s revisionist history, the Department has followed a 
consistent policy regarding the application of Title IX as an anti-violence and anti-harassment 
tool for decades. The 2011 Dear Colleague letter, in turn, reinforced these policies and clarified 
certain ambiguities in the 2001 notice-and-comment guidance, such as holding that Title IX 
applies “in connection with all the academic, educational, extracurricular, athletic, and other 
programs of the school . . .” including those activities occurring off-campus or on a study abroad 
program.113 The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter also included third-parties under the umbrella of the 
school’s protection. “For example, Title IX protects a high school student participating in a 
college’s recruitment program, a visiting student athlete, and a visitor in a school’s on-campus 
residence hall.”114 It also set forth preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof in 
cases of sexual misconduct. 
 
The Department’s apparent legal position is that it can abandon its longstanding 
interpretation of Title IX, without any explanation grounded in evidence, simply because its 
former interpretation was not a regulation. Yet under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,115 courts give 
significant deference to agency interpretations that speak from the agency’s expertise, are 
thoroughly considered, and are consistent with prior interpretations.116 As such, the 
Department’s more than twenty years of guidance on this issue—including policies put into 
place following notice-and-comment—have heavy legal weight that cannot be abandoned 
without a good reason. Yet the dearth of evidence offered in the Proposed Regulations makes it 
difficult to argue that these proposals were the product of agency expertise. The Preamble offers 
nothing but conclusory statements to justify the Department’s abrupt reversal. 
 
iv. The Proposed Rules Are Inconsistent with the 2013 VAWA 
Reauthorization (Campus SaVE Act) and Enacting Regulations 
 
The Department must also account for why it acts in derogation of congressional intent 
and its own interpretation of that intent.117 Less than six years ago, Congress passed legislation 
that specifically defines what due process rights it demands for campus adjudications of sexual 
misconduct, and the Department promulgated regulations to enforce that law. Nowhere did 
Congress manifest an intent that the Department should consider the elevated due process 
protections accumulated in the instant Proposed Regulations. To the contrary, the Proposed 
Regulations’ elevated emphasis on the rights of the accused undermine Congress’ wishes by 
relying on factors that Congress never intended to be considered and departs from the due 
process balance struck by Congress. 
 
                                                          
112 Id. 
113 See generally 2011 DCL. 
114 2011 DCL, at p. 4 n.11. 
115 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
116 See, Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268 (2006) and U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001). 
117 Agency decision-making that allows the agency to circumvent its own regulations is arbitrary and capricious. 
Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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In 2013, Congress reauthorized the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which 
was signed into law on March 7, 2013. The relevant provisions of this law are also known as the 
Campus SaVE Act. Among other things, this law amended Section 485(f) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 (HEA), better known as the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security 
Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act). VAWA amended the Clery Act to require 
institutions to compile statistics for incidents of dating violence, domestic violence, sexual 
assault, and stalking, and to include policies, procedures, and programs regarding these incidents 
in their annual security reports. 
 
In amending the Clery Act, VAWA set forth specific standards of due process that 
colleges and universities had to apply in proceedings arising from incidents of sexual assault and 
related crimes and violations. Those proceedings had to “provide a prompt, fair, and impartial 
investigation and resolution” by officials with “annual training on the issues related to domestic 
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking and how to conduct an investigation and 
hearing process that protects the safety of victims and promotes accountability.” The Reporting 
Individual and the Respondent were “entitled to the same opportunities to have others present 
during an institutional disciplinary proceeding, including the opportunity to be accompanied to 
any related meeting or proceeding by an advisor of their choice” and shared the right to 
simultaneous written notification of the outcome of the proceeding, any appeal procedures, and 
when the results became final.118  
 
The Department enacted regulations after a Negotiated Rulemaking process in a manner 
designed to implement Congress’ intent of preventing sexual violence and promoting the fair 
adjudication of campus sexual misconduct. In doing so, the Department did not interpret the 
phrase “prompt, fair, and impartial investigation and resolution” in Section 
485(f)(8)(B)(iv)(I)(aa) to require any of the elevated due process protections for the accused now 
under consideration. 
 
As to the role of the advisor, the Department considered comments asking it to 
specifically define the role of the advisor in campus proceedings, to which it demurred; the 
Department found that “regulating an institution’s actions in these areas would restrict their 
flexibility to protect the interests of all parties.”119 Blanket rules about the role of the advisor 
would “unnecessarily limit an institution’s flexibility to provide an equitable and appropriate 
disciplinary proceeding.”120  
 
Contrary to its present position, the Department did not interpret the Clery Act 
amendments to require the presence of an advisor at all. This function was at the parties’ option, 
but not mandatory, and institutions would not run afoul of the law if a properly notified advisor 
did not attend the proceeding.121 Indeed, the Department specifically rejected a proposal that 
would require institutions to provide legal representation in a meeting or hearing in which the 
accused or accuser has legal representation but the other party does not. “Absent clear and 
                                                          
118 See, Clery Act, § 485 (f)(8)(B)(iv)(I). 
119 VAWA Final Rule, at 62773. 
120 VAWA Final Rule, at 62774. 
121 VAWA Final Rule, at 62773. 
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unambiguous statutory authority,” the Department wrote at the time, “we would not impose such 
a burden on institutions.”122  
 
The Department’s current proposals elevate the due process rights of the accused in ways 
never anticipated by the drafters of the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act. Its present 
interpretation of Title IX is incompatible with its regulations implementing the Clery Act 
amendments, demonstrating another ground by which its present rulemaking is arbitrary and 
capricious as allowing the agency to circumvent its own regulations and offending the clear 
intent of Congress on the issue of procedural due process in campus sexual assault 
proceedings.123 
 
v. The Proposed Rules May Prove to Be a Pretext for Otherwise 
Unlawful Agency Action 
 
The sum total of this analysis is that a court may find that the Department has acted in a 
manner designed to hide its true purpose in pursuing these Proposed Regulations. As the January 
2019 decision in State of New York v. Department of Commerce shows, courts will look beyond 
the “presumption of regularity” afforded Executive Branch officials where they cannot escape 
the conclusion that the agency’s stated rationale was not the true reason for its actions, and may 
look both within the administrative record and outside of it to identify if the stated reason for 
acting was just a pretext masking an unstated goal.124 There, the Secretary of Commerce decided 
to add the citizenship question to the census for reasons unrelated to Voting Rights Act 
enforcement before he involved the Department of Justice. The evidence showed that his aides 
sought to conceal aspects of the process and set aside “near uniform opposition” from experts 
about the citizenship question.125 The agency’s obfuscation and demonstrated unwillingness to 
consider alternative arguments showed that the Secretary of Commerce had prejudged the 
outcome regardless of the evidence.126 
 
Respectfully, the Department is proceeding along a similar path. The Department has 
entered the rulemaking process having decided that the due process afforded to Respondents in 
disciplinary proceedings violates Title IX’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex. It 
has offered a series of proposals that it believes will correct this putative imbalance. Yet it has 
not produced any evidence to support its belief that these measures are needed to address sex-
based discrimination, or even any evidence that sex-based discrimination exists against 
Respondents. Making such a critical change without any explanation may be found to be an 
arbitrary and capricious act.127 
 
                                                          
122 VAWA Final Rule, at 62774. 
123 Compare, Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 720 (9th Cir. 2002) (where Congress 
requires agency regulations to be based on scientific evidence, a regulation is arbitrary and capricious where it is 
grounded in political choices rather than scientific evidence). 
124 Dept. of Commerce, Case 1:18-cv-05025-JMF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2019), at p. 248, available at 
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.491254/gov.uscourts.nysd.491254.166.0.pdf. 
125 Id. at 246-48. 
126 Id. at 251. 
127 Fox v. Clinton, 684 F.3d 67, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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Surely, the Department is aware that the public’s response to its “opening bid” in this 
process, the 2017 DCL, was nearly universally negative. According to a survey of 12,035 
comments received by the Department in the wake of the 2017 DCL, ninety-nine percent of the 
commenters filed a comment in support of Title IX, with ninety-seven percent of the Title IX 
supporters specifically asking the Department to maintain the 2011 DCL.128 Only one percent of 
the writers offered comments opposing Title IX, of which just 123 letters supported rescinding 
the 2011 DCL.129 This interpretation elevates the needle over the entire haystack, and is not the 
basis for an evidence-based determination.130 
 
Prior to even engaging in this process, the then-Assistant Secretary showed that the 
determinations of how to regulate had already been made, telling the New York Times that 
“[i]nvestigative processes have not been ‘fairly balanced between the accusing victim and the 
accused student,’…and students have been branded rapists ‘when the facts just don’t back that 
up.’ In most investigations, she said, there’s ‘not even an accusation that these accused students 
overrode the will of a young woman…Rather, the accusations — 90 percent of them — fall into 
the category of ‘we were both drunk,’ ‘we broke up, and six months later I found myself under a 
Title IX investigation because she just decided that our last sleeping together was not quite 
right.’”131 The Assistant Secretary later apologized for her statement.132 
 
Having released its Proposed Regulations without considering the overwhelming support 
of these commenters to the pre-2017 DCL, the Proposed Regulations weaken the core goal of 
Title IX as a means of preventing and redressing campus sexual harassment and assault, even if 
their stated goal is otherwise. Line-by-line, the Proposed Regulations discourage reporting and 
raise the cost of handling complaints, raising the due process floor in ways sometimes not even 
required in the criminal justice system. Yet the department has offered no evidence that requiring 
such protections is necessary to stop discrimination on the basis of sex against people accused of 
sexual violence and harassment, nor a reasoned explanation for why such extreme measures are 
needed, when less restrictive means could prove adequate.133 
 
At the same time, the Department has not considered the impact these elevated 
protections will have on individuals who have relied on Title IX for decades to prevent and 
address campus sexual assault. The Department writes that it “does not believe it is reasonable to 
                                                          
128 Tiffany Bufkin, et al., Widely Welcomed and Supported by the Public: A Report on the Title IX-Related 
Comments in the U.S. Department of Education’s Executive Order 13777 Comment Call, California Law Review 
Online (forthcoming), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3255205. 
129 Id. 
130 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, an agency decision will be arbitrary and capricious where it 
reaches a conclusion that contradicts the underlying record. Tucson Herpetological Soc. v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870, 
879 (9th Cir. 2009). 
131 Erica L. Green and Sheryl Gay Stollberg, Campus Rape Policies Get A New Look As The Accused Get DeVos’ 
Ear, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/us/politics/campus-rape-betsy-
devos-title-iv-education-trump-candice-jackson.html.  
132 Fernanda Zamudio-Suaréz, Civil Rights Official Apologizes For Saying 90% Of Campus Rape Cases Stem From 
Regret, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (July 12, 2017), available at 
https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/civil-rights-official-says-sexual-assault-policies-ignore-rights-of-the-
accused/119310.  
133 Cin. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 761 (6th Cir. 1995). 
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assume that these Proposed Regulations will have a quantifiable effect on the underlying rate of 
sexual harassment occurring in the education programs or activities of recipients.”134 This 
statement is surprising. If implemented as proposed, these regulations would offend Title IX by 
allowing institutions to treat those who disclose sexual harassment, assault, and violence 
unequally. The chilling effect on Reporting Individuals would be immediate, and, without a 
robust and credible infrastructure for addressing these claims, rates of sexual harassment would 
remain the same or even increase, all for a new regime that the Department does not even believe 
will reduce discrimination. 
 
Ultimately, the Proposed Regulations present a solution in search of a problem. Its 
authors insist that a lack of “clear regulatory standards” have “contributed to processes that have 
not been fair to all parties involved, that have lacked appropriate procedural protections, and that 
have undermined confidence in the reliability of the outcomes of investigations of sexual 
harassment allegations.”135 Yet the Department’s guidance has been in place for at least twenty 
years. Any lack of clarity has been the Department’s own creation, produced by its revocation of 
long-standing guidance without a good reason, and a pretextual reason is not a legally sufficient 
reason. 
 
Respectfully, upending twenty years of guidance in the manner proposed will not provide 
more clarity; rather, it will dilute Title IX’s effectiveness in addressing the perniciousness of 
sexual violence on campuses. We believe that New York State’s Education Law Art. 129-B’s 
statutory framework does provide clear guidance, all while protecting the rights of the parties 
involved and without sacrificing Title IX’s purpose of remedying and preventing sexual violence 
on campuses.  
 
E. The Proposed Regulations Implicate Significant First Amendment Academic 
Freedom Issues 
 
 Even as the Proposed Regulations direct that “[n]othing in this part requires a recipient 
to: (1) Restrict any rights that would otherwise be protected from government action by the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,”136 the Proposed Regulations violate the First Amendment 
rights of academic institutions. Traditionally, it is the provenance of educational institutions, and 
especially public institutions which enjoy the sovereignty of their state, to determine for 
themselves “on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, 
and who may be admitted to study.”137 Elemental to the right of deciding who may be admitted 
to study is determining who, and under what conditions, someone can continue to study. 
 
Colleges and universities, and especially state colleges and universities, thus have a duty 
to investigate violations of their policies (both academic and non-academic), conduct a fair 
process to determine responsibility, and sanction, where warranted, in a way that both educates 
the student as to the consequences of their actions and deters further similar deleterious activity. 
We can find no case that says the First Amendment or other Constitutional rights automatically 
                                                          
134 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61484. 
135 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61465. 
136 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61495. 
137 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter, J, concurring). 
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give way just because the action by the federal government is declared to be under the Spending 
Clause. The due process elements of the Proposed Regulations abrogate the rights of colleges 
and universities to determine their process at a local level, in a shared governance approach with 
the communities they serve, by setting detailed, costly processes, beyond those required by 
courts or statute, before the institution can determine whether someone credibly accused of 
harassing or assaulting another member of the institution’s community can be sanctioned or 
limited in their ability to continue harassing or assaulting the Reporting Individual or other 
community members. This infringes upon the institution’s academic freedom rights under the 
First Amendment to the Constitution. 
 
Institutions have an interest, protected by the First Amendment, in determining that 
process and developing that policy. These Proposed Regulations would diminish that interest. It 
is hard to determine if, in consideration of all the other issues raised in this letter, the Department 
would be able to survive a strict scrutiny analysis and show that, in depriving public and private 
institutions of what would otherwise be their First Amendment right, to determine a process that 
serves their interests and needs at the local level, the Department’s regulations were addressing a 
compelling governmental interest and were narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. It is 
especially difficult to make this showing inasmuch as the prior system has existed for more than 
four-and-a-half decades without infringing on academic freedom. 
 
Further, since the Department has stated that it “does not believe it is reasonable to 
assume that these Proposed Regulations will have a quantifiable effect on the underlying rate of 
sexual harassment occurring in the education programs or activities of” educational 
institutions,138 it is not even clear what the compelling governmental interest is that the 
Department would be addressing in the first place. Again, due process rights for Respondents, 
without some showing of unequal treatment or disparate impact on the basis of sex, is not even 
within the jurisdiction of the Department under this specific civil rights law, and so could hardly 
be called a compelling governmental interest. If it is, the Department could ask Congress to 
change the law or enact a new law, amend the Constitution, or otherwise take action in a manner 
that does not infringe on the First Amendment rights of institutions. But the Department may not 
use the regulatory process to infringe upon the First Amendment rights of institutions recognized 
under Supreme Court precedent. 
 
F. The Proposed Regulations Violate Basic Principles of Federalism 
 
One of the largest oversights of these Proposed Regulations is the Department’s lack of 
recognition that many states have considered legislation related to sexual assault since 2014.139 
In 2015, nearly a quarter of U.S. states passed legislation on this topic, and legislators in other 
states created committees to examine this issue and make policy recommendations.140 The lack 
of consideration of state laws regarding campus sexual assault will create problems not only for 
New York, but for a host of other states that have been active in legislating in this area. Many of 
                                                          
138 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61485. 
139 Kati Lebioda, State Policy Proposals to Combat Campus Sexual Assault, American Association of State Colleges 
and Universities (Dec. 2015), available at https://www.aascu.org/policy/publications/policy-
matters/campussexualassault.pdf (In 2014, only six states considered legislation related to sexual assault). 
140 Id. 
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these state laws incorporate federal statute, regulations and previous guidance as the “floor” and 
then regulate beyond what is required on the federal level to ensure increased due process 
protection for both Reporting Individuals and Respondents. 
 
i. Federalism and State Impacts on New York’s Administrative Law 
 
SUNY opposes the Proposed Regulations because they interfere with New York State’s 
obligation under New York Education Law Article 129-B to provide for a safe campus 
environment for New York’s students and fairly adjudicate violations of conduct on college 
campuses. Although the Department states, without evidence, that “[w]e also have determined 
that this regulatory action does not unduly interfere with State, local, or tribal governments in the 
exercise of their governmental functions,”141 for the reasons outlined in this letter, these 
Proposed Regulations violate the principle of federalism, the sovereignty of the State of New 
York, and are inconsistent with existing New York State law. 
 
The Tenth Amendment states that powers not expressly granted to the federal 
government must remain with the sovereign state. Issues of state law preemption and preemption 
of the rulings of a state’s highest court must be considered when a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking is issued. 
 
Even though multiple states in the country have laws addressing this overall issue, 
nothing in the Proposed Regulations has acknowledged that fact. It is one of grave importance 
when the Department’s Proposed Regulations make wholesale changes to the nature of campus 
conduct hearings. While the proposed definition of “sexual harassment” is broader than what is 
defined in New York State’s Education Law, it encompasses specific conduct addressed in New 
York State law. 
 
The Proposed Regulations define “sexual harassment” as: 
 
(i) An employee of the recipient conditioning the provision of an aid, benefit, or 
service of the recipient on an individual’s participation in unwelcome sexual 
conduct;  
(ii) Unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person equal access to the 
recipient’s education program or activity; or 
(iii) Sexual assault, as defined in 34 CFR 668.46(a).142 
 
Sexual harassment as defined in the Proposed Regulations squarely captures certain areas now 
regulated by New York State law, including sexual assault, and significantly changes the nature 
of campus hearings in regard to due process in a way that runs counter to New York State’s 
public policy and could cause significant conflicts with New York’s own law.  
 
                                                          
141 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61484. 
142 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61,496. 
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Specifically, the Proposed Regulations will cause issues in regard to hearsay statements 
as used in administrative proceedings in New York. The final ruling of Matter of Haug v. State 
Univ. Of N.Y. at Potsdam,143 which was taken up by the New York Court of Appeals in late 
2018, held that hearsay evidence and Haug’s own testimony constituted substantial evidence to 
support the University’s determination.144 Similarly, the Second Circuit recently affirmed in Doe 
v. Colgate University (2019), a private college case, that a university’s sexual misconduct 
hearing did not violate Title IX when it considered hearsay evidence and did not permit the 
Respondent to directly cross-examine the Reporting Individuals.145 
 
Hearsay statements are commonly used in administrative proceedings in New York.146 
New York’s highest court, the New York State Court of Appeals, has stated in numerous cases, 
including Haug: “[h]earsay evidence is admissible as competent evidence in an administrative 
proceeding, and if sufficiently relevant and probative may constitute substantial evidence even if 
contradicted by live testimony on credibility grounds.”147 This is not the first time the Court of 
Appeals has ruled on this issue in general, but it was the first time the high court has taken up 
this issue regarding CPLR Article 78148 proceedings challenging a formal hearing on a college 
campus in New York for sexual misconduct. The facts here demonstrate exactly why hearsay 
was an important, probative component of this specific type of hearing. The Reporting Individual 
did not testify, but the police officer who took the Reporting Individual’s statement did, and 
written notes prepared by the Director of Student Conduct and Community Standards were also 
considered.149 In Haug, the Petitioner (Respondent below) testified at the hearing, and the Court 
stated: “[t]he hearing board also could have reasonably interpreted some of petitioner’s behavior 
as consciousness of guilt and concluded that his version of the events was not credible.”150 The 
Court further stated that, “[u]ltimately, it was the province of the hearing board to resolve any 
conflicts in the evidence and make credibility determinations.”151 As a matter of process, New 
York has an entire structure for any administrative proceedings to ensure that due process rights 
are not violated. Considering the myriad of agencies and different types of administrative 
hearings that exist, it is no surprise that New York’s courts have ruled on some of the issues that 
go to the heart of the Proposed Regulations. 
 
The lack of a requirement for cross-examination during administrative proceedings goes 
directly to the heart of New York Education Law Article 129-B (Article 129-B) as well.152 
Article 129-B affords this discretion and is integral to the law because it allows the Reporting 
Individual to decide not to participate in the disciplinary process, but still allows an institution to 
go forward in the event they want to pursue these allegations. New York’s law is structured in 
                                                          
143 Matter of Haug v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 32 N.Y.3d 1044, 1046 (2018). 
144 32 N.Y.3d at 1046-47. 
145 Doe v. Colgate Univ., 2019 WL 190515, at *8 (N.D.N.Y., Jan. 15, 2019) (Summary Order). 
146 See Matter of Gray v. Adduci, 73 N.Y.2d 741, 742 (1988); see also Matter of National Basketball Assn. v. New 
York State Div. Of Human Rights, 68 N.Y.2d 644, 646 (1986); see also People ex rel. Vega v. Smith, 66 N.Y.2d 130, 
139 (1985); and Matter of Malacarne v. City of Yonkers Parking Auth., 41 N.Y.2d 198, 193 (1976). 
147 Haug, 32 N.Y.3d at 1046. 
148 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 et seq. 
149 Matter of Haug v. State Univ. Of New York at Potsdam, 149 A.D.3d 1200, 1201-1202 (3d Dep’t 2017). 
150 Haug, 32 N.Y.3d at 1046. 
151 Id. at 1046-47. 
152 N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6439 et seq. 
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such a way that the institution is responsible for investigating and adjudicating any claims of 
misconduct.153 This was true even before the enactment of Article 129-B and is now an essential 
part of the Students’ Bill of Rights provisions.154 To ignore what is current principle and process 
on cross-examination in administrative proceedings in not just New York, but also the Second 
Circuit, would then create significant issues going forward for college campuses in New York.  
 
Specifically, Jacobson v. Blaise, an Appellate Division case, directly addressed the issue 
of cross examination in live hearings relating to sexual misconduct.155 The court “reject[ed the] 
petitioner’s claim that he was denied due process because he was not permitted to cross-examine 
an adverse witness in an administrative proceeding.”156 Further, the Second Circuit has stated, 
“[t]he right to cross-examine witnesses generally has not been considered an essential 
requirement of due process in school disciplinary proceedings.”157 The Department’s Proposed 
Regulations will cause undue disruption of settled case law and statute in New York, and goes 
against well-settled administrative law principles that govern administrative proceedings. 
 
New York’s laws and the rulings by New York’s highest court are embedded with New 
York’s fundamental policies and beliefs as a state, and preempt the Proposed Regulations by the 
Department. The Proposed Regulations violate the principles of federalism. 
 
ii. How Sebelius Informs the Nature of Federalism 
 
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.”158 As recently as 2012, the United States Supreme Court has 
ruled on the limited powers of the federal government and the importance of state police 
powers.159 While Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius deals with the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), it is instructive on how the U.S. Supreme Court has now treated 
federal laws and regulations and how they abridge the states’ police powers going forward. 
 
The majority opinion in Sebelius clarifies that Congress’ power under the Spending 
Clause has great latitude, including allowing grants to be conditioned upon “taking certain 
actions Congress could not require [states] to take.”160 However, the Court made it clear there 
are “recognized limits [ ] to secure state compliance with federal objectives.”161 The Court has 
“repeatedly characterized” legislation and regulation reliant on the Spending Clause as 
contractual in nature between the states and the federal government.162 When the federal 
                                                          
153 Matter of Boyd v. State Univ. Of N.Y. at Cortland, 110 A.D.3d 1174, 1175 (3d Dep’t 2013). 
154 N.Y. EDUC. L § 6443(3) (”Make a decision about whether or not to disclose a crime or violation and participate 
in the judicial or conduct process and/or criminal justice process free from pressure by the institution”). 
155 Jacobson, 157 A.D.3d at 1076-78. 
156 Jacobson, 157 A.D.3d at 1076. 
157 Winnick, 460 F.2d at 549. 
158 U.S. CONST. art. X. 
159 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012). 
160 College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999); Sebelius, 
567 U.S. at 576. 
161 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 577. 
162 Id. at 577. 
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government exercises spending power, it hinges upon “the State voluntarily and knowingly 
accept[ing] the terms of the ‘contract.’”163 Essentially, when the federal government uses 
“financial inducements to exert a ‘power akin to undue influence,’” it is a violation of the 
principles set forth in the Tenth Amendment.164 This concept has been supported in past 
decisions by the Supreme Court in New York v. U.S. and Printz v. U.S.165 The Court has long 
stated that federal programs do not hold the same type of danger when the state has a “legitimate 
choice whether to accept the federal conditions in exchange for the federal funds.”166  
 
In Sebelius, the PPACA was written so that if a state did not implement the new 
substantial expansion of Medicaid, the state would lose all Medicaid funding going forward. 
That would include both federal dollars for the existing Medicaid program, and any funding for 
the Medicaid expansion.167 Essentially, the Court stated that federal funding for Medicaid made 
up such substantial portions of current state budgets that changing the program in this fashion 
through this legislation constituted a new program, and as such, revoking all funds from the 
existing program on top of any new funds constituted an essential overreach in Spending Clause 
powers.168 The Court was very clear by stating: “[w]hen… such conditions take the form of 
threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a 
means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”169  
 
Here, the Department has substantially altered the nature of Title IX through these 
Proposed Regulations so that it would create an entirely new process for campus hearings in 
relation to sexual harassment and sexual assault. A parallel argument can be made to Sebelius 
that if these Proposed Regulations were implemented and a state did not come into compliance, it 
would lose a significant portion of its state budget provided through federal education funding. 
Many of the funds a state would stand to lose are independent grants, including a loss of all 
federal financial aid funds. Sebelius does also address blanket warnings about future loss of 
federal funding for noncompliance in statute.170 Essentially, the Court has stated that there can be 
a blanket warning, however, a state cannot anticipate alterations that “transform [something] so 
dramatically.”171 For many reasons stated above, the Proposed Regulations are a significant 
departure from all guidance, statutes and regulation that have come before it, and, as such, no 
state would have any advance warning or knowledge from the past 45 years of accepting federal 
funds for education. This would constitute a significant overreach with no clear precedent in the 
actual text of Title IX itself and would allow the Department to withhold federal funding from 
states that do not comply if these regulations are implemented. For these foregoing reasons, 
SUNY requests that the Proposed Regulations be withdrawn. 
 
 
                                                          
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
166 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 578. 
167 Id. at 579-80. 
168 Id. 
169 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 580. 
170 Id. at 584-85. 
171 Id. at 584. 
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iii. The Conduct Regulated by the Department Falls Directly Within New 
York State’s Police Powers 
 
A recognized principle of state sovereignty is the acknowledgement of what qualifies as a 
state police power. State police powers have historically been broad. Case law refers to this as a 
“general power of governing, possessed by the States but not by the Federal Government.”172 
State police power does not need constitutional authorization, as it occupies the space where the 
federal government has no authority to govern, and ensures that issues “touch[ing] on citizens’ 
daily lives” are addressed “by smaller governments closer to the governed.”173 This includes 
issues such as “punishing street crime, running public schools, and zoning property for 
development,” however, that list is not exhaustive.174 Even if the federal government does not 
have express authorization through the Constitution to govern certain issues, any state 
government action is still subject to constitutional principles, including due process and equal 
protection.175 
 
SUNY is a public state entity providing education, thus, it falls squarely within New 
York’s police powers to regulate it. Further, in 2015, New York passed the most comprehensive 
law in the country governing campus conduct processes in relation to sexual assault, dating 
violence, domestic violence, and stalking.176 Article 129-B of the New York State Education 
Law put into place a balanced procedure for receiving, investigating and adjudicating disclosures 
by Reporting Individuals in relation to that specific conduct. Article 129-B creates uniform 
procedures for handling these types of reports on college and university campuses in New 
York.177 As early as 2014, New York’s upper chamber held a roundtable discussion about best 
practices for any hearings conducted by campuses in relation to sexual assault and released a 
report on this issue in relation to how it affected New York students.178 New York’s Governor 
and both houses of New York’s Legislature engaged in extensive negotiations before the final 
passage of the legislation and its signature into law.179 
 
New York’s laws in this specific area are well within its state police powers. The federal 
government has set the floor on this issue in the past with the passage of the VAWA 
                                                          
172 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 536; see also e.g. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000). 
173 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 536. 
174 Id. at 535. 
175 Id.  
176 N.Y. EDUC. L. Art. 129-B; Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Signs “Enough is 
Enough” Legislation to Combat Sexual Assault on College and University Campuses (July 7, 2015), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-enough-enough-legislation-combat-sexual-assault-
college-and-university. 
177 Assemblymember Glick Letter in Support, Bill Jacket, L. 2015, ch.76 at 06 (N.Y.); New York Civil Liberties 
Union Mem. Of Support, Bill Jacket, L. 2015, ch. 76 at 21 (N.Y.). 
178 Press Release, Senator Kenneth P. LaValle, Senator Ken LaValle Holds Roundtable Concerning College Rape 
and Sexual Assault (May 20, 2014), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/video/kenneth-p-lavalle/senator-ken-
lavalle-holds-roundtable-concerning-college-rape-and; Sen. Kenneth P. LaValle, Chairman, New York State Senate 
Standing Committee on Higher Education, Sexual Violence on College Campuses: A New York State Perspective 
(Oct. 2014). 
179 Matthew Hamilton, Cuomo, legislative leaders reach agreement on ‘Enough is Enough’ (update), Times Union, 
Jun. 16, 2015, https://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/237093/cuomo-legislative-leaders-reach-agreement-on-
enough-is-enough/. 
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Amendments to the Clery Act, and New York’s law incorporates the due process strictures 
required in the Final Rule promulgated pursuant to the 2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery 
Act.180 New York’s law has features that are not discussed in either guidance or federal law, such 
as transcript notations.181 The Proposed Regulations, if enacted, threaten to disturb not just New 
York’s laws, but also that of many other states. Further, it significantly disrupts settled law in 
New York and at least one provision runs in direct contravention to case law settled in the New 
York State Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court.182 
 
In Matter of Haug v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, a student commenced a CPLR 
Article 78 proceeding against SUNY Potsdam, challenging his expulsion after a finding of 
responsibility.183 The original decision saw Haug suspended, and when Haug challenged the 
decision with an appeal, the school revised its decision and expelled Haug.184 The Court of 
Appeals took up the case specifically on the issue regarding whether hearsay evidence, along 
with the petitioner’s own testimony at the administrative hearing, was enough to provide 
substantial evidence to support SUNY Potsdam’s determination.185 The Proposed Regulations as 
a whole are troubling because specific sections of it directly contradict New York State’s 
administrative procedures. This again goes back to how important it is for the federal 
government to recognize that state sovereignty must be respected, especially in relation to these 
specific processes. The Federal government’s goal in regulating this area has never gone so far as 
to invalidate such procedures in this arena, and if these Proposed Regulations go into effect, it 
will render part of New York’s considered approach to these issues less effective. For these 
reasons, the Proposed Regulations should be withdrawn. 
 
iv. Inconsistency with New York State Law 
 
SUNY further opposes the Proposed Regulations because of the inconsistencies it creates 
with New York State law. One distinction between New York Education Law Article 129-B and 
the Proposed Regulations is that the Department would only allow parties to exclude past sexual 
history while Article 129-B allows parties to exclude both past sexual history and past mental 
health history to protect Reporting Individuals and Respondents alike in the conduct process.186 
 
SUNY also has concerns with how protective and supportive measures are described by 
the Department in the Proposed Regulations. Previously, in the 2016 Clery Act Handbook, 
Department guidance stated: 
 
[p]rotective measures should minimize the burden on the victim. For example, if 
the complainant and alleged perpetrator share the same class or residence hall, the 
school should not, as a matter of course, remove the victim from the class or 
                                                          
180 See N.Y. EDUC. L. ART. 129-B, § 6440 et seq.; see also 34 C.F.R. Part 668 (2014). 
181 N.Y. EDUC. L. §6444(6). 
182 See Haug, 32 N.Y.3d at 1045. 
183 149 A.3d 1200, 1200-1201 (3d Dep’t 2018). 
184 Id. 
185 Haug, 32 N.Y.3d at 1045. 
186 See N.Y. EDUC. L § 6444(5)(b)(vi) in contrast with Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61474. 
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housing while allowing the alleged perpetrator to remain without carefully 
considering the facts of the case.187 
 
Supportive measures are considered non-disciplinary and non-punitive. Once a complaint 
is lodged against a student, if one student’s housing or academic schedule must change to 
maintain a status quo, colleges generally move the accused student. Education Law Article 129-
B requires that if there is a no contact order in place, if both parties arrive simultaneously to a 
location, the Respondent must leave.188 This now raises a series of questions that may cause New 
York colleges to have compliance challenges. The Department is unclear on whether these 
supportive measures are now considered disciplinary in nature, and whether this would constitute 
an “unreasonable burden.”189 At this point, the Proposed Regulations do not lend any clarity to 
what this means and do not define this in plain terms for recipients to follow. This could cause 
confusion for states, and lead to onerous and expensive litigation. 
 
In sum, the Department has offered no rationale for why it upends its own long-standing 
guidance, including policies and sub-regulatory guidance enacted following a notice-and-
comment period, severely impacting the reliance interests of millions of students, faculty, and 
staff at the nation’s school districts, colleges, and universities. Moreover, these proposals are 
inconsistent with the procedural due process minimums and balances already established by 
superior authorities—Congress, through the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) and the United States Supreme Court—for recipient institutions handling 
cases of sexual harassment and sexual violence. They offend the Tenth Amendment right of 
States, including New York, to set forth standards of due process applicable to administrative 
proceedings, and they erode the First Amendment rights of colleges and universities without 
serving a compelling government interest. Our hope is that the Department is not so single-
minded in its pursuit of the Proposed Regulations that it cannot accommodate SUNY’s concerns, 
and the concerns of thousands of other writers submitting comments. The Department must fully 
consider all of these comments and address the undeniable imbalance promised by the Proposed 
Regulations. 
 
II. Issues With Specific Sections of the Proposed Regulations 
 
In this part of its comments, SUNY discusses its issues with specific sections of the 
Department’s Proposed Regulations. Section A describes issues with the § 106.30 definitions. 
Section B describes issues with § 106.44, which describes how recipients should respond to 
sexual harassment allegations. Section C describes issues with § 106.45, which relates to 
grievance procedures for formal complaints of sexual harassment. Section D contains answers to 
the Department’s directed questions. 
 
                                                          
187 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE HANDBOOK FOR CAMPUS SAFETY AND SECURITY REPORTING 2016 
EDITION, pp. 8-15, available at 
https://ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/attachments/HandbookforCampusSafetyandSecurityReporting.pdf (hereinafter 
referred to as “2016 Handbook”). 
188 N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6444(5)(b)(vi). 
189 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61469. 
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A. § 106.30 – Definitions - Sexual Harassment 
 
Section A describes SUNY’s specific issues with the Department’s definition of “sexual 
harassment” as it narrows the Department’s administrative enforcement of Title IX with its 
definition in the Proposed Regulations, and also contains inconsistencies with the 2013 VAWA 
amendments to the Clery Act. 
 
Department Narrows Administrative Enforcement of Title IX through Its New Definition 
of “Sexual Harassment” 
 
The Department’s Proposed Regulations would change its approach to administrative 
enforcement of Title IX in a way that is far narrower than the plain language of the statute. The 
Proposed Regulations define “sexual harassment” as, among other things, “unwelcome conduct 
on the basis of sex that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies 
a person equal access to the recipient’s education program or activity.”190 While this provision 
mirrors the statutory language of “excluded from participation,” it forgets the other two 
provisions, which state that no person should be “denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination” in educational programs or activities.191 While SUNY understands and agrees 
with the Supreme Court’s higher standards for receipt of money judgments, we find it very 
surprising that the Department would reduce its administrative authority in this area in this way.  
 
Across the country, sexual harassment and assault can deny people the benefits of 
education, even if it does not exclude them from education. If Congress meant “deny benefits” to 
be as narrow as “exclude,” it would not have bothered repeating the phrase. A plain 
interpretation, consistent with statutory interpretation standards, states that a legislative body 
does not use words accidentally or without meaning. Therefore, a plain interpretation is that a 
lower level of denial of benefits could violate Title IX. This likely does not mean that a very 
minor limitation would meet the standard. But by affirmatively declining any authority to even 
investigate whether the actions of an employee or other student in a K-12 or higher education 
institution denies a person or persons “the benefits of” education on the basis of sex, the 
Department firmly closes the door on investigating a prong that Congress included in the statute. 
Further, it is possible to be the victim of discrimination without being fully denied access. Again, 
by regulating away any authority to even investigate such cases, the Department denies itself the 
ability to effectuate the will of Congress or to even attempt to effectuate that will. We believe 
this is an error of interpretation and urge the Department to return to its long-held approach to 
investigating Title IX. 
 
The 2013 VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act Show Congressional Intent and the 
Department’s Definition Contradicts Congress’ Statements on this Issue 
 
In defining sexual harassment to specifically include “sexual assault” as defined in the 
2013 Violence Against Women Act amendments to the Clery Act,192 the Proposed Regulations 
create significant inconsistencies that could require colleges to make the Hobson’s choice of 
                                                          
190 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61496 (emphasis added). 
191 20 U.S.C. §1681. 
192 34 CFR 668.46(a). 
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risking funds and fines by acting in a way that is inconsistent with the Higher Education Act or 
risking funds (and having determinations of responsibility for violations—but not determinations 
of non-responsibility—overturned by OCR staff) by acting in a way that is inconsistent with 
Title IX regulations. While the greatest impact will be in higher education, we will note that 
some traditional K-12 institutions accept Title IV funds for certain post-baccalaureate career and 
technical education and will likewise face this difficult and confusing choice. 
 
These distinctions and inconsistencies are troubling since the Proposed Regulations 
conflict with a statute passed by bipartisan majorities in both Houses of Congress, signed by the 
President, and implemented after a successful Negotiated Rulemaking and opportunity for public 
comment. 
 
In the Final Rule implementing the Violence Against Women Act amendments to the 
Clery Act, the Department heard from commenters who worried that the “Proposed Regulations 
eliminate essential due process protections, and entrust unqualified campus employees and 
students to safeguard the interests of the parties involved in adjudicating allegations.”193 The 
Department firmly disagreed, pointing out that the statute and the regulations developed pursuant 
to the statute “require that: an institution’s disciplinary proceedings be fair, prompt, and impartial 
to both the accused and the accuser; the proceedings provide the same opportunities to both 
parties to have an advisor of their choice present; and the proceedings be conducted by officials 
who receive training on sexual assault issues and on how to conduct a proceeding that protects 
the safety of victims and promotes accountability. Thus, these procedures do provide significant 
protections for all parties.”194 The Department also made clear that the levels of due process 
should be appropriate for these types of cases, writing that “[w]e also note that institutions are 
not making determinations of criminal responsibility but are determining whether the 
institution’s own rules have been violated.”195 In the current Proposed Regulations, the 
Department ignores this history to make changes that are inconsistent with, and may be seen as 
an attempt to supersede, the VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act, inasmuch as both sets of 
regulations would include actions defined in the VAWA Amendments as sexual assault. 
 
B. § 106.44 – Recipient’s response to sexual harassment 
 
Section B of this Part outlines SUNY’s specific concerns with parts of the Department’s 
Proposed Regulations. Subsection (i) discusses SUNY’s concerns with the contradictions to 
Clery Act geography, and the inconsistencies in relation to off campus programs. Subsection (ii) 
discusses SUNY’s concerns with the Department’s new “safe harbor” provisions. Subsection (iii) 
discusses SUNY’s concerns with mandated investigations in the instance of two or more 
complainants and highlights the confidentiality issues associated with that provision. Subsection 
(iv) discusses SUNY’s specific concerns with the Department’s proposed “emergency removal” 
provision. 
 
 
 
                                                          
193 VAWA Final Rule, at 62771. 
194 Id. at 62772. 
195 Id. 
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i.  §106.44(a) Generally – Geography 
 
SUNY takes specific issue with how the Department has treated geography in its 
Proposed Regulations. It is in contradiction with the Congressional intent of the 2013 VAWA 
amendments to the Clery Act in relation to geography, and also causes significant problems 
going forward in relation to Greek letter organizations. 
 
The Department’s Proposed Regulations Ignore Congressional Intent of the 2013 VAWA 
Amendments to the Clery Act Regarding Geography 
 
The response requirements of the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act are not limited to 
Clery Act geography. From the face of the Final Rule, they apply to the institution regardless of 
whether the incident disclosed occurred on campus or off campus. The Final Rule requires that 
higher education institutions have a policy statement explaining the process and procedure for 
disclosures of sexual assault (and three other crimes) and the policy statement would apply 
“whether the offense occurred on or off campus.”196 In its 2016 Clery Handbook, the Department 
clearly states and emphasizes that “[y]ou must follow the procedures described in your statement 
(of response, investigation and adjudication policy) regardless of where the alleged case of 
dating violence, domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking occurred (i.e., on or off your 
institution’s Clery Act geography).”197 
 
The Department, even while defining sexual harassment to include, in part, sexual assault 
as defined in the Clery Act, uses a very different standard of geographic jurisdiction. The 
Department had traditionally required institutions to respond to harassment or violence that could 
limit participation in educational programs or activities, wherever they occurred in the world, if 
the covered institution was in the United States. Case law is split in determining whether the 
provisions of Title IX would apply to activity that occurred outside of the United States.198 In its 
Proposed Regulations, the Department now states that “[t]he requirements that a recipient adopt 
a policy and grievance procedures as described in this section apply only to exclusion from 
participation, denial of benefits, or discrimination on the basis of sex occurring against a person 
in the United States.”199 In addition to being inconsistent with the Department’s own 
interpretation of the VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act, another education law that is a mere 
half-decade old, and being inconsistent with longstanding Department interpretation and 
practice, this limitation will have real and significant impact on the access of some students to 
their education. 
 
                                                          
196 VAWA Final Rule, at 62786. 
197 2016 Handbook, at pp. 8-16 (emphasis in original). 
198 Compare King v. Board of Control of Eastern Michigan University, 221 F.Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Mich. 2002) with 
Mattingly v. Univ. of Louisville, 2006 WL 2178032 (W.D. Ky. July 28, 2006) and Phillips v. St. George’s 
University, 2007 WL 3407728 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2007). For more detail, see Robert J. Aalberts, Chad Marzen, and 
Darren Prum, Studying is Dangerous? Possible Federal Remedies for Study Abroad Liability, 41 J. OF COLLEGE AND 
UNIV. L. 189 (2015); Joseph Storch and Natalie Mello, Reporting on Student Safety and Security Abroad: Legal 
Requirements and Best Practices, Conference Paper, National Association of College and University Attorneys 
Annual Conference (2015), available at https://system.suny.edu/media/suny/content-
assets/documents/compliance/NACUA-Mello-and-Storch.pdf.  
199 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61496. 
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Based on the plain language of the Department’s Proposed Regulations, if 10 students of 
an educational institution go on an institution-sponsored and run study abroad trip to fulfill a 
requirement of their major at the institution, and the three female participants disclose that they 
have been repeatedly raped, harassed and sexually assaulted by an institution-employed 
chaperone (no male students report this experience), hired to attend this program and supervise 
students, and due to the repeated harassment by an institution employee, those three students 
leave the international program, thus derailing their ability to complete their major at their home 
institution in the United States, and causing all three to drop out of their institution and incur 
significant debt, if the institution takes no action, those students—whose access to education 
at home and abroad was barred by the action aimed solely at females—would have 
absolutely no recourse to OCR under Title IX, the law charged with prohibiting 
restrictions of access to education on the basis of sex. We can see no policy reason to support 
this change and believe that such a scenario is not impossible to imagine (indeed similar 
scenarios have been reported on distance education trips). At best, we will see confusion in 
Reporting Individuals between the requirements of Title IX, the Clery Act, and state laws such as 
Education Law Article 129-B. 
 
The Department’s Intent on Off Campus Programs Is Confusing and Inconsistent with the 
Clery Act 
 
The Department, in significantly limiting Title IX requirements to disclosures of 
incidents that occur on campus or off campus on institution programs or activities includes some 
language around Greek letter organization housing and other off campus activities.200 In addition 
to being inconsistent with the Clery Act response requirements as added by the 2013 VAWA 
amendments, the standards are inconsistent with the Clery Act crime reporting definitions of On 
Campus, Non-Campus and Public Property,201 and will likely cause additional confusion as the 
Department adds yet one more set of geographic demarcating rules. 
 
Further, the Department’s discussion of Greek letter association housing will likely have 
an impact on the relationship of some institutions to those organizations. Institutions that are 
incentivized to reduce their obligations under Title IX (and we do not count the State University 
of New York among this group), may be incentivized to reduce their oversight of such housing 
so violations occurring there are not covered under these Proposed Regulations. 
 
Under the prior OCR interpretations, institutions would be required to take action if 
incidents disclosed there could limit access to education, regardless of the level of oversight of 
the group. Further, under the Clery Act, analogous sexual assault crimes might be reported if 
they occurred at Greek letter housing, but only, per the Department’s definition, if the house was 
“owned or controlled by a student organization that is officially recognized.”202 The limiting 
factor here is that the deed or lease would have to be held by the organization, since the 
Department also declares that “[p]rivate homes and businesses are not included.”203 Therefore if 
individual members of a recognized organization (Greek letter or otherwise) live in a house and 
                                                          
200 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61468. 
201 VAWA Final Rule, at 62783-62784. 
202 2016 Handbook, at 2-18. 
203 2016 Handbook, at 2-13. 
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they (or their parents) are on the deed or lease, it would not be considered non-campus property. 
This definition is inconsistent with the Department’s new regime based on a reading of selected 
case law that could indicate whether a recognized student organization’s house would or would 
not be considered to be a program or activity under these new Title IX standards. At best, this is 
confusing and inconsistent with longstanding Clery Act geographic definitions. At worst, it 
would incentivize some institutions to either no longer recognize Greek letter associations, or 
reduce their recognition so that it would not meet the tests drawn from the selected cases in the 
Proposed Regulations.204 But there are very good reasons for the Department to incentivize such 
relationships. Recognition can come with requirements such as mandatory insurance, risk 
management standards and, most importantly, training requirements. Not only could such 
training requirements reduce the incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assault,205 but it 
could also reduce the incidents of hazing, educate about the safe use of alcohol, assist in suicide 
reduction, and other important topics. Disincentivizing engagement with these student 
populations, even slightly, may lead some institutions to forego these beneficial educational 
programs, increasing risks for certain students. 
 
ii. §106.44 (a) and (b) – “Safe Harbor” 
 
SUNY has significant concerns with the “safe harbor” provision the Department has 
included in its Proposed Regulations. The Proposed Regulations create a significant imbalance in 
rights for Reporting Individuals and Respondents, and do not follow the spirit of Title IX. In 
truth, the Proposed Regulations provide a “partial” safe harbor—safe harbor from accusations of 
Title IX violations made by Reporting Individuals but elevated exposure to Title IX violation 
accusations made by Respondents. 
 
The Safe Harbor Provisions Provide Only Partial Safe Harbor, Elevating Rights of 
Respondents over Those Traditionally Protected By Title IX 
 
In its Proposed Regulations, the Department writes that institutions will not be found to 
be deliberately indifferent and, thus, out of compliance with Title IX in responding to complaints 
unless their actions are “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances”206 and the 
“Assistant Secretary will not deem a recipient’s determination regarding responsibility to be 
evidence of deliberate indifference by the recipient merely because the Assistant Secretary would 
have reached a different determination based on an independent weighing of the evidence.”207 
The Department separately refers to this as a “safe harbor.”208 But the Department only seeks to 
shield institutions from liability from failing those who directly experience sexual harassment or 
sexual violence. These are, to be clear, the people that Title IX was written to protect.  
 
                                                          
204 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61468. 
205 For a particularly useful example, see Binghamton University: State University of New York, 20:1 Sexual 
Assault Prevention; 20:1 Bystander Intervention, available at https://www.binghamton.edu/hpps/students/peer-
education/index.html. 
206 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61497. 
207 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61497. 
208 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61469. 
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In considering the incredibly detailed due process requirements imposed by the 
Department on public and private institutions of education, requirements that are, in total, far 
beyond what any statute or court case in any jurisdiction have ever required of a disciplinary 
process, the Department invades upon the measured and considered due process and policy 
balance that public and private institutions carefully apply to their policies and practices, and 
wholesale replaces local control with a top down one-size-fits-all set of standards issued from 
what the Secretary of Education called “the heavy hand of Washington.”209 The Department 
admits in the preamble that these due process requirements go beyond what case law would 
require of institutions.210 As the Secretary of Education once criticized, this is an example of “the 
Department insist[ing] it knew better than those who walk side-by-side with students every 
day.”211 The Department in its Preamble, at least in terms of reducing liability for failing to serve 
a Reporting Individual, writes that it believes the narrowed standard of obligation  
 
…holds recipients accountable without depriving them of legitimate and 
necessary flexibility to make disciplinary decisions and to provide supportive 
measures that might be necessary in response to sexual harassment. Moreover, the 
Department believes that teachers and local school leaders with unique knowledge 
of the school culture and student body are best positioned to make disciplinary 
decisions; thus, unless the recipient’s response to sexual harassment is clearly 
unreasonable in light of known circumstances, the Department will not second 
guess such decisions. In fact, the Court observed in Davis that courts must not 
second guess recipients’ disciplinary decisions. As a matter of policy, the 
Department believes that it would be equally wrong for it to second guess 
recipients’ disciplinary decisions through the administrative enforcement 
process.212  
 
Later, the Department insists that its “intent is to balance the need to establish procedural 
safeguards providing a fair process for all parties with recognition that a recipient needs 
flexibility to employ grievance procedures that work best for the recipient’s educational 
environment.”213 SUNY again appreciates the Department’s acknowledgement of the expertise 
that exists on our campuses and in our states for how to address harassment and violence in a 
balanced, thoughtful manner. 
 
                                                          
209 Remarks of Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, George Mason University (Sep. 7, 2017), available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/07/transcript-betsy-devoss-remarks-on-campus-
sexual-assault/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.037d88f26620.  
210 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61469. “Recognizing that the Department has broad authority under the Title 
IX statute to issue regulations that effectuate the provisions of Title IX, the Department is retaining and proposes to 
add in the proposed regulation provisions that would clarify that, in addition to a general deliberate indifference 
standard, schools must take other actions that courts do not require in private litigation under Title IX (e.g., requiring 
a designated Title IX Coordinator, requiring written grievance procedures, describing the supportive measures that a 
non-deliberatively indifferent response may require, requiring a school to investigate and adjudicate formal 
complaints, and other requirements found in proposed §§ 106.8, 106.44, and 106.45”). 106.44 is the safe harbor 
section. 106.45 list due process obligations. 
211 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61469. 
212 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61468. 
213 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61472. 
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So it is curious that, while the Department offers safe harbor from a Title IX violation 
finding for failing to serve a Reporting Individual, it specifically disclaims any safe harbor for 
failing to follow the detailed due process obligations the Department would impose upon 
institutions. The Department calls for institutional policies to have the “basic requirement” to 
“treat complainants and Respondents equitably.”214 The Department admits that “OCR’s role is 
not to conduct a de novo review of the recipient’s investigation and determination of 
responsibility for a particular Respondent. Rather, OCR’s role is to determine whether a recipient 
has complied with Title IX and its implementing regulations.”215 To that end, with local control 
and minimal impact as its goal, the Department states that “OCR will not find a recipient to have 
violated Title IX or this part solely because OCR may have weighed the evidence differently in a 
given case. The Department believes it is important to include this provision in the regulations to 
provide notice and transparency to recipients about OCR’s role and standard of review in 
enforcing Title IX.”216 
 
But even as it calls for institutions to treat Reporting Individuals and Respondents 
equitably as a basic part of their own procedures, OCR will only provide such local control and a 
light bureaucratic touch in cases where a Respondent has been found not responsible. Incredibly, 
on the same page as these adulatory statements of flexibility and local control of the process by 
institutions that are closest to the students, the Department firmly states that “[t[his provision 
does not, however, preclude OCR from requiring a recipient’s determination of responsibility to 
be set aside if the recipient did not comply with proposed § 106.45.”217 No standards are set for 
such an invasive overturning of a determination made by an institution after going through its 
process. Ostensibly, OCR could find a minor violation of the detailed due process requirements 
of the regulations and reverse a finding of responsibility. Yet even with a finding of gross or 
even malicious violations that lead to a non-responsibility finding, an OCR investigator would be 
powerless to do anything aside from closing the file and moving on. 
 
This inequitable and unbalanced process will certainly lead to more administrative 
litigation filed by Respondents. What attorney for a Respondent found responsible after a hearing 
would not file with OCR on the off chance that they can point out a major or minor process 
violation and have an OCR attorney in Washington or their region completely reverse the finding 
against their client? In filing, the only possibilities are that nothing will happen or their case will 
be overturned on this new OCR appeal, meaning their client will be considered not responsible, 
regardless of institutional policy, practices, and the weight of the evidence at the institution level. 
Frankly, it might be ineffective assistance of counsel not to make such a filing inasmuch as it is 
free, does not meet the current vexatious standards of the Case Processing Manual and could 
only have positive results for their Respondent client. OCR could become, in effect, one more 
level of appeal for Respondents (and only Respondents) hoping to have a determination of 
responsibility overturned.  
 
Like many aspects of these Proposed Regulations, such a one-sided application has no 
support in statute. But more so, it is hard to imagine the framers of Title IX hoping that OCR’s 
                                                          
214 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61497. 
215 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61471. 
216 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61471. 
217 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61471. 
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role would be reduced to closing cases of harassment and assault filed by Reporting Individuals 
who directly experienced that harm and believed their access to education was limited or denied, 
while serving as a free appeals board for Respondents so credibly accused that they were found 
responsible by neutral hearing officers after an institutional process. 
 
iii. §106.44(b)(2) – Multiple Complainants/Confidentiality 
 
SUNY is concerned about the Proposed Regulations’ mandate to always investigate 
multiple complainants against the same individual—not because of the requirement to 
investigate, but because of the impact of other provisions on such a requirement—and wishes to 
raise some of the issues this new requirement will cause with confidentiality to Reporting 
Individuals (we later detail harm these provisions will cause to Respondents). 
 
Harm to Reporting Individuals in the Department’s Proposed Regulations Regarding 
Confidentiality and Reversal of Course on Previous Guidance 
 
SUNY opposes the Proposed Regulations on the basis that they harm Reporting 
Individuals by not following previous precedent in regard to confidentiality. In 2014, the 
Department called on institutions to protect the confidentiality of Reporting Individuals, “even if 
the victim does not specifically request confidentiality.”218 The Department adopted the 2013 
VAWA amendment to the Clery Act confidentiality provisions, which also govern cases of 
sexual assault, and which include name and contact information.219 The issue here is that the 
Department has changed course in these Proposed Regulations, and now expects recipients to 
release the names of Reporting Individuals to a Respondent in the notice process if the Reporting 
Individual participates or if there are two or more disclosures and the Title IX Coordinator is 
obligated to commence the process, even if both individuals decline to be involved in an 
investigation.220 This could cause significant issues in the case where one individual is the 
subject of multiple complaints and a Title IX coordinator does not have enough information to 
open an investigation. It would mean that individuals who do not want to be involved would then 
have their names revealed in the notice, but if they still do not participate, will likely see a 
finding of non-responsibility against the Respondent which could then nullify any future 
involvement by the individuals if more reporters come forward later. This would certainly chill 
reporting and cause significant problems for investigations at recipient schools going forward. 
 
Unfortunately, higher education and K-12 have seen their share of serial violators, both 
among students and employees. If two Reporting Individuals disclose assault or harassment by 
the same person but decline to participate in any way, the Title IX Coordinator would be 
obligated to start an investigation, reveal the identities of the two Reporting Individuals to the 
Accused (now a Respondent) in the notice, and then, if they still refuse to participate, ultimately 
find the Accused/Respondent not responsible. Under public college due process obligations, it 
would be very hard if not impossible to then use these first two disclosures in the investigation 
and adjudication of reports three and four. If those Reporting Individuals in turn do not 
participate, the Respondent will have another “get out of jail free” card and be free to offend 
                                                          
218 2016 Handbook at p. 8-12; VAWA Final Rule, at 62785. 
219 2016 Handbook at pp. 8-12–8-13. 
220 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61474. 
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again and again until someone is willing to testify and be subject to cross-examination. For 
offenders who target vulnerable populations—children; immigrants; those dependents upon the 
harasser for employment, scholarship funds or work study or a letter of recommendation in their 
chosen field; individuals with disabilities; transgender and gender non-binary—the likelihood of 
willingness to stand for cross-examination is reduced significantly. The offender will be free to 
continue and the institution would be powerless under processes subject to these Proposed 
Regulations, even as, in cases of sexual assault, the Proposed Regulations would require 
institutions to ignore the confidentiality provisions of VAWA and New York State law. 
 
For the foregoing reason, SUNY requests the Proposed Regulations be withdrawn due to 
the harm it will cause students and institutions attempting to investigate multiple complaints 
against one individual. 
 
iv. §106.44(c) - Emergency Removal 
 
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations that dictate a new process for 
emergency removal on the basis that it does not actually track the Clery Act language as the 
Department claims, would inadvertently cause due process violations with the way the 
provisions are currently written, and would cause SUNY to potentially violate New York State 
law. 
 
The Department’s Emergency Removal Provision Lacks Crucial Context 
 
Under proposed section 106.44(c), recipients would have the authority to conduct an 
“emergency removal” of Respondents based on an individualized threat assessment, provided 
that the Respondent had the opportunity to challenge the decision “immediately following the 
removal.” While the Department writes that this language tracks the Clery Act regulations at 34 
CFR 668.46(g), the corresponding Clery Act provision says nothing about the process owed to 
Respondents subject to an interim suspension. Courts hold that the due process required under an 
interim suspension is less elaborate than necessary during a full hearing.221 In turn, New York 
Education Law Article 129-B provides a detailed framework by which campus officials may 
conduct an individualized threat assessment, order an interim suspension, and provide due 
process to the Respondent.  
 
The Proposed Regulations, however, harbor a clear ambiguity in requiring an opportunity 
to challenge the suspension “immediately” following the removal. It is unclear if the 
“immediate” challenge must occur minutes, hours, one day, or several days after the suspension. 
A requirement that the challenge occur minutes after the suspension (a plain language 
interpretation of “immediately”) could jeopardize the safety of the Reporting Individual and the 
community, since the very point of an interim suspension is to remove a known risk from 
campus. Conversely, requiring an immediate hearing could undermine the Respondent’s due 
process rights, because the Respondent might not be physically present on campus when the 
interim suspension is issued. This ambiguity will subject recipients to potential litigation by both 
Reporting Individuals and Respondents, seeking to parse the definition of “immediate,” with no 
corresponding benefit. 
                                                          
221 Haidak v. Univ. of Mass. at Amherst, 299 F.Supp.3d 242, 265-66 (D. Mass 2018). 
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C. § 106.45 – Grievance procedures for formal complaints of sexual harassment 
 
Section C of this part of the comment letter outlines SUNY’s specific concerns with § 
106.45 of the Department’s Proposed Regulations. Subsection (i) outlines issues with the lack of 
definition of “bias.” Subsection (ii) outlines issues with lack of clarity on the phrase “delay 
caused solely by administrative needs.” Subsection (iii) outlines issues with the Department’s 
changes in what standard of evidence may be used to determine responsibility and specifically 
raises that the Department’s current Proposed Regulations are in direct contravention to 
Congressional intent of the 2013 VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act. Subsection (iv) outlines 
specific issues with the notice of allegations, including the ambiguities created with no definition 
of “sufficient time,” and the issue that the notice the Department is requiring through the 
Proposed Regulations is more detailed than notice given in criminal adjudications. Subsection 
(v) discusses the confusion caused by the differences in approach between K-12 and higher 
education. Subsection (vi) outlines SUNY’s issues regarding cross-examination and advisor of 
choice, including that this will completely eliminate any cost-savings the Department claims. 
Subsection (vii) outlines issues related to allowing access to evidence that is not relevant. 
Subsection (viii) outlines issues related to the investigative report requirements that the 
Department has mandated. Subsection (ix) discusses SUNY’s concerns with the Department’s 
appeals provision in the Proposed Regulations. 
 
i. §106.45(b)(1)(iii) – No conflicts of interest or bias of coordinators, 
investigators and decision makers 
 
Lack of Definition of “Bias” by the Department Will Cause Confusion 
 
Proposed section 106.45(b)(1)(iii) would prohibit “any individual designated by a 
recipient as a coordinator, investigator, or decision-maker” from having a bias or conflict of 
interest for or against Reporting Individuals or Respondents. This proposal is similar, albeit 
broader in scope, to the Department’s regulations enacting the 2013 VAWA Amendments to the 
Clery Act mandating that “proceedings” be “[c]onducted by officials who do not have a conflict 
of interest or bias for or against the accuser or the accused.”222 
 
Without a clearer definition of “conflict of interest” or “bias,” and in light of the other 
confusing and conflicting aspects of these Proposed Regulations, institutions will have difficulty 
implementing this mandate. After all, the Proposed Regulations suggest a reversal of the judicial 
presumption that campus decision-makers are free of bias. To overcome this presumption in Title 
IX litigation, courts require proof that a conduct official had an “actual” bias against the party 
because of the party’s sex, and that the discriminatory actions flowed from that actual sex-based 
bias. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held, “[t]he presumption is a rebuttable one, but 
the burden of rebuttal is heavy indeed: To carry that burden, the party claiming bias must lay a 
specific foundation of prejudice or prejudgment, such that the probability of actual bias is too 
high to be constitutionally tolerable.”223 
 
                                                          
222 34 C.F.R. 668.46(k)(3)(i)(C). 
223 Hess v. Bd. of Trustees of S. Illinois Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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The Proposed Regulations open the door to numerous claims that undermine the 
presumption of honesty in campus proceedings. For example, litigants in Title IX cases 
commonly argue that campus disciplinary officials were biased or conflicted because of their 
research agenda or record of pro-victim advocacy. Yet the Department has previously indicated 
that a party could not support a claim of “bias” under Section 668.46(k)(3)(i) of VAWA based 
on the bare allegation that “ideologically inspired people dominate the pool of available 
participants” in a proceeding arising from sexual misconduct.224 Federal courts of appeal, 
including the Sixth Circuit, likewise agree that “being a feminist, being affiliated with a gender-
studies program, or researching sexual assault does not support a reasonable inference than an 
individual is biased against men.”225 The present proposal offers no clarity on whether the 
Department would brook such frivolous claims. 
 
The plain text of the Proposed Regulations also does not illuminate whether the 
Department will consider an official’s holding of two or more roles in the conduct process to be 
per se proof of bias or conflict of interest. Small community colleges, in particular, have limited 
staff resources to investigate and adjudicate incidents of campus sexual harassment and violence. 
If the Department intends to prohibit any overlap in responsibilities among the “coordinator, 
investigator, or decision-maker,” it must make that intention clear. Such a rule would provide 
due process protections exceeding those required by federal and state courts, including the Sixth 
Circuit.226 Courts have held that a decision-maker’s being part of the initial investigation of the 
incident and the initiation of the conduct proceeding is not, in and of itself, proof of bias.227 
Declaring the holding of dual roles as a per se due process violation will strain already limited 
resources, even as courts have condoned the practice absent clear evidence of “actual” bias.  
 
Finally, these Proposed Regulations cloud efforts to bring trauma-informed practice to 
campus disciplinary proceedings. To address the neurobiological impact of trauma on Reporting 
Individuals’ memories, many colleges and universities now require conduct officials to obtain 
training in trauma-informed practice. The VAWA amendments to the Clery Act require officials 
to be trained annually and several states, including New York, California, and Illinois, mandate 
trauma-informed training for campus officials who respond to sexual assault.228 Title IX litigants 
have claimed that trauma-informed practice constitutes a form of sex discrimination in favor of 
Reporting Individuals.229 Courts generally reject this argument, but the Department’s lack of 
clarity promises further litigation in the future.230 
 
 
                                                          
224 See, VAWA Final Rule, at 62775. 
225 Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579, 593 n. 6 (6th Cir. 2018). 
226 See, Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d at 601 (“an individual’s dual roles do not per se disqualify him or her 
from being an impartial arbiter”). 
227 Doe v. University of South Alabama, 2017 WL 3974997 at * 4 (S.D. Alabama, 2017), citing Nash v. Auburn 
Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 666 (11th Cir. 1987); Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 839 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). 
228 Jeffrey J. Nolan, “Promoting Fairness in Trauma-Informed Investigation Training,” NACUA Notes, vol. 16, no. 
5, p. 3 (Feb. 8, 2018). 
229 E.g., Doe v. University of Oregon, 2018 WL 1474531 (D. Oregon, March 26, 2018). 
230 Rossley v. Drake Univ., 2018 WL 5307625 at *17 (S.D. Iowa, 2018), citing Doe v. Univ. of Colo., Boulder ex rel. 
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Colo., 255 F.Supp.3d 1064, 1075, 1076 (D. Colo. 2017). 
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ii. §106.45(b)(1)(v) – Reasonably prompt timeframes for conclusion of 
process 
 
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations specifically because of the 
language around delays caused solely by administrative needs. SUNY can demonstrate multiple 
situations in which this would be unworkable and untenable. 
 
The Department’s Lack of Clarity on “Delay Caused Solely by Administrative Needs” 
Causes Significant Issues in Interpretation for Recipients 
 
According to proposed section 106.45(b)(1)(v), the Department recognizes that grievance 
procedures need only provide “reasonably prompt timeframes” and may allow for temporary 
delays and delays based on “good cause.” While we agree that some flexibility is necessary, we 
are confused by the Department’s contradictory interpretation of the Proposed Regulations as 
meaning that “delays caused solely by administrative needs are insufficient to satisfy this 
standard.”231 The Department must further clarify what “administrative needs” would not 
constitute good cause for delay.  
 
For example, it is not uncommon for a SUNY campus in New York’s “Snow Belt” to 
delay or cancel classes because of dangerous winter weather. Under that circumstance, parties, 
witnesses, and disciplinary officials could not be expected to attend a scheduled meeting or 
hearing in the proceeding. Yet the Proposed Regulations would offer grounds for a party to claim 
a due process violation based on a recipient’s “administrative needs” decision to delay a hearing 
to protect the safety of its students and staff. 
 
iii. §106.45(b)(1)(vii) – Standard of evidence described to determine 
responsibility 
 
SUNY takes issue with the constraints the Department has put around the use of 
preponderance of the evidence because it reverses course from the Congressional intent of the 
2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery Act. 
 
The 2013 VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act Are Inconsistent With The Proposed 
Regulations on What Standard of Evidence Should be used in Campus Conduct Processes 
 
In its Final Rule implementing the Violence Against Women Act amendments to the 
Clery Act, the Department allowed institutions to select between the preponderance of the 
evidence standard and the clear and convincing evidence standard. The Department allowed 
institutions to select in their discretion, without emphasis on one standard over the other or 
challenges to implementing the chosen standard. The Department received comments asking that 
it require the “‘clear and convincing’ standard of evidence...because this standard better 
safeguards due process.”232 But the Department demurred writing that an institution “can comply 
                                                          
231 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61473. 
232 Id. 
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with both Title IX and the Clery Act by using a preponderance of the evidence standard in 
disciplinary proceedings.”233 
 
However, the Department’s instant Proposed Regulations instead set a standard that is 
incongruent with what was previously stated in the VAWA Final Rule. Now, the Department is 
putting significant bounds on when preponderance of the evidence can be used versus clear and 
convincing evidence, with a clear intent to push recipients to use the higher standard. The 
Department states: 
  
...in reaching a determination regarding responsibility, the recipient must apply 
either the preponderance of the evidence standard or the clear and convincing 
evidence standard. The recipient may, however, employ the preponderance of the 
evidence standard only if the recipient uses that standard for conduct code 
violations that do not involve sexual harassment but carry the same maximum 
disciplinary sanction. The recipient must also apply the same standard of evidence 
for complaints against students as it does for complaints against employees, 
including faculty.234 
 
This is a reversal of previous policy without any explanation from the Department other 
than the fact that campus conduct processes are not the same as civil litigation.235 This, frankly is 
not enough of a showing to warrant such a drastic reversal in course. The Department has never 
contended before now that campus conduct processes must hold the same level of “process” as a 
lawsuit in federal court, and it is clear that was never Congress’ intent based on much of the 
commentary in the 2013 VAWA Final Rule. The tying of this standard to those in place for 
employees and faculty is also arbitrary and capricious; such standards are often collectively 
bargained and tailored specifically to the circumstances of particular employees. There was no 
sufficient basis given for tying a standard for student discipline to that of employee or faculty 
discipline. Again, the Department is imposing a one-size fits all approach on colleges without 
concern for the nuances and considerations that may be at play. For the foregoing reasons, 
SUNY requests that the Proposed Regulations be withdrawn. 
 
iv. §106.45(b)(2)(i)(B) - Notice of allegations upon receipt of formal 
complaint  
 
SUNY takes issue with this specific section of the Department’s Proposed Regulations 
because there is now a major ambiguity regarding what constitutes “sufficient time,” and because 
the notice the Department now requires is far more detailed than what is required in criminal 
investigations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
233 Id. 
234 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61477. 
235 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61477. 
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“Sufficient Time” Creates a Major Ambiguity in Interpretation 
 
The Proposed Regulations require written notice to the parties of all hearings, 
investigative interviews, or other meetings with a party, “with sufficient time for the party to 
prepare to participate.”236 We are concerned that requiring “sufficient time” for preparation 
creates a major ambiguity in Title IX proceedings. It will inevitably be exploited during the 
proceeding to create undue delays, and be deployed in post-hearing litigation and OCR 
investigations as a due process wedge. Campus codes of conduct generally limit a party’s right to 
request adjournments to several days, absent good cause, because of the risk that a party will 
delay the proceeding. Such delays prejudice the rights of the parties to obtain a fair hearing. The 
“sufficient time” clause leaves the door open for unwarranted legal maneuvers that will 
compromise the due process rights of the parties. Therefore, SUNY requests that the Proposed 
Regulations be withdrawn due to the ambiguities created by this provision. 
 
Notice is More Detailed than what is Required in Criminal Investigations 
  
Not only does dictating the terms of the required notice infringe on SUNY’s academic 
freedom under the First Amendment, but its structure undermines the ability of campuses to 
effectively adjudicate cases of sexual harassment and sexual violence. 
 
 As indicated in Part I of this letter, the Department has not offered a specific showing for 
why it must upset its longstanding interpretation of Title IX in favor of prescriptive, top-down 
policies that conflict with the text and purpose of the statute. Nor has the Department justified 
why the level of due process provided to Respondents, who face expulsion or suspension from 
voluntary higher education, is higher than the notice provided to criminal defendants, who face 
the loss of their liberty (or in some states for some crimes, life). 
 
As the Secretary is aware, campus investigations of sexual violence often run 
concurrently with the criminal justice process. Campuses coordinate how they will question the 
Respondent, Reporting Individual, and witnesses with police to ensure a fair and effective 
process. Here, the Proposed Regulations would require, “upon receipt of a formal complaint,” 
that the Respondent be issued a detailed notice of the charges, and “sufficient time to prepare 
before any initial interview.”237 A campus investigator could not even begin to question the 
Respondent until the Respondent knew of the charges and had “sufficient time to prepare,” 
which presumably would involve consultation with an advisor or attorney. 
 
This procedure elevates the notice rights of the Respondent well beyond any notice rights 
afforded to an individual suspected of committing a crime. We are not aware of any jurisdiction 
that prohibits a police officer from questioning an individual without first obtaining an 
indictment (the closest analog to a “formal complaint”), providing that individual with the 
indictment, and then giving the individual “sufficient time to prepare” before questioning. Nor 
can we imagine that U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence would support such fetters on policing. 
Police may approach a suspect and start questioning right away. They can even lie to the suspect 
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or hide their identity as a police officer. With certain exceptions, evidence obtained in this 
manner may be used in the investigation and prosecution. The Department must make a strong 
case under Mathews v. Eldridge238 to support such a drastic imbalance in the due process rights 
of criminal defendants and administrative Respondents, and has not done so anywhere in the 
body of these proposals. Further, the Department would need to show that this additional notice 
is required to ameliorate discrimination on the basis of sex. 
 
Not only is this proposal Constitutionally-unsound, but it will have several pernicious 
impacts on campus investigations of sexual violence. First, it will interfere with the ability of 
campus officials to conduct concurrent investigations with police. Take a case where the 
Reporting Individual goes to the Title IX office, rather than the police, to report a sexual assault. 
A formal complaint is drafted. Then, the Reporting Individual decides to file a report with the 
local police. Immediately upon receiving the report, a police officer goes to the Respondent’s 
residence hall and questions the Respondent. Then, the Title IX coordinator sends the required 
notice to the Respondent. The Respondent has now been questioned about the charges without 
receiving the necessary notice and time to prepare. Has the process now been tainted by a due 
process violation, such that the campus cannot move forward on its internal, federally-required 
investigation? This amounts to a fundamental violation of the Reporting Individual’s Title IX 
rights, particularly since the Reporting Individual has no way of anticipating how these 
overlapping enforcement entities will pursue the complaint. 
 
Second, by including a statement prohibiting “knowingly making false statements or 
knowingly submitting false information during the grievance process,”239 the required notice 
may discourage Reporting Individuals and Respondents from participating in the process, out of 
fear that their statements may be used against them. While most colleges already have such 
policies detailing consequences for false statements, by requiring specific language in the notice, 
the Proposed Regulations will send a specific but unnecessary message to students that may deter 
participation. Respondents could use this language to demand charges be brought against 
Reporting Individuals for submitting false statements and vice versa. By discouraging reporting, 
the required notice promises to make the grievance process less effective, less fair, and not 
impartial, in contradiction of the Proposed Regulations and the Department’s longstanding 
guidance regarding Title IX. As with other aspects of these Proposed Regulations, there is no 
showing that false statements impact individuals differently on the basis of gender, occur 
differently from different genders, or that this specific statement will ameliorate inequality on the 
basis of gender. 
 
v. §106.45(b)(3)(vi) - Elementary and secondary schools – may require a 
live hearing 
 
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations on the basis that they create 
extreme confusion for recipients, Reporting Individuals and Respondents, and give lower due 
process rights to individuals who deserve a higher amount of due process for a mandatory 
property right. 
 
                                                          
238 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
239 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61474, 61498. 
56
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 14 [2019], Art. 44
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/44
   
 
Page 57 of 82 
 
Differences in Approach Between K-12 and Higher Education Will Lead to Needless 
Confusion 
 
These Proposed Regulations draw bright line distinctions between K-12 and college and 
university education in a manner that does not necessary reflect the realities of enrollment and 
education within the State University of New York and other higher education institutions and 
systems. Proposed Regulations §106.45(b)(3)(vi) and (vii) establish significantly different 
systems for adjudicating allegations of harassment and assault. At the elementary and secondary 
level, institutions may or may not require a live hearing. Questions must be asked of both parties, 
including follow-up questions, but they need not be conducted live and there is no role for 
advisors (including attorneys) of the parties to cross-examine the other party.240 For institutions 
of higher education, the Proposed Regulations mandate a live hearing that must allow for cross-
examination of parties by the advisor of choice of the other party. Further, if a party does not 
have an advisor, the institution must provide an advisor “aligned with that party to conduct cross-
examination.” If the party or witness chooses not to submit to cross-examination, the “decision-
maker must not rely on any statement of that party or witness in reaching a determination 
regarding responsibility.”241 In other words, the expectations and experiences of student 
participants in a K-12 and higher education adjudication process will be markedly different.  
 
Modern education does not necessarily match the neat lines and standardized approaches 
of yesteryear. Colleges and high schools have developed myriad programs that include dual 
enrollment, summer and intersession college learning, high school laboratory schools on college 
campuses, colleges operating K-12 charter schools, and situations as simple as high school 
students who enroll in college classes. Further, colleges regularly return their students to 
elementary and secondary schools as student teachers and related experience based learning 
assignments.  
 
By maintaining strict differences in the process between K-12 and higher education, the 
Department will necessarily create confusing situations where students will not know precisely 
which system—and accompanying rights—apply in their case. Do the rights run with the 
Reporting Individual or the Respondent? What if one Reporting Individual in a multi-report case 
is a high school student and the other a college student? What if a college student discloses 
harassment by a high school student? What of a high school student disclosing harassment or an 
assault in a college class or a dual-enrollment program? Is it different if the Respondent is a 
fellow high school student dual-enrolled in the college class? What if the Respondent is an 
employee of the high school? Or an employee of the College? What of a college investigating 
whether one of its students committed harassment against a high school student or students in a 
student teaching assignment? What if multiple elementary school students report assault by a 
college-level student teacher? Must the Title IX Coordinator at the college move forward with a 
report, identify the elementary school students to the Respondent student teacher, but then find 
the Respondent not in violation if the children refuse to be subjected to cross-examination by the 
Respondent’s advisor of choice (after all, none of their prior statements would be admissible in 
the college process if they refuse to be cross-examined)? Must the college then return that 
                                                          
240 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61498 (§106.45(b)(3)(vi)). 
241 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61498 (§106.45(b)(3)(vii)). 
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student teacher to a different elementary school, exposing additional children to harassment or 
violence, since they have been found not responsible in the prescribed Title IX process? 
 
In any of these cases, one is hard pressed to determine from the plain language of the 
Proposed Regulations which set of rules and responsibilities apply, or whether they only partly 
apply. While this will cause confusion among education professionals and lead to significant 
litigation costs defending various permutations in lawsuits filed by Reporting Individuals and 
Respondents at different education levels, it will be even more confusing for students, who will 
not know whether and to whom to report, and what rights and challenges they will face in 
reporting. In a society in which reporting harassment and assault at all levels—from elementary 
school through professional employees—is depressed by the challenges that face those who 
disclose, this confusing labyrinth of rules will further depress reporting and disclosure among 
students in dual enrollment and other programs where the lines between high school and college 
are simply not as clear cut as these Proposed Regulations would imagine. We urge the 
Department to follow longstanding practice (including the 2001 Notice and Comment Dear 
Colleague Letter, and 2011, 2014, 2015, and 2017 Dear Colleague Letters) and set uniform, 
high-level, standards equally applicable to elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education 
systems. 
 
We can find no evidence offered in the Preamble for drawing such a bright line between 
K-12 and higher education. Nor do we see any evidence that the bright line is drawn to address 
and redress sex discrimination in education. This appears to be an arbitrary line drawn between 
high school seniors and college freshmen, based on an outdated and inaccurate assumption of the 
age and competency of all K-12 and all college students, without any evidence offered. But there 
is no such clear line of the maturity level of students that would support a clear line of different 
processes. The Department devotes a mere 59 words—four of which are “may” or “most” 
indicating likelihood, but not certainty—to support a distinction that will have significant impact 
on millions of K-12, college, and mixed jurisdiction Reporting Individuals and Respondents. 
“Because most parties and many witnesses are minors in the elementary and secondary school 
context, sensitivities associated with age and developmental ability may outweigh the benefits of 
cross-examination at a live hearing...In contrast, the Department has determined that at 
institutions of higher education, where most parties and witnesses are adults, grievance 
procedures must include live cross-examination at a hearing.”242 
 
 Respectfully, Mathews v. Eldridge243 and its progeny would require far more analysis 
before drawing hard line conclusions of the appropriate balance of due process during various 
processes. And even that would assume that the plain language of Title IX even provided 
jurisdiction to enact such narrow and detailed distinctions between important proceedings at 
various educational institutions (language we cannot find in the statute). 
 
Further, we would note the interesting reversal of expectations for due process within K-
12 and higher education. Elementary and secondary education is compulsory. It is a right 
guaranteed by federal law and state law in every jurisdiction in the United States. A young 
person of eligible age may seek public education as a right. Higher education is not a right under 
                                                          
242 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61476 (emphasis added). 
243 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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federal or state law. While some colleges are “open admission” offering admission to all 
qualified students, that still is not a legal requirement and those institutions may place academic 
and behavioral limitations on whom they admit. Colleges have First Amendment rights to 
determine, among other things, “who may be admitted to study.”244 It is clear that the property 
rights that accumulate in K-12 are greater than the property rights that accumulate in higher 
education as the K-12 rights are guaranteed by law. Concomitantly, any due process obligations 
imposed (if there was authority in the law to impose them) should be equal or greater in the 
compulsory K-12 sphere than in higher education since the deprivation would be of a right 
guaranteed in state law. Yet these Proposed Regulations invert the levels of due process 
requiring significantly more process in the lower property rights that apply in higher education 
than in the compulsory K-12. 
 
vi. §106.45(b)(3)(vii) – Cross-Examination and Advisor of Choice 
 
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations regarding cross-examination and 
advisor of choice for numerous reasons. The Department’s changes are an overreach that do not 
follow binding authority and will cause recipients skyrocketing costs. The Proposed Regulations 
will cause needless confusion in relation to cross-examination, and result in significant due 
process violations. The provisions relating to exclusion of all evidence relating to a party or 
witness if they refuse to subject themselves to cross-examination will create significant issues for 
recipients, Reporting Individuals and Respondents. Further, the Proposed Regulations are in 
direct conflict with the Congressional intent of the 2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery Act. 
Lastly, requiring on the spot detailed explanations for each such determination as to why 
evidence is excluded in a hearing is a higher standard than judges adhere to in civil and criminal 
adjudications in courts and will lengthen hearings while inevitably raising litigation costs. 
 
Proposed Regulations on Cross-Examination are an Overreach by the Department, do not 
Follow Binding Authority and Will Skyrocket Costs for Recipients 
 
Perhaps the Department’s most overreaching proposal is its requirement that colleges and 
universities (but, puzzlingly, not K-12 institutions where attendance is a right under the law of 
every state) provide a live hearing and cross-examination by the advisor of choice for each party 
and provide advisors to students without one to conduct cross-examination on their behalf.245 No 
court has ever required this level of due process for an accused party in a campus disciplinary 
proceeding. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor Congress have ever anticipated this mandate as 
a due process requirement. And such a policy is manifestly in error, as it will unduly complicate 
campus affairs, dramatically raise costs, and inflict trauma on Reporting Individuals and 
Respondents alike, without any corresponding benefit to seeking the truth. 
 
Ostensibly, the Department acts according to its reading of case law emanating from one 
split Circuit Court decision. While we appreciate the Department’s statement that “[t]he 
Proposed Regulations would help ensure that the obligations imposed on recipients fall within 
the scope of the civil rights law that Congress created,” we object to its reservation that these 
                                                          
244 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter, J, concurring). 
245 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61498 (section 106.45 (b)(3)(vii)). 
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regulations will, “where persuasive, align with relevant case law.”246 Case law must be followed 
in the jurisdictions covered by its courts, whether “persuasive” to Department staff or otherwise. 
While the Department enthusiastically cites a 2-1 decision of a Sixth Circuit panel, Doe v. Baum, 
on the issue of cross-examination, that decision only binds four states, is inconsistent with 
myriad decisions of other Circuits and state law (and even other Sixth Circuit decisions), and the 
decision itself does not demand the criminal justice-level procedures of the Proposed 
Regulations.247  
 
To that point, federal courts of appeals have roundly rejected the Department’s strained 
analogy between the student conduct and the criminal justice process. Justice Harry Blackmun, 
writing for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, emphasized that “school regulations are not to 
be measured by the standards which prevail for the criminal law and for criminal procedure.”248 
Courts understand that student discipline is part of the education process. When a student is 
removed from the academic community, the purpose is not punitive in the criminal law sense, 
but a determination that the student is not qualified to remain part of the community. Expelled 
students may suffer damaging effects, but they do not face imprisonment, fines, 
disenfranchisement, or probation.249  
 
Frankly, there are Supreme Court decisions that require far different balances of due 
process in education discipline cases. Colleges and universities should not be required to ignore 
binding judicial precedent and separately enacted state law and federal law simply because 
current representatives of the Department find a recent 2-1 decision of one Circuit court more 
“persuasive.” That is inconsistent with interpretations of federalism, administrative law, and the 
general rule of law. 
 
Here, precedent is clear that cross-examination is not a constitutional requirement in 
campus conduct proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court has never required it in such 
administrative settings; indeed, it held in Goss v. Lopez that “[n]o better instrument has been 
devised for arriving at the truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the 
case against him and opportunity to meet it.”250 The Court has never held that cross-examination 
is necessary under these circumstances to satisfy procedural due process.  
 
In turn, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which governs SUNY institutions, holds 
that “the right to cross examine witnesses has not been considered an essential requirement of 
due process in school disciplinary proceedings.”251 Most recently, in Doe v. Colgate University 
(2019), the Second Circuit affirmed that a university’s sexual misconduct hearing did not violate 
Title IX when it considered hearsay evidence and did not permit the Respondent to directly 
cross-examine the Reporting Individuals.252 The court noted that the university permitted both 
                                                          
246 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61465 (emphasis added). 
247 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018). 
248 Esteban v. Cent. Missouri State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077, 1090 (8th Cir. 1969). 
249 See, General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax 
Supported Institutions of Higher Education (U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Missouri, 1968), p. 6. 
 250 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).  
251 Winnick, 460 F.2d at 549. 
252 Doe v. Colgate Univ., 2019 WL 190515, at *8 (N.D.N.Y., Jan. 15, 2019) (Summary Order). 
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parties to submit questions to one another through the nonvoting chair of the hearing, as well as 
to submit questions to the Title IX investigator, and that neither party was allowed to directly 
cross-examine the other.253 The court identified nothing in this procedure that violated the rights 
of the parties or demonstrated gender bias against men.254 
 
The Department’s proposal, moreover, exceeds anything required in the line of Sixth 
Circuit decisions referenced in Doe v. Baum. The Sixth Circuit does not require that campuses 
falling within its jurisdiction hold adversarial proceedings with cross-examination by the advisor 
of choice for each party in every case. Rather, it has identified that the “Supreme Court has 
declined to set out a universal rule and instead instructs lower courts to consider the parties’ 
competing interests.”255 Applying Goss v. Lopez and the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, the Sixth Circuit holds that “when the university’s determination turns on the 
credibility of the accuser, the accused, or witnesses, that hearing must include an opportunity for 
cross-examination.”256 The Sixth Circuit cautions, however, that the university need only provide 
“some form of cross-examination”257 when credibility is at issue. There are many college 
disciplinary cases which are fact-specific but do not necessarily rely on credibility. Often the 
weight of the evidence is clear, or it is backstopped by video or other electronic evidence. Or a 
party has already admitted conduct and the only question is what sanction is appropriate. Going 
even beyond this Sixth Circuit case, the Proposed Regulations would seem to require that parties 
subject themselves to cross-examination when credibility is not at issue. Here there is much harm 
and no gain to the process.  
 
We likewise note that the same Sixth Circuit just one year earlier declined to strike down 
a “circumscribed form of cross-examination” that “involves submitting written questions to the [ 
] panelists.”258 Such trauma-informed questioning—directed through a panel, rather than against 
the other party—has become the norm among institutions of higher education, and was 
approved, without comment, by the Second Circuit in Doe v. Colgate University.259 The 
Department acknowledges this state of practice and specifically allows this system elsewhere in 
the Proposed Regulations for investigations and adjudications in K-12.260 Such a bright line 
comes without evidence and, indeed, is contrary to the evidence. 
 
The Sixth Circuit also has never announced a per se rule akin to proposed section 106.45 
(3)(vii) that a hearing board cannot consider an out-of-court statement by a witness who declines 
                                                          
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018). 
256 Baum, 903 F.3d, at 581. 
257 Id. 
258 Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 396-97 (6th Cir. 2017). 
259 Tamara Rice Lave, A Critical Look at How Top Colleges and Universities are Adjudicating Sexual Assault, 71 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 377, 396 (2017) (survey of thirty-five highly-ranked colleges and universities determined that only 
six percent of surveyed institutions permitted traditional cross-examination, while fifty percent permitted 
questioning through the hearing panel); Doe v. Colgate Univ., 2019 WL 190515, at *8 (N.D.N.Y., Jan. 15, 2019); Yu 
v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (requirement that questions be asked through a hearing 
chair is procedurally adequate); Doe v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., No. 118CV1374FJSCFH, 2019 WL 181280, at 
*7 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (same). 
260 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61498. 
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to be cross-examined. In fact, the Sixth Circuit held in Doe v. University of Cincinnati “that 
admission of hearsay evidence [at a school disciplinary proceeding] is not a denial of procedural 
due process.”261 Federal and state rules of evidence appropriate to courtrooms do not apply in 
campus disciplinary proceedings, and hearsay evidence may be admitted and considered to the 
extent it is relevant to the ultimate question of responsibility. The Department has not, and 
cannot, provide any statutory or judicial authority allowing it to mandate such rules of evidence 
for campus disciplinary proceedings. 
 
Finally, as a matter of law, judicial precedent holds that cross-examination is not required 
in myriad civil court and administrative proceedings that can result in significant property and 
liberty deprivations. The U.S. Supreme Court has not announced a “blanket rejection by the 
Court of administrative reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability and probative value,” and 
holds that hearsay evidence may constitute substantial evidence supporting an administrative 
finding.262 As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holds, 
“[w]e have rejected a per se approach that brands evidence as insubstantial solely because it 
bears the hearsay label. . . . Instead, we evaluate the weight each item of hearsay should receive 
according to the item’s truthfulness, reasonableness, and credibility.”263 
 
Administrators base fundamental liberty interests on hearsay evidence. Liberty interests 
are traditionally valued higher than property interests. Prison administrators, for example, may 
rely on hearsay evidence of a prisoner’s alleged criminal activity within the prison to make a 
finding of responsibility that adds years to the prisoner’s sentence.264 Child welfare officials may 
also depend on hearsay to determine child custody if it is relevant and probative, particularly 
where the parent waives the right to cross-examine the child.265 Thus, a video-recorded interview 
may be offered to establish proof of child sexual abuse, sufficient to remove a parent’s visitation 
rights, where the parent raises no specific objection to the reliability of the evidence.266  
 
Agencies may also rely on hearsay to decide other liberty and property interests. Cross-
examination is not an absolute requirement in a Social Security Disability benefits case,267 a 
hearing to revoke a police officer’s duty disability payments,268 an action to revoke a store’s 
cigarette and lottery license,269 a Coast Guard finding that a pilot negligently operated a boat,270 
a Department of Agriculture finding of animal abuse based on a four-year-old veterinary 
                                                          
261 Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 405 (internal quotation marks omitted.) 
262 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407 (1971). 
263 Johnson v United States, 628 F.2d 187, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal citation omitted). 
264 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567–68 (1974); Matter of Jehan Abdur-Raheem v. Mann, 85 N.Y.2d 113 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1995). 
265 In re J.D.C., 284 Kan. 155, 170 (Kan. 2007).  
266 In re D.B., 947 A.2d 443, 450-51 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
267 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). 
268 Delgado v. City of Milwaukee Employees’ Retirement System/Annuity and Pension Bd., 268 Wis.2d 845 (Wisc. 
Ct. App. 2003). 
269 Putnam Companies v. Shah, 93 A.D.3d 1315, 941 N.Y.S.2d 432 (4th Dep’t 2012), leave to appeal denied, 96 
A.D.3d 1514, 945 N.Y.S.2d 587 (4th Dep’t 2012) and leave to appeal denied, 19 N.Y.3d 811, 951 N.Y.S.2d 721, 
976 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012). 
270 Williams v United States Dept. of Transp., 781 F2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1986), Reh. Den., en banc, 794 F2d 687 
(1986). 
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record,271 or a Department of Environmental Protection decision to designate a waterway as a 
fishery.272 
 
Limitations on cross-examination also apply in cases where individuals face the 
suspension or loss of employment or their professional licenses.273 An administrative agency 
may support its termination decision on hearsay statements drafted by the terminated employee’s 
superiors, as long as those statements bear the indicia of reliability.274 A police officer contesting 
his termination does not necessarily have the right to cross-examine laboratory technicians who 
administered a positive drug test,275 nor do physicians have the right to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses in license suspension hearings in a manner comparable to the criminal justice 
system.276 This despite the fact that any of these processes affect significant property interests, if 
not liberty interests. 
 
This discretion is derived from basic principles of administrative law and a concern for 
the separation of powers. Courts will not impose cross-examination as a due process requirement 
where the legislature has not authorized the administrative body with subpoena power, as this 
allows the agency to act in a manner contrary to its enabling statute.277 If the body cannot force a 
witness to appear (as in most college proceedings where the institution and parties generally do 
not have subpoena powers), then it cannot be foreclosed from relying on hearsay testimony of 
absent witnesses. Thus, where lawmakers require cross-examination and the right to an attorney 
in civil and administrative proceedings, they will clearly and unambiguously set forth this 
elevated procedure in law.278 
 
Along with these legal considerations, as neutral bodies, whose obligations extend 
equally to Reporting Individual and Respondent, SUNY holds numerous practical concerns 
about the ability to maintain fair and impartial proceedings under proposed section 
106.45(3)(vii).  
 
Cross-examination threatens to weaponize the hearing process against the Reporting 
Individual, and risks intimidation and victim-blaming. Contrary to the Proposed Regulations’ 
ban on the use of sex stereotypes, cross-examination of rape complaints often utilizes rape myths 
                                                          
271 Crawford v United States Dep’t of Agric., 50 F3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
272 Honeywell International, Inc. v. EPA, 372 F.3d 441, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  
273 Johnson v United States, 628 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
274 Lacson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 726 F.3d 170, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
275 Matter of Gordon v. Brown, 84 N.Y.2d 574, 578 (NY Ct App 1994) 
276 Matter of Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N.Y. 347, 352–353, (NY Ct App 1947) (limitation on right to 
confront investigators in suspension hearing for performing illegal procedures); See also Matter of Yoonessi v. State 
Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, 2 A.D.3d 1070, 1072, 769 N.Y.S.2d 326 (NY 3d Dep’t 2003), lv. denied 3 
N.Y.3d 607, 785 N.Y.S.2d 24, 818 N.E.2d 666 (2004) (limitation on cross-examination of board’s expert witness 
not an abuse of discretion); Sookhu v. Commissioner of Health of State of New York, 31 A.D.3d 1012 (3d Dep’t NY 
2006) (cross-examination of patient not required in license suspension hearing). 
277 Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Stamps, 898 So.2d 664, 676 (Sup. Ct., Miss. 2005). 
278 E.g., North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 116-40.11 (student right to be represented by counsel, at student’s own expense, 
in campus disciplinary hearings, except in cases of academic dishonesty or where institution maintains a “Student 
Honor Court”); Mass. Gen. L. 71 § 37H 3/4 (student facing expulsion or suspension for more than ten days for 
bullying has the right to cross-examination and the right to counsel). 
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and victim-blaming language to discredit witnesses, causing a phenomenon known as “secondary 
victimization.”279 Regardless, the Department does not actually offer an evidence-based study 
supporting its unique effectiveness as a means of detecting lies. 
 
Yet this untested assumption bears further scrutiny should it be mandated at every college 
and university covered by Title IX. Empirical studies of cross-examination suggest that its 
storied reputation as a truth-seeking device may be more mythic than real. In particular, a 2017 
survey of available scientific evidence published in the Cornell Journal of Law and Public 
Policy contends that the “observable behavioral cues” derived from cross-examination do little to 
aid laypeople and experts in detecting lies.280 “From evasive eyes to twitching toes, behavioral 
responses to questioning seem to be more idiosyncrasies than deception giveaways.”281 Notably, 
many of the cues that observers associate with deception may simply be reactions to the stress of 
an adjudicatory hearing, and the lawyer’s demeanor in questioning the witness may also 
prejudicially impact how the observer judges the testimony.282 While cross-examination can 
have the salutary effect of disrupting efforts to maintain a lie, research demonstrates that 
witnesses can be enticed by questioners to distort the truth, even among adult victims.283 This 
result is by design: lawyers avoid asking a question they do not already know the answer to, 
making cross-examination an exercise in creating “a carefully crafted narrative at the expense of 
broader context and accuracy.”284 
 
The Proposed Regulations are also certain to tilt disciplinary proceedings in favor of 
parties who have the means to afford attorneys who are skilled at cross-examination. The 
Department may imagine that this will only limit the testimony of Reporting Individuals but not 
Respondents, the protected party of interest. But some Reporting Individuals may be represented 
by highly-skilled attorneys, sometimes pro bono, while some Respondents may bring a friend or 
family member. 
 
Yet because colleges and universities have affirmative duties in the Proposed Regulations 
to ensure a fair and impartial proceeding, they may have to cover the costs of expert litigators on 
behalf of Reporting Individuals or Respondents to ensure equal representation between the 
parties. The Department has previously acknowledged that it lacks statutory authority to mandate 
legal representation in these proceedings.285 Requiring cross-examination by an “advisor” rather 
than an “attorney” is a thinly-veiled means of circumventing the Department’s own five-year-old 
regulations and interpretations of the Clery Act. And it masks the true costs of supplying 
attorney-advisors in campus disciplinary proceedings.  
 
After all, having offered no research to support its unprecedented advisor requirement, 
the Department cannot begin to estimate how high these costs will be. Because both the 
Reporting Individual and the Respondent have the right to an impartial proceeding under Title 
                                                          
279 Sarah Zedervelt, et al., “Lawyers’ Strategies for Cross-Examining Rape Complainants: Have we Moved Beyond 
the 1950s?,” 57 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2016). 
280 Bruton, at 155-56. 
281 Id. at 156. 
282 Id. at 157. 
283 Id. at 164. 
284 Id. at 166. 
285 VAWA Final Rule, at 62774. 
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IX, in theory, both should have access to equal representation. Allowing one party to hire 
litigators from a prestigious trial law firm, while allowing the other to be represented by a well-
meaning professor, coach, friend or parent without training in cross-examination, could be a 
facial inequality that opens recipients to a Title IX challenge which, under the Proposed 
Regulations could result in OCR overturning a finding of responsibility on an appeal from a 
Respondent (while a similar complaint filed by a Reporting Individual would result in no action 
by OCR under the partial safe harbor). If a recipient responds by hiring an attorney for the 
unrepresented party, and pays the costs of that attorney, then the other side can plausibly argue a 
Title IX violation in having to personally bear the costs of legal representation. The result is that 
the recipient may receive challenges seeking that it indemnify both parties for their legal 
representatives. 
 
Institution costs will skyrocket, as the incentive to hire an attorney in campus proceedings 
will be very high. If the campus pays the cost of representation, then both parties will rely on 
lawyers, rather than any other type of “advisor,” to represent them in these proceedings. These 
attorneys must be allowed to participate in all aspects of the proceeding, including pre-hearing 
conferences, pre-hearing examination of the investigatory report, the hearing, the sanctions 
hearing, and the appeal. The attorneys will write pre-hearing and post-hearing briefs, responses 
to the investigatory reports, appeal briefs, and various other correspondence. The attorneys will 
also be involved in gathering and submitting evidence to the fact-finder. At the rate of $250 per 
hour (a conservative rate in New York State), the likely costs of a single proceeding will easily 
run into the tens of thousands of dollars and, unfortunately, since federal funding to absorb these 
new costs demanded by the Proposed Regulations is unlikely, costs will likely have to be passed 
on to students or institutions will have to cut academic programs or student services to make up 
for the new expense. 
 
We also note that the requirement that the advisor of choice be allowed to conduct the 
cross-examination is actually not limited to attorneys trained in litigation (not even all attorneys 
are actually trained in direct and cross-examination). The Department’s Proposed Regulations 
would allow the fraternity brother or sorority sister, parent, roommate, or anyone else to conduct 
cross-examination, so long as the party said they were the chosen advisor. Cross-examination 
may or may not be the “greatest legal engine,” but it is doubtful that Dean Wigmore was 
imagining that such cross-examination would be conducted by an untrained 19-year-old friend of 
the party. Whatever gain to truth-seeking the Department imagines would occur with genteel 
attorneys ethically asking probing questions is sure to be outweighed by the grave trauma and 
harm caused by unskilled advisors “playing attorney” while likely elucidating few, if any, facts 
that could not have been learned in a less adversarial, more educational manner. 
 
Significant Harm to Both Reporting Individuals and Respondents if all Evidence is 
Excluded When Anyone Will Not Submit to Cross Examination 
 
The Proposed Regulations bar the institutional decision maker from considering the 
testimony or account of any participant who does not subject themselves to cross-examination by 
the advisor of the other party. The Department states: “[i]f a party or witness does not submit to 
cross-examination at the hearing, the decision-maker must not rely on any statement of that party 
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or witness in reaching a determination regarding responsibility[.]”286 While this clearly impacts 
Reporting Individuals as noted elsewhere herein, it likewise can have significant and severe 
consequences for Respondents. Inasmuch as the Proposed Regulations define harassment to 
include sexual assault as defined by the Clery Act, and the Clery Act itself takes its definitions 
from the Uniform Crime Reporting and National Incident Based Reporting System,287 the same 
facts that may undergird a Title IX disciplinary charge may also be a crime, and disclosures of 
such facts may lead to criminal charges (and in some cases, a civil suit). 
 
For that reason, attorneys for Respondents may advise their clients not to testify in a 
formal hearing or subject themselves to cross examination where they could make statements 
against penal interest, generally admissible as an exception to the hearsay prohibition in criminal 
and civil courts.288 Instead, many institutions have traditionally accepted written statements or 
other methods of providing information, with decision makers according different weight to an 
uncrossed statement than would be given to crossed testimony. 
 
With these limiting rules, however, the Proposed Regulations would prohibit the decision 
maker from considering any statements by Respondent. To the extent that a Reporting Individual 
testifies, is willing to subject themselves to cross examination by the advisor of the Respondent, 
and is generally credible, these rules would nearly certainly require the institution to find the 
Respondent responsible under either a preponderance or clear and convincing standard without 
considering any denials or different account the Respondent might have provided. But such a 
silencing by regulation nearly certainly offends the due process rights of such a Respondent, 
since they would not be able to defend themselves in any way (including having prior statements 
to law enforcement or college officials considered on their behalf) unless they were willing to 
risk inculpating themselves in a criminal or civil proceeding. In such cases, an alternative model 
that does not include the formal cross examination requirement or allows for uncrossed evidence 
to be taken into account “for what it’s worth” by the decision maker provides significantly more 
due process and fundamental fairness to such a Respondent. 
 
Based on the narrative in the Proposed Regulations, it is clear that such harm to 
Respondents in Title IX cases was not its intention. The Department stated in its background:  
 
The Proposed Regulations require schools to investigate and adjudicate formal 
complaints of sexual harassment, and to treat complainants and Respondents 
equally, giving each a meaningful opportunity to participate in the investigation 
and requiring the recipient to apply substantive and procedural safeguards that 
provide a predictable, consistent, impartial process for both parties and 
increase the likelihood that the recipient will reach a determination 
regarding the Respondent's responsibility based on objective standards and 
relevant facts and evidence.289 
 
                                                          
286 Title IX Proposed Regulation, at 61475 (section 106.45(b)(3)(vii)). 
287 VAWA Final Rule, at 62784, 62790. 
288 See e.g. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)(a). 
289 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61465 (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, the proposed rule should be withdrawn because of the harm it will cause 
Respondents who might be advised not to appear in the hearing process or subject themselves to 
cross-examination. 
 
The 2013 VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act State Reflect Congressional Intent in 
Regard to Providing Advisors and Cross-Examination in Campus Conduct Processes 
 
In the Final Rules implementing the 2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery Act, the 
Department was interpreting a statute that required, in black letter, that “the accuser and the 
accused are entitled to the same opportunities to have others present during an institutional 
disciplinary proceeding, including the opportunity to be accompanied to any related meeting or 
proceeding by an advisor of their choice.”290 This is far more detailed and specific to details of 
access to an advisor of choice than the 37 words of the Title IX statute. Since Congressional 
intent was fairly plain from the language of the statute, the Department reasonably interpreted 
“of their choice” to mean that the identity and professional qualifications of the advisor belonged 
to the Reporting Individual and Respondent, not to the institution. That is to say, an institution 
could not ban a participating student from choosing an attorney. While the negotiated rulemaking 
process included a spirited discussion of the policy wisdom of this minor extension, there was 
general assent to the Department’s interpretation of the plain language of the supporting statute. 
 
During the commenting process, “[o]ne commenter asked that the final regulations 
require institutions to provide legal representation in any meeting or disciplinary proceeding in 
which the accused or the accuser has legal representation but the other party does not.”291  
 
The Department responded to this comment by following time-tested administrative law 
principles. “We do not believe that the statute permits us to require institutions to provide legal 
representation in any meeting or disciplinary proceeding in which the accused or the accuser has 
legal representation but the other party does not. Absent clear and unambiguous statutory 
authority, we would not impose such a burden on institutions.”292 Again, and to emphasize, when 
faced with a statute that made specific reference to the presence of an advisor for the Reporting 
Individual and Respondent in a case of sexual assault, and a request that the Department extend 
that statutory provision by requiring that institutions provide an advisor to students who did not 
have an advisor, the Department declined because “[a]bsent clear and unambiguous statutory 
authority, we would not impose such a burden on institutions.”293  
 
Unlike when interpreting the 2013 VAWA amendments to the Clery Act, there is not a 
single reference to an advisor of choice anywhere in the Title IX statute. While SUNY does not 
contest the wisdom of allowing students to have advisors of choice, and our campuses have since 
time immemorial chosen on their own accord and in concert with due process to allow advisors 
to be present in proceedings, at the students’ cost, we can find no statutory authority in Title IX 
for the Department to require them to be provided to students at no cost in regulations pursuant 
to Title IX. If a simple extension of a right guaranteed by the enacting federal law was, a mere 5 
                                                          
290 20 U.S.C. §1092(f)(8)(B)(iv)(II). 
291 VAWA Final Rule, at 62774. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. (Emphasis added). 
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years ago and immediately following passage of the enabling statute, considered to be outside of 
the Department’s “clear and unambiguous statutory authority,” then certainly a statute that 
completely lacks reference to advisors, attorneys or otherwise, participating or silent, and is 
being interpreted by the Department this way for the first time more than 45 years after 
enactment must even more clearly lack such authority. To put it plainly, the Department has 
already acknowledged it lacks clear and unambiguous authority when it arguably might have had 
such authority. Here, there is absolutely no authority, no evidence that providing or not providing 
advisors has a disparate impact based on gender, and such a requirement is therefore arbitrary 
and capricious under the law.  
 
The requirement that colleges and universities allow for cross-examination by an advisor 
of choice in sexual harassment cases under Title IX that are also within the definition of sexual 
assault as defined by the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act runs in contrast to the plain 
language of the rules and preamble promulgated pursuant to that law, just a few years ago. The 
Department responded to concerns that advisors of choice, interpreted by the Department to 
include attorneys, may interfere with the process and make the efficient investigation and 
adjudication of sexual assault (and related) cases more legalistic and take it further away from 
the educational model. The Department made several clear statements that institutions did not 
have to allow advisors—including attorney advisors—to participate in any way, shape, or form. 
“Institutions may restrict an advisor’s role, such as prohibiting the advisor from speaking during 
the proceeding, addressing the disciplinary tribunal, or questioning witnesses. An institution may 
remove or dismiss advisors who become disruptive or who do not abide by the restrictions on 
their participation.”294 Further, “Section 668.46(k)(2)(iv) allows an institution to establish 
restrictions on an advisor’s participation in a disciplinary proceeding. As stated earlier in the 
preamble, we believe that specifying what restrictions are appropriate or removing the ability of 
an institution to restrict an advisor’s participation would unnecessarily limit an institution’s 
flexibility to provide an equitable and appropriate disciplinary proceeding.”295  
 
The language of the VAWA regulations clearly allows colleges and universities to 
prohibit advisors, including attorneys, from participating in any way, including prohibiting them 
from conducting or participating in direct or cross examination. This language in the Final 
VAWA Rules would cover those sexual harassment cases that are also sexual assault. While this 
inconsistency does not impact most of K-12 or cases adjudicating verbal sexual harassment, it is 
certainly noteworthy for those cases of sexual assault disclosed, investigated and adjudicated in 
higher education under the Clery Act and Title IX. 
 
Further, as discussed already, there is no statutory authority under Title IX to support a 
requirement that institutions allow advisors, including attorneys, to participate in investigations 
and adjudications under Title IX. The Department could have—and did not—at least made an 
argument that the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act that required that parties be allowed to 
bring an advisor of choice with them to required or optional hearings and related meetings would 
likewise be effectuated if those advisors could participate. At least the Department in 2014 
would have been simply stretching clear statutory language, not creating regulatory requirements 
with no underlying statutory authority. We urge the Department to return to the conservative 
                                                          
294 VAWA Final Rule, at 62773. 
295 Id. at 62774. 
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principles of administrative law that limits regulations to the clear statutory authority under 
which they regulate. 
 
In the Proposed Regulations, the Department would also require that institutions provide 
advisors “aligned” with a student who does not have an advisor. The document does not define 
“aligned,” and we fear that this will lead to litigation to determine what is required to properly 
align. Further, it may be argued that the only way to truly “align” with a party is to develop a 
formal “alignment.” In litigation and administrative complaints to OCR, parties may argue that 
the only way to achieve this new regulatory requirement is through an attorney-client 
relationship with the student party, one that requires the advisor to zealously advocate296 for the 
client and allows the client to provide information to the advisor in a way that is privileged. At 
best, courts are likely to split on this question and various OCR Field Offices are likely to 
interpret it differently, with some overturning determinations of a college if an advisor was not 
considered aligned enough (due to the partial safe harbor in the Proposed Regulations, only 
determinations that OCR views as harming the Respondent in the due process section could lead 
to the determination being overturned; Determinations that are seen as harmful to the Reporting 
Individual alone would likely be subject to the partial safe harbor). While the harms of further 
legalizing the system are clear, this will also likely create inequity. Frankly, a creative student 
can find the other party accompanied by a parent or sibling, demand an advisor paid for by the 
college, receive an attorney, and have an advantage in cross-examination over the other party. 
This will create a second-mover advantage, and such gamesmanship should have no place in the 
Title IX and student conduct processes. If an advisor need not be an attorney, it will likewise 
potentially lead to inequity as parties would have advisors with different skills and competencies 
conducting cross-examination on their behalf. 
 
If the institution is forced to hire and compensate the student party, the advisor will have 
an incentive to create additional work for themselves, the institution and the other party, since 
that will be tied to their compensation. This will further delay and bog down formal proceedings, 
raising costs for institutions and students and delaying final determinations for both Reporting 
Individuals and Respondents. Finally, the cost of providing such advisors may be astronomical 
for institutions.  
 
Explaining Decisions to Exclude Evidence during the Hearing 
 
The Proposed Regulations impose an unusual burden on the fact-finder to “explain to the 
party’s advisor asking cross-examination questions any decision to exclude questions as not 
relevant.”297 The Department offers no jurisdictional basis for imposing this micro-level mandate 
on the hearing board, nor any statutory or judicial authority requiring administrative officials to 
put on the record, during a live hearing, why they have permitted or excluded a question as 
irrelevant. Presumably, a fact-finder excludes a question as being “not relevant” because it does 
not tend to prove the matter at issue.298 In other words, if it is not relevant, it is not relevant. The 
                                                          
296 See e.g. American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2018), available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct
/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_scope/. 
297 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61474. 
298 See, FRE Rule 401. 
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parties face no prejudice, much less prejudice of Constitutional proportions, where a fact-finder 
does not explain why a question is not relevant, because the answer is self-evident: the fact-
finder does not believe it has a tendency to answer the ultimate question at issue. Therefore, this 
provision promises much mischief, with no gain to truth-seeking. 
 
vii. §106.45(b)(3)(viii) - Inspect and review evidence upon which recipient 
does not intend to rely  
 
SUNY opposes the Department’s Proposed Regulations because this provision relies on 
technology that does not exist and forces institutions to share irrelevant information with 
Respondents that is both deeply private and irrelevant to the investigation being conducted by the 
institution. 
 
Access to Evidence that is Not Relevant 
 
Proposed section 106.45(b)(3)(viii) requires that the recipient must “[p]rovide both 
parties an equal opportunity to inspect and review evidence obtained as part of the investigation 
that is directly related to the allegations raised in a formal complaint, including the evidence 
upon which the recipient does not intend to rely in reaching a determination regarding 
responsibility, so that each party can meaningfully respond to the evidence prior to the 
conclusion of the investigation.”299  
 
In addition to requiring recipients to provide this information electronically, through an 
undisclosed and likely technologically unfeasible “file sharing platform” that prevents a party 
from copying, downloading, or ostensibly using their smartphone to photograph the screen, the 
Proposed Regulations require that this evidence be again provided “at any hearing” and for 
purposes of cross-examination. 
 
In explaining this section of the Proposed Regulations, the Department has used 
justifications that include, “these requirements will facilitate each party’s ability to identify 
evidence that supports their position and emphasize such evidence in their arguments to the 
decision-maker.”300 However, this statement is conclusory, unworkable, and conflicts with New 
York State law. 
 
Section 6444 of New York Education Law states that “[t]hroughout proceedings 
involving such an accusation of sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, stalking, or 
sexual activity that may otherwise violate the institution’s code of conduct, [every student has] 
the right”:***“[t]o review and present available evidence in the case file, or otherwise in the 
possession or control of the institution, and relevant to the conduct case, consistent with 
institution policies and procedures.”301 There could be a situation where there are points that are 
conceded factually, such as that both parties agreed that there was sexual intercourse, and the 
question hinges upon affirmative consent. The Reporting Individual could have had a forensic 
examination conducted. The forensic exam includes copious amounts of confidential information 
                                                          
299 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61498. 
300 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61476. 
301 N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6444(5)(c)(v). 
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that is not relevant to the underlying question of whether there was affirmative consent, such as 
whether the Reporting Individual has another medical condition or other trauma that would not 
be relevant to the current question. 
 
Likewise, it is possible that information about a Reporting Individual’s mental health 
history could be disclosed to the Respondent, in direct violation of New York State law.302 There 
would be no gain in providing the Respondent access to this information that is not considered 
“relevant” since the occurrence of sexual intercourse is conceded by both parties and would 
cause significant harm to the Reporting Individual. With the way the regulation is drafted, it 
would mandate sharing this information, and would cause significant harm potentially to both 
Respondent and Reporting Individual, depending upon the type of information that is collected 
during the course of the investigation.  
 
But remember that it is not just Reporting Individuals who should fear overexposure of 
deeply private information that is irrelevant to the determination. Respondents should be 
concerned as well. The nature of such investigations is that some witnesses will provide 
extraordinary amounts of information about Respondents, some of which is positive and some of 
which is negative. Past bad acts, not relevant to the question of violation here, are often 
discussed. The Respondent may seek to prove some positive point academically and in doing so, 
turn over their transcript. Relevant to the question of affirmative consent? Clearly not. Covered 
under this requirement that all evidence is provided? Likely so. Evidence might include the 
Respondent’s other disciplinary records, their own medical records, mental health history, or past 
sexual history, and other information that may be in the file, but is not relevant to the underlying 
question of responsibility (and indeed may be protected from disclosure by New York State law). 
In its effort to protect Respondents by creating a regime where a Reporting Individual’s life is 
laid bare before the Respondent and their advisor or attorney, regardless of relevance to the 
underlying matter, the Department is likewise creating a regime that may dissuade Respondents 
from participating or being forthcoming, knowing that any information they provide, even if 
irrelevant, even if more prejudicial than probative, even if completely detached from any matter 
being considered in the conduct process, will be provided to the Reporting Individual and their 
advisor or attorney.  
 
Due to both the potential legal conflict with New York State Education Law Article 129-
B, the unworkable aspects the Department requires, and the ramifications it would have on 
individuals involved in campus conduct processes, SUNY requests the Proposed Regulations be 
withdrawn. 
 
viii. §106.45(b)(3)(ix) - Investigative report must be created 
 
SUNY opposes this section of the Department’s Proposed Regulations because of the 
onerous and burdensome requirements the investigative report as outlined would put on 
recipients and the ambiguity some of the language in this section creates. 
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Investigative Report Requirement is Onerous and Burdensome on Recipients 
 
Section 106.45(b)(3)(ix) of the Proposed Regulations requires recipients to generate an 
“investigative report that fairly summarizes relevant evidence” and provide that report to the 
parties for their “review and response” at least ten days before the hearing.303 Even as the 
Proposed Regulations effectively eliminate the “single investigator” model, it now imposes an 
investigative report requirement that is administratively burdensome, impractical, and has limited 
benefit as a truth-seeking technology. 
 
To our knowledge, many college campuses generally do not create a single report prior to 
the evidentiary hearing. Drafting such a report is time-consuming and requires the singular 
attention of investigative staff, which is an unreasonable expense at many of our smaller 
campuses. There is little corresponding benefit in truth-seeking to creating a comprehensive 
report so far in advance of the hearing, moreover, because the very purpose of the hearing is to 
try the evidence. The parties already are guaranteed the right to examine the evidentiary file prior 
to the hearing under New York State Education Law Article 129-B; it goes beyond any due 
process requirement we are aware of to have this information synthesized into a summary report 
ten days before the hearing. 
 
We also note that this requirement imposes a shadow cost in terms of the need for a 
responsive report to the parties’ “review and response.” Presumably, the Proposed Regulations 
cannot be satisfied unless the recipient amends its “investigative report” in light of the 
“response” to “fairly summarize[ ] relevant evidence.” How these revisions must occur, and 
according to what standard, are undefined, as are the practical and legal consequences of a 
failure to respond, or failure to “fairly” respond, to the parties’ objections. Errors in such a 
revision, we assume, could be appealed by Respondents to OCR seeking to have a responsibility 
determination overturned. Errors that inappropriately led to a finding of responsibility, if 
appealed by the Reporting Individual, would likely not be reviewed by OCR under the partial 
safe harbor provision of these Proposed Regulations. 
 
ix. §106.45(b)(5) - Appeals 
 
SUNY opposes this section of the Department’s Proposed Regulations because of the 
inequity it would create in appeals of findings, and the confusion this section causes due to the 
Department including some measures that would not historically be included in an appeal. 
 
The Proposed Regulations Create Inequity in Appeals of Findings 
 
In terms of its requirements for appeal, even as the Department calls for campuses to 
“[t]reat complainants and Respondents equitably” as a “basic requirement,”304 the Proposed 
Regulations are not equitable between a Reporting Individual and Respondent. While a 
Respondent may appeal and seek to overturn both the underlying finding and the sanction, the 
Department limits the appeal rights of the Reporting Individual. An earlier leaked version of the 
Proposed Regulations would have allowed institutions to offer appeals either to Respondent only 
                                                          
303 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61498. 
304 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61497. 
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or to Respondent and Reporting Individual. The Violence Against Women Act amendments to 
the Clery Act305 and New York State Education Law 129-B306 both require that appeals be 
offered to both parties.  
 
In the time prior to finalizing the Proposed Regulations, the Department changed the 
language to require that appeals be offered to both parties,307 but then undercut the value of the 
Reporting Individual’s appeal, writing that in “cases where there has been a finding of 
responsibility, although a complainant may appeal on the ground that the remedies are not 
designed to restore or preserve the complainant’s access to the recipient’s education program or 
activity, a complainant is not entitled to a particular sanction against the Respondent.”308 But the 
appeal of a student conduct finding is simply not the place to even ask for changes to remedies 
other than the sanction levied against a person found responsible. It is not the place to appeal and 
ask for academic accommodations, mental health counseling, or medical assistance. That is 
through a separate process that, frankly, need not even involve the other party to a conduct 
proceeding. By placing this limitation, not only does it invasively govern the processes of 
institutions, but it makes such a “right” of appeal a right in name only as the one thing a 
Reporting Individual would seek in a student conduct appeal would be barred by federal 
regulation. This is an overstep and creates inconsistency and inequity in the process. 
 
D. Directed Questions 
 
Section D provides SUNY’s responses to certain directed questions as put forth by the 
Department in the Preamble. Subsection (i) relates to question 1 (applicability to elementary and 
secondary schools), subsection (ii) relates to question 2 (applicability of provisions based on type 
of recipient or age of parties), subsection (iii) relates to question 3 (applicability of the rule to 
employees), subsection (iv) relates to question 4 (training), subsection (v) relates to question 6 
(standard of evidence), subsection (vi) relates to question 7 (potential clarification regarding 
“directly related to the allegations” language), and subsection (vii) relates to question 8 
(appropriate time period for record retention). 
 
i. (Question 1) Applicability to elementary and secondary schools 
 
As we indicated in our response to Proposed Regulations §106.45(b)(3)(vi) and (vii), 
SUNY does not believe that a bright-line division between institutions of higher education and 
primary and secondary schools is workable or appropriate, as modern education does not 
necessarily match the neat lines and standardized approaches of yesteryear. These educational 
environments overlap, with programs that include dual enrollment, summer and intersession 
college learning, high school laboratory schools on college campuses, colleges operating K-12 
charter schools, and situations as simple as high school students who enroll in college classes.  
 
Further, colleges regularly return their students to elementary and secondary schools as 
student teachers and related experience based learning assignments. Attempting to create two 
                                                          
305 See generally, VAWA Final Rule, at 62752. 
306 N.Y. EDUC. L. Art. 129-B. 
307 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61478. 
308 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61478. 
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sets of processes along this line will create enormous confusion where students cannot identify 
which system and surrounding rights apply to their case. Such confusion, as we indicate in our 
response, above, will further depress reporting and disclosure among students in dual enrollment 
and other programs where the lines between high school and college are simply not as clear cut 
as these Proposed Regulations would imagine. We urge the Department to follow longstanding 
practice (including the 2001 Notice and Comment Dear Colleague Letter, and the 2011, 2014, 
2015, and 2017 Dear Colleague Letters) and set uniform, high-level, standards equally applicable 
to elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education institutions and systems. 
 
While we appreciate the Secretary’s effort to gather information on this topic, we note 
that the Department has offered no evidence in the Preamble that the developmental level of the 
parties or systematic differences between the K-12 and higher education settings merit different 
standards of procedure when addressing sexual harassment. As we indicate in our response to the 
second Direct Question, absent such a showing, there is no legal basis for the Department to add 
more due process protections in the higher education setting, which is voluntary, than in the K-
12 setting, which is compulsory and a recognized property right. 
 
Elementary and secondary education is compulsory. It is a right guaranteed by federal 
law and state law in every jurisdiction in the United States. A young person of eligible age may 
seek public education in their jurisdiction as a right. Higher education is not a right under federal 
or state law. While some colleges are “open admission” offering admission to all qualified 
students, that still is not a legal requirement and those institutions may place academic and 
behavioral limitations on whom they admit. Colleges have First Amendment rights to determine, 
among other things, “who may be admitted to study.”309 
 
It is clear that the property rights that accumulate in K-12 are greater than the property 
rights that accumulate in higher education as the K-12 rights are guaranteed by law. 
Concomitantly, any due process obligations imposed (if there were authority in the law to 
impose them) should be equal or greater in the compulsory K-12 sphere than in higher education 
since the deprivation would be of a right guaranteed in law. Yet these Proposed Regulations 
invert the levels of due process requiring significantly more process before a deprivation of the 
lower property rights (or quasi-property rights) that arguably apply in higher education than the 
property rights that clearly apply in the compulsory K-12. 
 
ii. (Question 2) Applicability of provisions based on type of recipient or 
age of parties 
 
The Secretary further requests comment on whether its Proposed Regulations, including 
the “safe harbor” of §106.44(b) and the provision regarding written questions and cross-
examination of §106.45(b)(3)(vi) and (vii), should differentiate on the basis of whether the 
parties are age 18 or over, “in recognition of the fact that 18-year-olds are generally considered 
to be adults for many legal purposes.”310 
 
                                                          
309 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter, J, concurring). 
310 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61483. 
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Just as we can find no evidence offered in the Preamble for drawing a bright line between 
K-12 and higher education, we do not see a showing that the due process rights afforded to a 17-
year-old first-year college student should be different than those provided to an 18-year-old first 
year college student or an 18-year-old high school student. Nor do we see any evidence that the 
bright line is drawn to address and redress sex discrimination in education. The Department 
offers no evidence that an 18-year-old first-year college student will absorb less trauma from 
cross-examination than a 17-year-old peer or that these differences are exacerbated based on sex. 
 
This appears to be an arbitrary line drawn between high school seniors and college 
freshmen, based on an outdated and inaccurate assumption of the age and competency of all K-
12 and college students, without any evidence offered. The Department devotes a mere 59 
words—four of which are “may” or “most” indicating likelihood, but not certainty—to support a 
distinction that will have significant impact on millions of K-12, college, and mixed jurisdiction 
Reporting Individuals and Respondents.311 
 
 Respectfully, even if the Department has the authority under the plain language of Title 
IX to draw such narrow and detailed distinctions, Mathews v. Eldridge312 and its progeny would 
require far more analysis before drawing hard line conclusions of the appropriate balance of due 
process during various processes. 
 
iii. (Question 3) Applicability of the rule to employees 
 
The Department’s Proposed Regulations Significantly Interfere with New York State Law, 
New York City Law, and the State Collective Bargaining Agreements 
 
The Secretary further requests comment on whether its Proposed Regulations would 
prove unworkable in relation to employees. With this SUNY responds as follows: 
 
a. The Proposed Regulations Interaction with Due Process Required by New York Civil 
Service Law and/or Collective Bargaining Agreements  
 
Taken together, SUNY employees constitute the largest segment of New York State 
government employees. As a public employer, SUNY is required to comply with the State’s 
Civil Service Laws and/or collective bargaining agreements (CBA) with various divisions of its 
predominantly unionized employees. The Civil Service Law and applicable CBAs cover various 
subjects such as employee pay, working conditions, and disciplinary measures for misconduct. 
Such disciplinary measures include specific due process rights afforded to the represented 
employees including, without limitation, the ability to file grievances and the right to seek 
binding arbitration for all disciplinary-related reasons with an independent arbitrator. The due 
process requirements imposed by law and/or by CBA are largely inconsistent with the 
Department’s Proposed Regulations. 
 
As a practical matter, collective bargaining negotiations in New York take place on a 
statewide level at approximate six-year intervals. Put simply, SUNY’s compliance with the 
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Proposed Regulations as written would require significant and substantial changes to most, if not 
all, of its CBAs. While SUNY takes its compliance requirements seriously, the unions may not 
want to open up their current agreements, would have no incentive to do so, and certainly would 
be required to change policies and procedures that are already handled in their CBAs. Further, 
some unions bargain statewide, not with SUNY, and would have even less incentive to make 
changes to help one employer, especially if they may not be positive for some or all of their 
members. Therefore, SUNY requests that the Department withdraw the Proposed Regulations or, 
in the alternative, make clear the Proposed Regulations do not abrogate the rights and procedures 
afforded to employees by law or by applicable CBAs. 
 
b. Inconsistencies with Applicable State and Municipal Employment Discrimination Laws  
 
SUNY respectfully notes that the proposed Regulations are inconsistent with New York 
State’s related employment laws. For example, New York adopted a law that became effective 
on October 9, 2018 requiring that all New York employers—including colleges and 
universities—adopt a sexual harassment policy that, inter alia: prohibits sexual harassment; 
provides a complaint process that allows for due process by all parties; makes clear any such 
harassment is employee misconduct; informs employees of their rights; provides training to all 
employees on an annual basis; and, prohibits retaliation against any individual that participates in 
the reporting and/or investigation process.313 
 
On August 23, 2018, Governor Andrew Cuomo issued an executive order to ensure 
diversity and inclusion and to combat harassment and discrimination, including sex-based 
discrimination at all levels of state government.314 
 
Similarly, in May 2018, New York City enacted a package of legislation to combat 
workplace sexual harassment. The package consisted of 11 bills that will mandate anti-sexual 
harassment training in the public and private sectors; make information about sexual harassment 
available so more New Yorkers know their rights; require sexual harassment data reporting from 
city agencies; and expand sexual harassment protections under the New York City Human 
Rights Law (NYCHRL).315 Under the NYCHRL, sexual harassment is a form of gender-based 
discrimination that is defined as “unwelcome verbal or physical behavior based upon a person’s 
gender.” This definition differs significantly from the definition of sexual harassment in the 
Proposed Regulations.316 
 
Thus, the Proposed Regulations not only conflict with state and local government laws 
generally but also infringe on said bodies police powers to manage its own affairs with regard to 
employee conduct and investigating discrimination.  
 
 
 
                                                          
313 N.Y. LAB. L. § 201-g (2018). 
314 N.Y. EXEC. ORDER NO. 187 (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO187.pdf.  
315 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101 to 8-703.  
316 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61496. 
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c. The Proposed Regulations Interplay with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 
As noted by the Department, a college or university employee may have rights against its 
higher education employee under Title IX and also Title VII for sex-based discrimination. 
Section 106.6(f) of the Proposed Regulations attempts to address this possible conflict by noting 
that nothing in the Proposed Regulations shall be read as derogation of an employee’s rights 
under Title VII or any regulations promulgated thereunder. However, it fails to address how an 
employer should proceed when such a conflict arises between the two laws as interpreted. For 
example, as with any civil case, Title VII discrimination claims generally utilize a preponderance 
of the evidence standard. However, the Proposed Regulations indicate that an institution may 
choose between the preponderance of the evidence standard and the clear and convincing 
standard. This conflict creates an undue burden on institutions to manage standards of evidence 
both in its own internal proceedings but also if the employee seeks external review by OCR or 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). As such, SUNY respectfully objects 
to the ambiguity caused by the overly prescriptive nature of the Proposed Regulations. 
 
In sum, due to the impact the Proposed Regulations will have on New York State 
collective bargaining agreements, multiple areas of New York State and New York City law, and 
the ambiguity caused by its inherent overlap with Title VII, SUNY believes the Proposed 
Regulations should be withdrawn. 
 
iv. (Question 4) Training 
 
As we indicated in the introduction, we strongly support the Department’s requirement 
that cases be investigated and adjudicated by those sufficiently trained in important concepts 
central to these investigations, including an emphasis on the neutral role of institutions, and using 
educational materials that are not based on sex stereotypes. The 2013 VAWA Amendments to 
the Clery Act and New York State Education Law Article 129-B similarly require 
comprehensive training and the State University of New York has committed itself to developing 
and promulgating training materials to help its campuses, and fellow educational institutions, 
continuously improve their response to, and prevention of, sexual harassment and sexual assault. 
SUNY System Administration and the SUNY Student Conduct Institute317 leadership and staff 
have hosted hundreds of live and digital trainings over the last decade. Our campuses have 
hosted thousands. We recognize that, as with any offering of due process and fair process before 
a government action, the level of training and preparation is not uniform at all institutions across 
the country. We hear and support the continued call of the Department to raise the capacity of 
professionals at the higher education and K-12 levels, and SUNY will continue to develop 
training materials and resources that can be accessed at no cost or very low cost to help fellow 
institutions meet this need. We urge the Department to conform the training requirements to 
                                                          
317 The SUNY Student Conduct Institute (SUNYSCI) is a joint Project of the SUNY Student Conduct Association 
(SUNYSCA), SUNY Title IX Coordinators Association (STIXCA), and Office of General Counsel. It provides in-
depth live and digital training to student conduct officials, hearing officers, Title IX officials and other college 
personnel in due process, trauma-informed investigations and adjudications, questioning and weighing of evidence, 
and other crucial best practices in the investigation and conduct process that comply with relevant case law, Title IX 
guidance, the Clery Act, and New York State Education Law 129-B. Material for training is created with a careful 
emphasis on case law, statutory requirements, best practices, and eschewing sex stereotypes. As of the date of this 
letter, the Institute had trained well over 600 people in its first half-year of operation. https://system.suny.edu/sci/.  
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those published in the Final Rules implementing the VAWA amendments to the Clery Act to 
avoid confusion and differing requirements. 
 
The mandated training required of Title IX coordinators, investigators, and decision-
makers is not comprehensive of the categories mandated under VAWA, and therefore presents a 
conflict of federal law. In particular, the training mandates under the Proposed Regulations 
would not require these officials to receive training that “protects the safety of victims and 
promotes accountability,” a phrase that is victim-centered and designed to ensure that institutions 
are accountable to those harmed by sexual violence. Further, VAWA does not reference sex 
stereotypes, which the University tries not to use in trainings, but which the Second Circuit 
recently opined do not reflect gender bias.318 In practice, these officials will likely receive 
training in VAWA and Title IX requirements, as well as Education Law Article 129-B if they 
serve New York institutions, but any differences may cause needless confusion and disserve the 
interests of all stakeholders to a fair process. 
 
In considering training, while we applaud the Department’s requirements for training 
those that work on the formal grievance process and urge the Final Regulations to conform with 
current analogous requirements, we would note that the Proposed Regulations are devoid of any 
training requirements or professional expectations for staff that work on an informal process. 
While SUNY does not use an informal process to address cases of sexual assault (we may use 
informal processes in certain harassment cases, depending upon the nature of the conduct and 
other factors) we acknowledge that some institutions may choose to do so based upon the 
imprimatur of the Department, and we urge the Department to set minimum standards for 
training in that area as well, so that students are served by individuals with the highest level of 
training, regardless of whether they go through a formal or informal process. 
 
v. (Question 6) Standard of evidence 
 
SUNY respectfully requests that the Department consider reversing course on the 
standard of evidence. Currently, there are no bounds on using preponderance of the evidence 
rather than clear and convincing evidence.319 Congressional intent of the 2013 VAWA 
                                                          
318 Doe v. Colgate Univ., 2019 WL 190515, at *9 (N.D.N.Y., Jan. 15, 2019) (Summary Order) (“John Doe contends 
that Rugg, the Title IX Coordinator, introduced gender bias into the EGP process. Rugg trained EGP staff, and in 
2014, she attended a training session for investigating campus sexual misconduct. Rugg’s notes from the session 
indicate that investigators should refer to the complainant as a ‘complainant’ when talking to a respondent, but as the 
‘victim’ or ‘survivor’ when talking to a complainant. Moreover, in her own training presentations, Rugg would 
sometimes refer to complainants using female pronouns and respondents with male pronouns because in her 
experience, most complainants were female and most respondents were male. This is insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that John Doe was expelled based on gender bias. There is no indication that Rugg’s use of such 
pronouns reflects anything more than the statistical reality that most respondents are men and most complainants are 
women, nor that calling complainants of any gender ‘victims’ or ‘survivors’ when speaking to them reflects gender 
bias, rather than a desire to be sensitive.”). 
319 A single District Court Judge in New Mexico ruled, without any explanation or citations at all, that 
“preponderance of the evidence is not the proper standard for disciplinary investigations such as the one that led to 
Lee’s expulsion, given the significant consequences” of a transcript notation. Lee v. The University of New Mexico, 
1:17-cv-01230-JB-LF, *3 (D. N.M. Sep. 20, 2018). No other court that we can find has similarly ruled and there is 
no explanation for this ruling in the opinion. 
78
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 14 [2019], Art. 44
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/44
   
 
Page 79 of 82 
 
amendments to the Clery Act and implementation of the Final Rule through a Negotiated 
Rulemaking process demonstrates that this issue was well thought out in 2014 and, as such, the 
Department should not reverse course due to the harm it would cause Reporting Individuals, 
Respondents and institutions in attempting to implement something counter to what has already 
been implemented and in place for years. 
 
In its Final Rules implementing the Violence Against Women Act amendments to the 
Clery Act, the Department allowed institutions to select equally, without emphasis on one 
standard over the other or challenges to implementing the institution’s chosen standard. The 
Department received comments asking that it require the “’clear and convincing’ standard of 
evidence...because this standard better safeguards due process.”320 But the Department 
demurred, writing that an institution “can comply with both Title IX and the Clery Act by using a 
preponderance of the evidence standard in disciplinary proceedings.”321 
 
These instant Proposed Regulations contain a clear reversal of previous policy without 
any explanation from the Department other than the fact that campus conduct processes are not 
the same as civil litigation.322 The Department has never contended before now that campus 
conduct processes must hold the same level of “process” as a lawsuit in federal court, and it is 
clear that was never Congress’ intent based on much of the commentary in the 2013 VAWA 
Final Rules. For the foregoing reasons, SUNY respectfully requests that the Department does not 
reverse course on this standard. 
 
vi. (Question 7) Potential clarification regarding “directly related to the 
allegations” language 
 
Proposed section 106.45(b)(3)(viii) requires that the recipient “[p]rovide both parties an 
equal opportunity to inspect and review evidence obtained as part of the investigation that is 
directly related to the allegations raised in a formal complaint, including the evidence upon 
which the recipient does not intend to rely in reaching a determination regarding responsibility, 
so that each party can meaningfully respond to the evidence prior to the conclusion of the 
investigation.” 
 
In addition to requiring recipients to provide this information electronically, through an 
undisclosed and likely technologically unfeasible “file sharing platform” that somehow 
completely prevents a party from downloading the documents apparently including using their 
smartphone to photographing the screen, the Proposed Regulations require that this evidence be 
again provided “at any hearing” and for purposes of cross-examination. 
 
In explaining this section of the Proposed Regulations, the Department has used 
justifications that include, “these requirements will facilitate each party’s ability to identify 
evidence that supports their position and emphasize such evidence in their arguments to the 
                                                          
320 VAWA Final Rule, at 62772. 
321 Id. 
322 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61477. 
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decision-maker.”323 However, this statement is conclusory, unworkable, conflicts with New 
York State law, and makes no assertion that it is intended to address gender-based inequality. 
 
Section 6444 of New York Education Law states that “[t]hroughout proceedings 
involving such an accusation of sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, stalking, or 
sexual activity that may otherwise violate the institution’s code of conduct, [every student has] 
the right”:***“[t]o review and present available evidence in the case file, or otherwise in the 
possession or control of the institution, and relevant to the conduct case, consistent with 
institution policies and procedures.”324 There could be a situation where there are points that are 
conceded factually, such as that both parties agreed that there was sexual intercourse, and the 
question hinges upon affirmative consent. The Reporting Individual could have had a forensic 
examination conducted. The forensic exam includes copious amounts of confidential information 
that is not relevant to the underlying question of whether there was affirmative consent, such as 
whether the Reporting Individual has another medical condition or other trauma that would not 
be relevant to the current question.  
 
Likewise, it is possible that information about a Reporting Individual’s mental health 
history could be disclosed to the Respondent, in direct violation of New York State law.325 There 
would be no gain in providing the Respondent access to this information that is not considered 
“relevant” since the occurrence of sexual intercourse is conceded by both parties and would 
cause significant harm to the Reporting Individual. With the way the regulation is drafted, it 
would mandate sharing this information, and would cause significant harm potentially to both 
Respondent and Reporting Individual, depending upon the type of information that is collected 
during the course of the investigation. 
 
But remember that it isn’t just Reporting Individuals who should fear overexposure of 
deeply private information that is irrelevant to the determination. Respondents should be 
concerned as well. The nature of such investigations is that some witnesses will provide 
extraordinary amounts of positive and negative information about Respondents. Past bad acts, 
not relevant to the question of violation here, are often discussed. The Respondent may seek to 
prove some positive point academically and in doing so, turn over their transcript. Relevant to 
the question of affirmative consent? Clearly not. Covered under this requirement that all 
evidence is provided? Likely so. Evidence might include the Respondent’s other disciplinary 
record, their own mental health history or past sexual history, and other information that may be 
in the record, but is not relevant to the underlying question of responsibility (and indeed may be 
protected from disclosure by New York State law). In its effort to protect Respondents by 
creating a regime where a Reporting Individual’s life is laid bare before the Respondent and their 
advisor or attorney, regardless of relevance to the underlying matter, the Department is likewise 
creating a regime that may dissuade Respondents from participating or being forthcoming, 
knowing that any information they provide, even if irrelevant, even if more prejudicial than 
probative, even if completely detached from any matter being considered in the conduct process, 
will be provided to the Reporting Individual and their advisor or attorney. 
 
                                                          
323 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61476. 
324 N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6444(5)(c)(v). 
325 N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6444(5)(c)(vi). 
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Section 106.45(b)(3)(viii) of the Proposed Regulations is not clear enough, and there are 
too many situations in which it could compromise privacy for both Reporting Individuals and 
Respondents alike. SUNY respectfully disagrees that this section, as written, complies with the 
intentions in FERPA that the Department has pointed to as justification for this language,326 and 
requests the Department does not include this language. 
 
vii. (Question 8) Appropriate time period for record retention 
 
The Department proposes in section 106.45(b)(7) of the Proposed Regulations “that a 
recipient must create, make available to the complainant and Respondent, and maintain records 
for a period of three years.”327 This time period is shorter than what is currently required by New 
York State law, where section 6444(5)(b)(2) of the Education Law states that every student at an 
institution shall have the right to have their records preserved for no less than five years.328 New 
York’s law goes beyond the record retention period that the Department has proposed, and as 
such, SUNY would have to comply with New York State’s five year record retention period. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
SUNY and its campuses care deeply about preventing and responding to harassment and 
assault in a way that makes education as accessible as possible, treats crimes and violations 
seriously, and offers all due process required under the Constitution, statute, and case law prior 
to assigning a sanction to a person found responsible for a violation. The University has had the 
honor of supporting balanced approaches to violence reduction in the past. We sent a Negotiator 
to the 2008 Negotiated Rulemaking to implement President Bush’s Higher Education 
Opportunity Act (HEOA). We worked with our bi-partisan delegation and advised Negotiators 
when the Department implemented President Obama’s Violence Against Women Act 
amendments to the Clery Act. We have advised House and Senate members and staff of both 
parties, inside and outside New York, on changes to the Higher Education Act, and other pieces 
of legislation. In New York State, we proudly worked with Governor Cuomo and a bi-partisan 
legislature that passed Education Law Article 129-B all but unanimously. 
 
These laws were balanced. Balance gives legislation staying power. In New York, nearly 
half of Education Law Article 129-B, the longest and most comprehensive state law on point to 
date, is devoted to due process and fair process. That is a critical part of the approach. 
Institutions must always try to “get it right” when it comes to sanctioning a student. But the law 
is balanced. It also includes provisions on consent, amnesty for Reporting Individuals and 
Bystanders disclosing violence at a time they were using drugs or alcohol, clear language around 
confidentiality, mandatory biennial climate surveys to understand the state of the issue, and clear 
language around available resources for all parties. Such a balanced approach has been lauded in 
New York and looked to elsewhere. 
 
A balanced approach helps a policy change stand the test of time. No one is calling for 
drastic changes to the HEOA, to the VAWA Amendments to the Clery Act, or to the Negotiated 
                                                          
326 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(A)(1). 
327 Title IX Proposed Regulations, at 61843. 
328 N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6444(5)(b)(2). 
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Regulations issued by the Department under that law. Here in New York, no one is calling for 
repeal of Education Law Article 129-B. These laws balance very important interests, and were 
passed as a result of significant input from multiple parties, beyond just those who speak loudest. 
It is likely that they will be on the books well beyond the retirement date of everyone who 
worked on this letter.  
 
The approach taken by the Department in these Proposed Regulations is not balanced. A 
future administration of another party would quickly look to change the provisions, and 
uncertainty about rights and responsibilities would continue. But that is not the only path 
forward. We urge the Department to re-open consideration of these rules and issue new Proposed 
Regulations that balance the rights of the accused with the rights of students exposed to 
harassment and violence to access K-12 and higher education. This is a moment where the entire 
country is considering issues of harassment in employment and education, athletics, the private 
sector, and government. The Department has an opportunity to lead a national conversation 
about a balanced approach to harassment and violence in education; to align with laws, both 
federally and in states; and to establish an approach that future administrations leave undisturbed 
because, even if not perfect, it is fair, balanced, and flexible to all different institutions to respond 
in appropriate ways. We hope the Department takes advantage of this opportunity, and if the 
leaders, faculty, staff, and students of the State University of New York can help the Department 
achieve this lasting balance, please do not hesitate to call upon us. 
 
Respectfully, 
 
 
Kristina M. Johnson, PhD 
Chancellor 
The State University of New York 
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